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This chapter provides a discussion of the problem
addressed by the study and its importance. It highlights
the study's expected contribution and limitations. An
outline of the chapters which form part of the study is
also included.
1.2	 DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM
Recently there has been some renewed interest in exploring
whether stock market returns are predictable or not [Yong
(1987), Fama and French (1988); Lo and MacKinlay (1988);
Fuller and Kling (1990); Heaney (1990); Jegadeesh (1990);
Schwert (1990); Sy (1990)]. The issue is investigated
within the framework of the Efficient Market Hypothesis
(EMH). According to Fama (1976) the theory of the EMH of
financial markets holds that the security prices tend to
fluctuate randomly around their intrinsic values, return
quickly towards equilibrium, and fully reflect the latest
information available. This means that in such markets
investment strategies based on past information cannot
consistently earn positive abnormal returns over extended
periods of time.
Following Fama (1970), the EMH is categorised into three
1major levels depending on the type of information assumed
to be used by the market in setting prices. These are:
(i) Weak-form efficiency:
The weak-form of the EMH states that the sequence of past
price returns contains no information about future
price returns. Successive price returns are random
and no trading strategies based on a study of past
prices can yield abnormal returns.
(ii) Semi-strong form efficiency:
The semi-strong form of the EMH states that the
security prices fully reflect all available public
information. Under the semi-strong form of the EMH no
trading strategies based upon the release of any
publicly available information, for example,
accounting earnings, will enable an investor to generate
abnormal returns except by chance. The basic conclusion
being that, if the market is semi-strong efficient, then
it will instantaneously impound all information as it
becomes publicly available into security prices.
(iii) Strong-form efficiency:
The strong-form of the EMH states that the security
prices reflects all the information available both
public	 and private at each point in time.	 The
2consequence of it is that no investor, even where such
investor has inside information, may be able to
device trading strategies based on such information to
consistently earn abnormal returns.
The levels of efficiency are nested.	 Strong-form
efficiency implies semi-strong form efficiency, and
semi-strong efficiency in turn implies weak-form market
efficiency.
The concept of efficient securities markets has
gained prominence in both the academic and business world
of today. The concept is now supported by empirical
evidence from many of the world's markets. Today, it is
not only widely accepted by academicians but it also
permeates investment practice and Government policy
towards the security markets [Brealey and Myers (1984,
p.281)]. Fundamentally, the role of an efficient stock
market has been expounded by Stiglitz (1981). As he points
out:
"There is a general consensus that when financial
markets are very competitive and efficient, prices
quickly reflect all the available information.
There is also a widespread belief that
competitive and efficient markets enable the
efficient allocation of scarce capital among
alternative investment opportunities" (p.235).
3The role of the capital market expounded by Stiglitz is
consistent with Fama (1970), who specifies:
"The primary role of the capital market is
allocation of ownership of the economy's capital
stock. In general terms, the ideal is a market in
which prices provide accurate signals for resource
allocation: that is, a market in which firms can
make production-investment decisions, and investors
can choose among the securities that represents
ownership of firm's activities under the assumption
that security prices at any time "fully reflect"
all available information" (p.383).
There is consensus among academicians that capital markets
in developed countries, for example, USA, Britain and
Japan, nearly achieve these objectives because they are
efficient at operation and information levels. This is
supported by a tremendous amount of research evidence
[Ross and Westerfield (1988); Stiglitz (1981); Fama
(1970)].
The consensus seems to break down when the debate is
extended to stock markets of developing countries. There
are those who believe that these markets are not efficient
because of their operating characteristics and the nature
of the investors [Drake (1977, 1985); Samuels (1981);
Kitchen (1986)]. At the operational level the markets are
argued to be inefficient because of:
4- small size, resulting in them being "thin" with an
inadequate number of traders to ensure competition
and insufficient securities to enable them to hold
diversified portfolios of their choosing.
- inadequate market regulation and standards of
disclosure by companies
- poor communications so that some investors have
an advantage over others.
- significant costs	 of	 obtaining	 investment
information.
- a lack of competent analysts and professional
advisers, resulting in differing expectations about the
performance of securities.
- significant transactions costs which may deter
small investors, thereby limiting the number of
market participants and restricting the market to
infrequent large bargains.
At the investor level it is argued that most of them are
naive and cannot correctly interpret the information they
receive [Samuels (1981)]. Most of the investors are also
said to take the view that the market is inefficient and
therefore an unreliable price setter, i.e. the prices
5shown do not reflect fundamental values. [Developing
countries denote countries of Africa (except South
Africa), the Middle East, Asia (except Japan, Australia,
and New Zealand), and Latin America [Root (1984, p.366)].
In this study the term will be used in the context of only
those countries that have stock markets].
It is difficult to test for operating efficiency although
one may look at features which seem to support its
existence. Evidence from tests of the EMH is used to infer
on the level of technical organisation and operating
efficiency. Beaver (1981, p.168) argues that there is no
direct or simple relationship between the "greater" market
efficiency and "improved" allocation of resources. Hence,
a distinction must be made between operating efficiency
and the EMH. They are distinct concepts and the
relationship between them has not been rigorously derived.
An efficient market does not imply that investors will
necessarily perceive it to be efficient. There may be
widespread perception of market inefficiency even though
the security prices fully reflect published information.
Keane (1983) holds the view that reasons given for
inefficiency are merely speculative opinions and that the
issues can only be addressed empirically. In the finance
literature, efficiency refers to efficiency with respect
to information. A market is efficient with respect to a
particular set of information. A market where prices
quickly	 reflect	 all available information	 is
efficient. The Efficient	 Markets Hypothesis (EMH)
6maintains that the total market is quite sophisticated
in the way it digests all available information and
arrives at equilibrium security prices.
If one agrees with the view that the stock markets are at
present one of the best barometers for indicating changes
in economic activity then we may expect, other things held
constant, that the imperfections in the economy will be
reflected by imperfections in the stock markets. The stock
market will not respond in an instantaneous and unbiased
manner to changes in economic activity [Joutz (1988)].
Price returns in an efficient market are independent over
time. Inefficiency will be reflected in non-randomness of
price returns.
Considerable research energy has been expended in
empirical tests of the EMH. A rejection of the EMH may
have the implication that the market is not a reliable
price setter and that it often, and sometimes
significantly, misinterprets the economic signals it
receives. Researchers have obtained substantial
evidence in support of the EMH. This evidence has been
found for varying time periods, different markets, and
when using newer methodologies which are claimed to be
superior than those used previously [Ball and Kothari
(1989); Dyckman and Morse (1986); Foster ( 1986);	 Watts
and Zimmerman (1986); Keane (1983)]. Some studies
claim nevertheless to have found evidence not consistent
with the EMH [Jegadeesh (1990); Rendleman et al (1982);
7Charest (1978); Jensen (1978)]. These studies have,
either through self-criticism or critical evaluation by
other researchers, been found to be deficient in
methodology and their conclusions have therefore been
suspect. The overwhelming evidence available in support of
the EMH has persuaded researchers to conclude that it
holds for	 stock markets of developed countries
[especially the New York, London and Tokyo markets].
This belief in the EMH has opened research in many new
areas. The extension of the EMH to market-based research
in accounting and other fields has provided more evidence
in its support. Research based on the validity of the EMH
continues, especially on the applicability of new return
generation models [Jegadeesh (1990); Lo and MacKinlay
(1988)].
EMH tests have been given some attention in the studies of
stock markets in developing countries [Sharma and
Kennedy (1977); Gandhi, Saunders and Woodward (1980);
Cooper (1982); Parkinson (1984, 1987); Yong (1987)].	 The
conclusions of the studies have been mixed,	 some
supporting the EMH and others not in support. There has
been empirical evidence which tends to support those who
believe that the share pricing systems of stock markets in
developing countries are not consistent with efficiency
[Parkinson (1987)]. There is also rapidly accumulating
evidence which supports the efficiency of emerging markets
at the weak-form level [Barnes (1986)]. Existing evidence
on emerging markets is inadequate to make valid
8conclusions on the EMH and therefore the weak-form
efficiency of stock markets in developing countries.
1.3 THE CURRENT STUDY
It is the uncertainty regarding the efficiency of
securities markets in developing countries that
motivates this study. In contrast to existing evidence and
conclusions of markets studies in developing countries do
exploitable inefficiencies exist in emerging	 stock
markets?	 The study is targeted on the Nairobi Stock
Exchange (NSE) in Kenya, a developing country.
Parkinson (1984), found evidence which cast doubt on the
EMH as a reasonable description of the operations of the
NSE.	 This study aims to seek further evidence on
weak-form efficiency in this market.
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM
Researchers in developed countries (e.g. USA., Britain
and Japan) use stock exchanges in such countries to carry
out higher level research that requires the basic
assumption of market efficiency.	 The assumption that
markets are efficient in developing countries - and
specifically in Kenya - cannot be made in the
absence of evidence.
There are particular problems that arise when the stock
9market is not efficient. The cost and availability of
finance may largely be a function of the efficiency of
the securities market [Samuels (1981)]. The need to
extend the studies on the efficiency of the securities
market in developing countries therefore becomes obvious
and observable. This is especially so in countries
where either such studies have not been undertaken, or the
results of existing studies are inconclusive.
The carrying out of studies of this type has much
support. Wai and Patrick (1973) are of the view that:
"the most profitable line of research would be
in detailed case studies of capital markets in
specific countries" (p.302).
Cooper (1982) supports the view that even where
evidence has been gathered in stock markets in
developed countries, for example, USA, Britain and Japan,
studies of other stock markets remain necessary. He goes
on to explain that:
"...stock exchanges are far from	 homogeneous
organisations. They differ from country 	 to
country in terms of organisation, ownership,
size,	 legal	 constraints	 governing	 their
administration, disclosure of information,
investors incentives such as taxation etc., while
the willingness and indeed the financial ability of
10the public to invest in shares will vary
markedly also" (p.528).
Empirical research also provides safeguards against
subjective interpretation. The researcher does not rely
on prior beliefs, but collects or generates evidence
to support given assertions. The existence of
supportive or non-supportive empirical evidence on
efficiency in one market is no assurance that it is the
same on another market.
Testing the EMH, especially at weak-form level, may seem
too obvious to some researchers at present. Recently,
however, researchers have shown renewed interest in some
of the fundamental findings of weak-form efficiency tests.
Ball and Kothari (1989), for example, examine why, in an
efficient market, negative serial correlation coefficients
seem to occur. Lo and MacKinlay (1988) revisit the
random-walk debate in the USA and so does Jegadeesh
(1990). Dyckman and Morse (1986) explain that:
each additional test that fails to reject the
EMH, provides further evidence that the EMH is a
reasonable description of how the securities
markets operate (1).9).
Triangulation is also a very important feature of
research.
11"Triangulation can be theoretical (apply different
frameworks to same data) or implemental (using
different research methods, different settings,
different data, different assumptions, improved
decision making techniques and so forth). The extent
to which triangulation may produce similar results
can be used as a measure of confidence in the
findings and validity of underlying theory"
[Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya (1979, p.21)].
Extension of evidence is acceptable in its own right.
Keane (1983) says that conclusion of one or two studies
should not be interpreted as grounds for slackening the
pace or scope of current research activities. He adds:
"If anything, they underlie the need for a regular
programme of research to serve the dual purpose of
providing a continuing attestation of the market's
efficiency and of acting as a monitoring process,
so that any short-term imperfections that might
occasionally surface can quickly be identified and
eliminated" (p.157).
According to Kuhn (1970, p.36)
"Bringing a normal research problem to	 a
conclusion is achieving the anticipated in a new
way
121.5	 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY
This study is intended to deal comprehensively with
weak-form efficiency issues of the Nairobi Stock
Exchange. It is intended to:
(i) Provide empirical evidence on the relationships
between past and current prices series and also a
database on which future empirical work on efficiency can
be formulated.
(ii) Give motivation for further research into accounting
issues, and to create a database from which such research
may be possible. This by itself will break the
drought of security market based research in Kenya.
(iii) Draw the attention of policy makers about the
existing pricing mechanisms of the exchange. They will
hopefully use this knowledge as a basis of making
necessary structural reviews of the exchange to increase
its importance in capital resources allocation in the
Kenyan economy and its expected contribution to
economic development.
131.6 STUDY LIMITATIONS AND PROBLEMS.
(a) An exploratory study of this nature is likely to be
beset by several problems. The key one amongst them
is that of data availability and aggregation. Particular
effort is required to ensure the accuracy and
reliability of the data used [Yule and Kendall (1965)].
(b) The results of this study depend on the
expectations model used. The validity of the results
obtained will depend on the extent to which such models
properly approximate the true market. Although the
models used have been subjected to empirical tests
elsewhere, this is no guarantee that they will work in
the type of market being studied.
1.7 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY
This study is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 discusses the nature of capital markets in
developing countries. Emphasis is laid on the operating
characteristics of these markets and the attention
required to increase their level of activity.
In Chapter 3 the structure of the Nairobi Stock Exchange
is examined. Unlike previous studies, [Yacout (1981);
Niarchos (1972); Parkinson (1984)], which concentrated on
14individual countries' economies, this chapter is devoted
to critical analysis of the nature of the trading activity
and price making processes.
Chapter 4 studies the theory underlying weak-form
efficiency. The problems inherent in carrying out
weak-form studies are also explained.
In Chapter 5 empirical evidence on weak-form efficiency
from both developed and emerging exchanges is reviewed.
Chapter 6 looks at the implications on methodology of
existing literature and evidence on emerging markets. The
research question and hypotheses to be tested are
developed.
In Chapter 7 the methods used to obtain data for this
research, and the nature of the data itself, are dealt
with in detail. Major problems that exists in obtaining
data in developing countries are noted. The sample used
and the basis of selection are given.
Chapter 8 contains the analysis of the results of the
study.
Chapter 9 is a summary of the research activities,
findings, and the suggestions for further research.
15CHAPTER 2
SECURITIES MARKETS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
A capital market is a place where buyers and sellers come
together to trade in financial assets [Sprecher (1975)].
This term has four different dimensions. These are the
securities market, the money market, the primary market
and the secondary market.
The securities market is the market in which long term
financial assets are traded. Examples of securities'
market instrument are preferred and ordinary shares
(preferred and common stocks), bonds and debentures.
The money market is the market for trading in short-term
instruments, such as Treasury bills, Commercial papers and
trade-bills, usually through the banking sector. Due to
its nature, it facilitates short-term financing and
assures the liquidity of the short-term financial assets.
It is also the main focus of Central Bank activities in
implementing monetary policy. It is also significant in
indicating changes in short-term interest rates, monetary
policy and availability of short-term credit. The money
market exchanges financial assets representing short-term
claims with funds. The importance of the money market
16arises because it assures borrowers that they can,
generally, obtain short-term funds quickly, and assures
the lenders that they can convert asset holdings into
money [Rose (1988)].
The primary market deals with new issues. Any new issue of
shares and bonds is dealt with in the primary securities
market. The primary money market is where short-term funds
are obtained.
The secondary market provides liquidity for the primary
market by providing a readily available market-place for
securities. It also facilitates the issuance of new
securities. If it does not exist, the issuers of the
securities have to seek out a market for their own
securities. The secondary securities market is mainly
represented by the organised exchange. The secondary money
market is where financial assets representing short-term
claims are traded.
There exist fundamental relationships between the markets.
For example, the interrelationship between the money and
securities markets arises because users and suppliers of
funds may decide to use any of the markets. A supplier of
funds has the option of using the short-term or the
long-term market when lending funds. A user of funds has
access to both markets, although the market used will
depend on the use to which the funds will be put.
Long-term financing may call for use of the securities
17market while short-term financing may demand the use of
the money market. The primary market develops to
facilitate capital formation. Secondary markets develop
for trade in existing securities. This forms the
foundation on which many studies of emerging markets link
financial development and the stock exchange.
This chapter restricts itself to the securities markets
because of its direct relevance to the aims of the
research.
2.2 THE ROLE OF SECURITIES MARKETS
Given the relative scarcity of capital and the small
volume of savings in most developing countries, the
question may be asked whether there is any need for the
establishment of securities markets. Drake (1985, p.5)
says that:
"There are different opinions about how beneficial
securities markets are likely to be in practice.
Some writers have been inclined to take a rather
optimistic view of the role which securities
markets might play in expediting economic
development. Others have been more pessimistic.
There are those, for example, who conclude that a
securities market may seriously jeopardise the
growth and stability of a country's financial
structure, may introduce factors which tend to
18aggregate, if not originate economic fluctuations,
and may adversely affect the allocation of savings,
reallocation of existing real wealth,
redistribution of income and the conduct of
monetary policy."
He concludes:
"The question of benefit to economic development is
an open one, subject to empirical investigation of
past performance and judgment of future prospects
in each specific case."
As the level of income, savings and monetisation increases
and the structures of the economies change in developing
countries, securities markets have started to gain a
significant role. In Kenya, for example, the development
of a capital market was conditioned by the need for funds
in the private sector and the structure of the economy
rather than the government need to borrow locally [Arowolo
(1971)].
The role of the securities market is that of financial
intermediation and capital formation. The market deals
with financial assets which are necessary to facilitate
the process of wealth and capital accumulation. The most
fundamental financial asset is money which is necessary
for the development of any form of advanced economic
system because it is necessary to facilitate the exchange
19of economic goods. Other financial assets, such as shares,
bonds and debentures are used to aggregate the small pools
of savings and channel them into real investment. This
channelling is accomplished by financial intermediation.
Financial intermediaries are firms whose assets consists
almost of financial claims against others. Examples of
such financial intermediaries are Banks, Life Insurance
Companies, Pension and Provident funds. In financial
intermediation savings are gathered from households and
the intermediaries invest them in financial assets. The
primary securities market plays a key role in this process
of financial intermediation.
In summary, a securities market may play the role of:
(a) Providing liquidity to investors by enhancing the
marketability of securities through the operation of the
exchange. The existence of a market facilitates the
purchase and sale of debt instruments and equity
securities, particularly through dealings on a stock
exchange. A stock exchange not only permits dealings in
existing securities (increasing the liquidity of such
securities) but also facilitates the issue of new
securities to the public [Arowolo (1971)]. This occurs
because the exchange provides a continuous market for
individual securities issues. A continuous market is
predicated on a large volume of sales, a narrow price
range between the bid and the asked price and between
the	 previous sale and the sale taking place at the
20moment. It also depend on the rapid execution of orders.
There are also sufficient number of buyers and sellers of
the shares of stock of each company traded and a
sufficient number of brokers and other members of the
exchange transacting orders to assure a broad and active
market. The effect of these factors is to improve the
liquidity and marketability of the securities that are
traded.
(b) The mobilisation of savings to finance new
investment. The markets for capital acts as a link
between borrowers and savers in the economy. A
continuous market for competitively priced securities
provides a favourable climate for raising capital. The
existence of a ready market to trade in the newly issued
securities makes them acceptable to investors.
(c) facilitating wide spread ownership of financial assets
thereby reducing the concentration of economic power,
income and wealth in the hands of a few. This occurs, for
example, where the shares are distributed nationwide
ensuring equal participation by all those who-desire in
the ownership of corporations. The distribution of new
issues in Kenya and Nigeria provides good examples [Yacout
(1981); World Bank (1987)].
(d) moving business into professional management as well
as acting as a stimulus to entrepreneurial capacity.
Calamanti (1983) states that besides making better use of
21latent entrepreneurial capacity, the market would also
lead to improved accounting practices, greater profit
orientation and more disclosure of information, thus also
yielding social benefits. The above is probably made on
the assumption that the pressures from the securities
markets are able to act effectively on corporate
management to make them aware of the need for full
information disclosure.
(e) indigenisation and/or privatisation of productive
activities. The securities market will be used as a
vehicle by which foreign capital can be channelled to the
locals without disruption of economic activity since
ownership certificates shares can be floated in the
primary (new issues) market or existing securities can be
disposed-off in the secondary market. Similarly,
withdrawal of any one foreign investor may not be readily
noticeable.
(f) increasing the volume of foreign investment. It has
been identified that one of problems of developing
countries is the shortage of capital [Abbott (1985)]. The
possibility of using the securities market as a magnet to
attract foreign capital and therefore close the capital
shortage gap is an important one. Currently, with the debt
burden of developing countries becoming unmanageable, a
deliberate system of replacing foreign inflows with
investment capital rather than debt would be most ideal.
The impact of foreign capital flows and the benefits it
22confers cannot be underestimated [Denison (1980)].
Investing in securities markets other than in one's own
country reduces the level of risk because of holding an
internationally diversified portfolio [Solnik (1975)]. For
example,	 van Agtmael and Errunza (1982) show that
investing in markets of developing countries may offer
attractive opportunities for high returns and
diversification to investors of developed countries.
Investments by foreigners may also be desired because a
key problem in developing countries is the inadequacy
of foreign reserves. The reserves are necessary to
purchase the capital good essential for industrialisation.
The foreign funds attracted by the securities market may
be used for this purpose.
2.3 SECURITIES MARKETS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Kitchen (1986) expounds on two hypotheses which can be
considered when evaluating securities markets in
developing countries. One is the development hypothesis
which looks at the financial system as one of the
catalysts to economic development. The other is the
"Casino Hypothesis" which takes the view that the
financial system is irrelevant to economic development.
The group holding this view take support from Keynes
(1936) assertion that investors' decisions "can only be
taken as a result of animal spirits, of a spontaneous urge
to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of
23a weighted average of benefits multiplied by quantitative
probabilities." This view is now not well founded
theoretically.
The development hypothesis tends to dominate current
thinking [Drake (1985)]. Its proponents generally agree
that developing the financial sector can lead to economic
development. Developing countries have centred the effort
of development in their financial sectors on an expansion
of the range of financial instruments and financial
institutions. The types of financial institutions include
specialised long-term credit and capital market
institutions such as stock exchanges and unit trusts [IFC
(1984)]. The range of new instruments encompasses time
deposits, negotiable certificates of deposit, corporate
stocks, Government equity, futures and options. Financial
innovation improves the efficiency of financial
intermediation to the extent that they increase the
acceptability of financial instruments, lower the costs
of financial transactions and expand the flow of
financial services [Kitchen (1986)].
The securities market enhances economic growth through
(a) Increasing the aggregate volume of savings
(b) More efficient allocation of the existing stock of
tangible wealth
24(c) An increase in the aggregate volume of investments
and more efficient allocation of savings among
potential investment [Calamanti(1983); Abbott(1985)].
These aspects are now examined in some detail.
2.3.1 The effect of securities market on aggregate volume
of savings.
To transfer savings from a saver to a user there should be
a process through which such savings are to be
aggregated and channelled. Without formal institutions,
transfer of savings to an investor may be on a person to
person basis, but the pool of savings available for
investment will be too low. Financial intermediaries
develop to play the role of aggregation and distribution
of savings. To be effective these institutions must
- provides incentives to save
- Increase volume of investment
- Improve efficiency of investment
Financial intermediaries must motivate savers to save and
guarantee them a future return. Goldsmith (1969), for
example, finds that the development of financial markets
and instruments provides increased opportunities and
incentives for savers to save and for investors to invest.
This is observed empirically through an increased savings
25ratio. The role of the market in savings is that of
maturity transformation which allows savers to save in
short-term instruments and investors to acquire long-term
funds. Also the saving role is expanded because the
intermediaries undertake the task of risk transfer. Savers
are not front-line investors since they do not wish to
take the risk. The financial intermediaries themselves
will diversify risks by allocating savings to a larger
numbers of investors, a feature not available to an
individual	 saver.	 Because of these two	 roles,
intermediaries play an important function by increasing
the mobilisation of savings. This in turn raises the level
of investment leading to increase in the level and rate of
economic growth [Abbott (1985)]. The stock-exchange, for
example, although not directly a savings institution,
provides marketability of saving instruments and enables
savers to regain liquidity quickly. It also ensures
proper management of listed companies thereby increasing
savers' confidence.
The markets will also provide greater opportunities for
gaining access to credit and an improvement in the
technical and economic characteristics of financial
assets. Shaw (1973) argues that these are important
processes through which the propensity to save may be
increased.
It should nevertheless be emphasised that the willingness
to save depends on social, cultural, economic and
26political factors. The opportunity to save in financial
assets depends on access to formal financial institutions
and the types of financial instruments that these
institutions make available to the market.
2.3.2 Efficient allocation of existing stock of real
wealth.
Calamanti (1983) argues that an efficient financial system
may help accelerate economic growth, particularly in
developing countries, by reducing the cost of investment
capital and also by changing investors beliefs. This in
turn changes the nature of investors portfolio holding
from only tangible assets (land and buildings mostly) to
also diversifying into financial assets.
These changes on portfolio holdings can only occur if
there exists a range of financial assets accessible to the
investors in developing countries and also change in their
beliefs. Currently, for example, it is not Unusual to find
that the total wealth holdings of an individual in a
developing country may be in animals and/or land which by
themselves not very productive and do not have spill-over
effects.
The provision of financial assets by capital markets
offers a chance not only of acquiring new investment but
27also of risk reduction through diversification. 	 The
release of real resources to financial assets increases
the production capacity of the economy through such
resources being transformed into capital goods. An
important argument is that when the capital market acts as
a channel for directing investment funds then it will do
this efficiently and to the most productive investments.
2.3.3 Increase in the aggregate volume of investment and
the allocation of savings.
An efficient securities market may increase the level of
investments and improve the allocation of savings. These
benefits arise because such markets are likely to have the
effect of reducing the cost of funds significantly. This
is a consequence of the reduced friction in the financial
system.
Similarly, the efficient allocation of resources will
increase the average returns that financial assets yields,
since it allows proper allocation of investment
opportunities to the most productive areas.
2.4 EVOLVING VIABLE SECURITIES MARKETS
Reilly (1979) suggests that the development of a viable
securities market depends on:
28(1) Timely and accurate information on the price and
volume of past transactions and similar information on
prevailing supply and demand.
(2) liquidity - a buyer or seller of a security can buy or
sell the asset quickly, at a price which is close to the
price of previous transactions, assuming no new
information has been received. In turn, a liquid market
requires continuity, i.e. prices do not change very much
from transaction to transaction. Price continuity itself
requires depth. There must be many buyers and sellers
willing and able to enter the market at prices above and
below those prevailing.
(3) Low transaction cost. This 'internal' efficiency
means that all aspects of the transaction entail low
costs. This includes cost of reaching the market, the
actual brokerage cost involved in the transaction, as well
as the cost of transferring the asset.
(4) Rapid adjustment of prices to new information. This
efficiency ensures that the prevailing price reflects all
available information regarding the asset.
The development of a securities market tends to go hand in
hand with the existence and/or development of certain key
features observed in the securities markets of developed
countries. It is not argued here whether they precede
29capital markets or develop together as such markets
develop over time. These features include:
(a) The existence of adequately sized businesses which can
issue securities in the primary market and have continued
trade in the secondary market. In developed countries the
size of entities whose securities are traded world-wide
can be readily observed. In the United States, for
example, companies such as Exxon, IBM, etc. offer very
good examples of the sizes of the entities and the level
of securities they offer for public holding.
(b) The growth in the level of domestic savings is
important to provide impetus for those savings to be
channelled to the capital market. It should be noted that
although the level of domestic savings in developing
countries has been going up steadily, many households are
still only able to sustain savings at very low levels
which might not be capable of being re-allocated from the
money market to the securities market, i.e. holding in
shares and bonds [Calamanti (1983)]. As the level of
savings grows we should expect to find an increase in the
level of activity in the securities market sector.
(c) a high degree of long-term political and economic
stability. This will mean adopting policies which leave
the businesses in the economy as much as possible to
market forces and create incentives to drive them in that
direction.
30(d) a well-established legal framework which reliably
regulates corporate activities, the ownership and
circulation of securities, and relations between issuers
of shares and those who subscribe to them.
(e)Adequate level of education (both public and private)
necessary to motivate investors in the capital market to
understand the relationship between risks and returns of
various assets and to remove social bias of predominantly
holding one type of asset, for example, land. Education
will also persuade the public of the need to appreciate
Government policies designed at the initial stages to
stimulate capital markets' development and also to see the
need for diversification. It should be noted that breaking
the barriers of communication in developing countries
through education not only enhances economic development
but also brings about the desired social changes necessary
for effective and efficient markets to exist.
The extent to which these features exist in developing
countries is not currently well researched. There are
those who argue that these features do not exist in these
markets [Drake (1977); Sharma and Kennedy (1977); Samuels
(1981); Yacout (1981); Kitchen (1986)], and that, these
markets:
- are small, resulting in them being "thin" with an
inadequate number of traders to ensure
31competition, and insufficient securities to enable
them to hold a diversified portfolio of their
choosing.
- are not properly regulated and have poor standards of
disclosure by companies.
- have poor communication systems so that some
investors have an advantage over others.
- have significant costs of obtaining information.
- lack competent analysts and professional advisers,
resulting in differing expectations about the
performance of securities.
- have significant transactions costs which may deter
small investors, thereby limiting the number of
market participants and restricting the market to
infrequent large bargains.
- have investors who are naive and who cannot correctly
interpret the information they receive [Samuels (1981)].
Most of the investors are also said to take the view that
the market is inefficient and therefore	 an unreliable
price setter.
The above shortcomings are used as a basis for arguing
32that the stock markets are inefficient at the operating,
and as a result at the information, level. There is
nevertheless accumulating considerable statistical
evidence from the International Finance Corporation (IFC)
and other databases on emerging markets which may provide
insight into these assertions. The next section examines
these shortcomings of the stock markets in developing
countries in light of the evidence available.
2.5 EXISTING FEATURES OF EMERGING MARKETS
2.5.1 The World of Emerging Markets.
Exhibit 2.1 shows the World of emerging stock markets as
defined by the IFC in 1989. This represents more than 30
markets for which information is now available from the
IFC. Most of these markets are to be found in Third world
countries. The features discussed in this section relates
to these markets. The features discussed are:
- Size of the markets
- Level of Activity of these markets
- Valuation details relating to the markets
- The nature of market information and investor protection
available in these markets.
332.5.2 Size of the Markets
The size of the market may be defined in terms of
capitalisation and the number of securities listed. Table
2.1 reports a summary of these statistics for 1980 and
1989. Columns (3) and (6) show the respective rates of
increase/decrease of the capital values and the change in
number of listed companies for both the developed and
emerging markets over this period.
2.5.2.1 Capitalisation
Market capitalisation for the emerging markets grew by
6.695 times compared to that of developed markets of 3.183
times between 1980-89. This can be attributed to the
significant growth of some individual emerging markets,
for example, Portugal; Indonesia; Taiwan; Korea and
Thailand. The dominant developed markets like USA; UK;
France; West Germany but not Japan registered little
growth in value. The emerging exchanges' share of the
World's market was small, 3.15% in 1980 and 5.22% in 1989,
although there were some slight gains over the developed
markets. Examining changes over-time in market
capitalisation can give insights into changes in the
consensus expectations of the relationship between future
and current profitability [Foster (1986, p.74)]. The
growth in capitalisation was impressive,	 suggesting
increased investor confidence in emerging markets.
3435 (a)TABLE 2.1 CAPITALISATION AND NUMBER OF LISTED COMPANIES: 1980 - 1989
CAPITALISATION	 NO. LISTED COMPANIES
COLUMN (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MARKET 1980 1989 RATIO 1980 1989 RATIO
AUSTRALIA 59700 136626 1.29 1007 1335 1.33
AUSTRIA 2000 22261 10.13 66 81 1.23
BELGIUM 10000 74596 6.46 225 184 0.82
CANADA 118300 291328 1.46 731 1146 1.57
DENMARK 5400 40152 6.44 218 257 1.18
FINLAND 2759 30652 10.11 48 78 1.63
FRANCE 54600 364841 5.68 586 668 1.14
GERMANY 71700 365176 4.09 459 628 1.37
HONG KONG 39104 77496 0.98 137 284 2.07
ISRAEL 4828 8227 0.70 117 262 2.24
ITALY 25300 169417 5.70 134 217 1.62
JAPAN 379679 4392597 10.57 1402 2019 1.44
LUXEMBOURG 4017 79979 18.91 74 493 6.66
NETHERLANDS 29300 157789 4.39 214 313 1.46
NEW ZEALAND 6161 13487 1.19 237 242 1.02
NORWAY 3190 25285 6.93 117 122 1.04
SOUTH AFRICA 100000 131059 0.31 481 748 1.56
SINGAPORE 24418 35925 0.47 103 136 1.32
SPAIN 16600 122652 6.39 496 423 0.85
SWEDEN 12900 119285 8.25 103 135 1.31
SWITZERLAND 37600 104239 1.77 118 177 1.50
UNITED KINGDOM 205200 826598 3.03 2655 2015 0.76
UNITED STATES 1448120 3505686 1.42 6251 6727 1.08
DEVELOPED MARKETS 2651956 11095353 3.18 15694 18690 1.19
ARGENTINA 3864 4225 0.09 278 178 0.64
BANGLADESH 27 476 16.63 22 116 5.27
BRAZIL 9160 44368 3.84 426 592 1.39
CHILE 9400 9587 0.02 265 213 0.80
COTE D'IVORE 344 437 0.27 193 82 0.42
COLOMBIA 1605 1136 -0.29 13 78 6.00
COSTRA RICA 118 246 1.08 22 24 1.09
EGYPT 246 1760 6.15 62 483 7.79
GREECE 3016 6376 1.11 116 119 1.03
INDIA 7585 27316 2.60 2265 6000 2.65
INDONESIA 63 2514 38.90 6 61 10.17
JAMAICA 54 957 16.72 38 45 1.18
JORDAN 1605 2162 0.35 71 106 1.49
KENYA 18 63 2.50 54 57 1.06
KOREA 3829 140946 35.81 352 626 1.78
KUWAIT 10108 9932 -0.02 55 52 0.95
MALAYSIA 12395 39842 2.21 182 251 1.38
MEXICO 12994 22550 0.74 259 203 0.78
MOROCCO 441 621 0.41 78 71 0.91
NIGERIA 3118 1005 -0.68 90 111 1.23
PAKISTAN 643 2457 2.82 314 440 1.40
PERU 1371 831 -0.39 103 265 2.57
PHILIPPINES 3478 11965 2.44 195 144 0.74
PORTUGAL 191 10618 54.59 25 182 7.28
SRI LANKA 365 471 0.29 171 176 1.03
TAIWAN 6082 237012 37.97 102 181 1.77
THAILAND 1206 25648 20.27 77 175 2.27
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 1175 411 -0.65 29 31 1.07
TURKEY 477 6783 13.22 314 50 0.16
URUGUAY 189 24 -0.87 54 39 0.72
VENEZUELA 2657 1156 -0.56 98 60 0.61
ZIMBABWE 1456 1067 -0.27 62 54 0.87
EMERGING MARKETS 86125 611130 6.10 5531 10582 1.91
WORLD 2738081 11706483 3.28 21225 29272 1.38
SOURCE: IFC EMERGING MARKETS FACTBOOK 1990
352.5.2.2 Listings
Between 1980 and 1989 the number of listed companies in
emerging markets grew by 1.91 times compared to that of
developed markets of 1.19 times. There were significant
growth in the number of listed companies in some
individual emerging markets especially those that also
registered material increase in capitalisation.
The emerging exchanges share of the listed companies in
World's market was 26.05% in 1980 and 36.15% in 1989,
representing some gain of 10% over this period. This gain
in the number of listed companies was nevertheless not
reflected by an increase in their share of the world's
market capitalisation which, as reported above, increased
by approximately 2%. The evidence nevertheless indicates
that the number of securities in the various markets had
increased significantly. The argument that not enough
securities are available may only apply in a small
minority of cases which cannot be generalised to all
emerging markets.
36TABLE 2.2	 VALUE TRADED 1980 AND 1990
MARKET 1980 1989 RATIO TURNOVER TURNOVER
RATIO RATIO
1980 1989
AUSTRALIA 9556 44786 3.69 16.01 32.78
AUSTRIA 105 11706 110.49 5.25 52.59
BELGIUM 838 7708 8.20 8.38 10.33
CANADA 28211 70173 1.49 23.85 24.09
DENMARK 58 14463 248.36 1.07 36.02
FINLAND 138 7363 52.36 5.00 24.02
FRANCE 10118 107286 9.60 18.53 29.41
GERMANY 15248 628630 40.23 21.27 172.14
HONG KONG 19226 34584 0.80 49.17 44.63
ISRAEL 2447 3909 0.60 50.68 47.51
ITALY 8574 38926 3.54 33.89 22.98
JAPAN 160931 2800695 16.40 42.39 63.76
LUXEMBOURG 17 186 9.94 0.42 0.23
NETHERLANDS 5099 89848 16.62 17.40 56.94
NEW ZEALAND 653 3027 3.64 10.60 22.44
NORWAY 84 12489 147.68 2.63 49.39
SOUTH AFRICA 5129 7095 0.38 5.13 5.41
SINGAPORE 3654 13711 2.75 14.96 38.17
SPAIN 981 38389 38.13 5.91 31.30
SWEDEN 1796 38389 20.37 13.92 32.18
SWITZERLAND 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
UNITED KINGDOM 35791 17420 -0.51 17.44 2.11
UNITED STATES 409816 320268 -0.22 28.30 9.14
DEVELOPED MARKETS 717662 6288206 7.76 27.06 56.67
ARGENTINA 1089 1916 0.76 28.18 45.35
BANGLADESH 0.4 5 11.50 1.48 1.05
BRAZIL 5313 16762 2.15 58.00 37.78
CHILE 548 866 0.58 5.83 9.03
COTE D'IVORE 187 74 -0.60 54.36 16.93
COLOMBIA 0.2 4 19.00 0.01 0.35
COSTRA RICA 6 9 0.50 5.08 3.66
EGYPT 16 115 6.19 6.50 6.53
GREECE 86 549 5.38 2.85 8.61
INDIA 2760 17362 5.29 36.39 63.56
INDONESIA 9 541 59.11 14.29 21.52
JAMAICA 3 90 29.00 5.56 9.40
JORDAN 139 652 3.69 8.66 30.16
KOREA 1867 121264 63.95 48.76 86.04
KUWAIT 387 1709 3.42 3.83 17.21
MALAYSIA 2572 6888 1.68 20.75 17.29
MEXICO 3262 6232 0.91 25.10 27.64
MOROCCO 10 33 2.30 2.27 5.31
NIGERIA 14 4 -0.71 0.45 0.40
PAKISTAN 180 193 0.07 27.99 7.86
PERU 134 90 -0.33 9.77 10.83
PHILIPPINES 619 2410 2.89 17.80 20.14
PORTUGAL 2 1912 955.00 1.05 18.01
SRI LANKA 3 12 3.00 0.82 2.55
TAIWAN 4503 965840 213.49 74.04 407.51
THAILAND 308 13452 42.68 25.54 52.45
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 19 69 2.63 1.62 16.79
TURKEY 10 798 78.80 2.10 11.76
URUGUAY 21 1 -0.95 11.11 4.17
VENEZUELA 60 93 0.55 2.26 8.04
ZIMBABWE 154 36 -0.77 10.58 3.37
EMERGING MARKETS 23672 1159812 48.00 27.49 189.78
WORLD 741334 7448018 9.05 27.07 63.62
SOURCE: IFC EMERGING MARKETS FACTBOOK 19902.5.3 Level of Activity
The level of activity in the market is best measured by
the value of securities traded as well as the relationship
between the value traded and capitalisation (turnover).
These indicators are reported in Table 2.2. In absolute
terms, the amount of value traded is higher for developed
countries. When the share turnover is considered there is
clear evidence that some emerging markets had very high
levels of activity. Taiwan, Korea, Thailand and India, for
example, had higher turnover ratios than the developed
markets like USA, Japan and UK except Germany. Considered
as a whole the turnover ratios for most of the emerging
markets were not substantially different from the average
for developed markets. One would therefore have difficulty
in making a general conclusion that majority of such
markets are inactive and investors do not wish to trade.
This evidence challenges another myth for developing
markets.
2.5.4 Valuation Details
The valuation ratios are the price/earnings (P/E),
price/book-value (P/BV) and dividend yield. The figures
for 1988 and 1989 are presented in Table 2.3. The PIE
ratios were reasonable for all markets both emerging and
developed.
38TABLE 2.3	 VALUATION RATIOS 1988 TO 1989
PRICE/
THIS
YEAR
1989
EARNING	 RATIO
RELATIVE LAST
TO WORLD YEAR
1988
PRICE/
THIS
YEAR
1989
BV	 RATIO
RELATIVE LAST
TO WORLD YEAR
1988
DIVIDENDYIELD
THIS	 RELATIVE LAST
YEAR	 TO WORLD YEAR
1989	 1988
developed markets
FRANCE 12.50 0.65 12.60 2.09 0.80 1.82 2.70 1.23 2.80
GERMANY 17.80 0.92 15.60 2.39 0.92 1.89 2.90 1.32 3.60
JAPAN 51.90 2.69 53.80 4.79 1.84 4.79 0.40 0.18 0.50
UNITED KINGDOM 11.70 0.61 10.40 1.95 0.75 1.68 4.50 2.05 5.00
UNITED STATES
emerging markets
14.10 0.73 11.60 2.16 0.83 1.81 3.30 1.50 3.70
ARGENTINA 22.14 1.15 11.30 1.64 0.63 0.30 4.69 2.13 3.62
BRAZIL 8.30 0.43 7.95 1.34 0.52 0.72 0.66 0.30 1.50
CHILE 5.82 0.30 4.40 1.33 0.51 1.11 9.50 4.32 9.38
COLOMBIA 6.96 0.36 8.75 1.08 0.42 1.59 7.05 3.20 5.93
GREECE 24.30 1.26 10.59 3.12 1.20 2.33 4.62 2.10 5.62
INDIA 18.34 0.95 21.51 3.46 1.33 2.46 1.93 0.88 3.23
JORDAN 14.93 0.77 17.30 1.88 0.72 1.48 2.38 1.08 3.40
KOREA 38.57 2.00 39.51 2.50 0.96 3.34 1.26 0.57 0.54
MALAYSIA 30.75 1.59 24.14 3.34 1.28 2.58 2.19 1.00 2.04
MEXICO 10.66 0.55 5.04 1.03 0.40 0.69 2.10 0.95 3.02
NIGERIA 6.99 0.36 6.07 1.83 0.70 3.46 7.33 3.33 8.96
PAKISTAN 8.44 0.44 9.37 1.80 0.69 1.68 8.26 3.75 7.93
PHILIPPINES 18.50 0.96 9.92 4.35 1.67 2.75 1.10 0.50 2.23
PORTUGAL 21.42 1.11 26.50 3.79 1.46 4.36 1.87 0.85 1.34
TAIWAN 51.17 2.65 40.23 6.55 2.52 4.57 0.58 0.26 0.61
THAILAND 23.07 1.20 12.62 8.06 3.10 3.41 7.94 3.61 4.01
TURKEY 17.64 0.91 2.62 7.18 2.76 1.53 3.61 1.64 11.24
VENEZUELA 6.44 0.33 11.45 1.37 0.53 2.31 2.21 1.00 1.10
ZIMBABWE 7.00 0.36 4.24 1.27 0.49 4.00 9.75 4.43 7.79
WORLD 19.30 1.00 18.10 2.60 1.00 2.41 2.20 1.00 2.40
SOURCE: IFC EMERGING MARKETS FACTBOOK 1990
A majority of emerging markets registered increases in
their P/E ratio over those for 1988. The P/BV ratio seems
slightly better for emerging markets for 1989. The
dividend yields were also higher for the emerging markets.
The P/E ratio and the dividend yield gives future value
signals to investors. The higher the P/E ratio, the higher
the expected future income relative to current income.
39Observing the statistics indicate that based on the P/E
and dividend ratios investors in emerging markets have
good prospects.
2.5.5 Market Information and Investor Protection
Table 2.4 shows the type and level of information
available to investors in emerging markets. It also shows
the extent to which investor protection is provided in
each of the markets.
The Table reveals that investors in emerging stock
exchanges have reasonable levels of information provided
for decision making. Whether the disclosure serves the
investors needs is an empirical issue [Wallace (1988)].
Annual, semi-annual and quarterly financial reports are
required in many of the cases. Except for Kenya, Pakistan
and Zimbabwe, all other markets have international
electronic coverage. Information is also available from
both local and international analysts. The level of
investor protection is considered world class for some
exchanges, but is reported to be poor for Taiwan, Greece
and Turkey although some of these performed well in the
period. The evidence does not at all support the held
notion that communication is poor and that disclosure is
non-existent. This argument should be discarded.
40TABLE 2.4 MARKET INFORMATION AND INVESTOR PROTECTION  IN EMERGING MARKETS
Reporting requirements-timing
Share	 Securities International Regular	 Market Company	 Consolidated
price exchange electronic publication commentaries brokerage annual Interim Accounting Investor
index publications coverage P/E,yield	 in English	 reports	 audited statement Standard Protect
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 (10)
Latin America
ARGENTINA	 X	 AOMWD	 x	 P	 LR	 X	 0	 A	 AS
BRAZIL	 X	 AMWD	 x	 C	 LR,IR	 LR,IR	 X	 0	 G	 GS
CHILE	 X	 AMWD	 X	 C	 LR	 LR	 X	 0	 G	 GS
COLOMBIA	 X	 AMWD	 X	 P	 LR	 X	 0	 A	 AS
MEXICO	 X	 AMWD	 X	 C	 LR,IR	 LR,IR	 x	 0	 G	 GS
VENEZUELA	 X	 AMWD	 X	 P	 LR	 x	 S(BANKS) A	 AS
East Asia
KOREA	 X	 AMWD	 X	 C	 LR,IR	 LR,IR	 X	 S	 G	 GS
PHILIPPINES	 X	 AMWD	 X	 C	 LR,IR	 IR	 X	 S	 G	 AS
TAIWAN	 X	 AMWD	 X	 C	 LR,IR	 IR	 X	 0	 P	 PS
South Asia
INDIA	 X	 AMWD	 X	 P	 LR	 LR	 X	 S	 G	 GS
INDONESIA	 X	 AND	 x	 c	 LR,IR	 LR,IR	 X	 S	 P	 AS
MALAYSIA	 X	 A(M12)WD	 x	 c	 LR,IR	 LR,IR	 X	 S	 G	 GS
PAKISTAN	 X	 AD	 P	 LR	 X	 S	 A	 AS
THAILAND	 X	 AQMWD	 x	 C	 LR,IR	 IR	 X	 Q	 A	 AS
Europe/Mideast/Africa
GREECE	 X	 AMWD	 X	 P	 LR,IR	 LR,IR	 x	 S	 P	 P
JORDAN	 X	 AMWD	 x	 P	 LR,IR	 LR	 X	 P	 AS
KENYA	 X	 AMW	 P	 LR	 LR	 X	 S	 A	 AS
NIGERIA	 X	 AWD	 X	 P	 LR,IR	 LR	 x	 a	 A	 AS
PORTUGAL	 X	 AMWD	 X	 C	 LR,1R	 LR,IR	 X	 S	 A	 AS
TURKEY	 X	 AMWD	 x	 P	 LR,IR	 LR,IR	 X	 0	 A	 PS
ZIMBABWE	 X	 AWD	 P	 LR	 LR	 X	 S	 A	 AS
KEY
Column	 Symbols
(1) X = At least one share price index is calculated; most have several and many have sectorial indexes
as well.
(2) A = Annual; 0 = Quarterly; M = Monthly; (M/2) = Biweekly; W = Weekly; D = Daily
(3) X = Daily coverage of stock market on an international wire service
(4) P = published; C = Comprehensive and published internationally
(5)&(6) LR= Prepared by local brokers or analysts; IR = Prepared by international brokers or analysts
(7) X = Consolidated audited annual accounts required
(8) 0 = Quarterly results must be published; S = Semiannual results must be published
(9)&(10) G = Good, of internationally acceptable quality; A = Adequate; P = Poor, requires reform
S = Functioning Securities Commission or similar government agency concentrating on regulating market
activity.
ADOPTED FROM: IFC (1990), EMERGING MARKETS FACTBOOK P.161
41The above evidence is a pointer that stock markets in
developing countries are moving in the right direction and
that their positions have greatly improved over the last
10 years. More still requires to be done.
2.6 DISCUSSION
To improve the emerging markets and help them reach the
level of those in developed countries, the factors that
hinder the growth of the markets should be identified and
dealt with. This section completes the chapter by
addressing itself to some of the key problems in such
markets and offering suggestions on how these problems may
be dealt with. The discussion centres on:
- Financial repression/Financial deepening
- The supply of securities
- The demand for securities
- Government regulation and control
2.6.1 Financial Repression/ Deepening
Financial repression may be defined as a state where, due
to either formal (Government) or informal controls, there
exist barriers to the development of free securities
markets in the economic sense. Following Goldsmith (1969),
Shaw (1973), Fry (1982) and Fischer (1989) one may
42conclude that the key characteristics of financial
repression include:
- Existence of controls on interest rates (normally
maintained at fixed statutory levels by the Government)
which may result in negative real interest rates in the
economy.
- Government and other institutional barriers to the entry
and development of financial institutions and instruments.
This is evidenced by very strict rules for joining stock
exchanges or registering financial institutions. These
maintain such institutions at the bare minimum and give
the existing ones no incentive to innovate new financial
instruments
- Formally targeting savings and investments into
specified areas of the economy thereby stifling capital
available to other high growth innovative projects. In
developing countries this is observed by requiring
specific deposit/liquidity ratios, investment in treasury
bills and demanding fixed percentage investment in certain
sectors e.g. agriculture [Fry (1982)]. This has the effect
of directing investment funds to inefficient investments.
The consequence is to slow down the rate of economic
growth and bring down the rate of innovation in the
securities market.
- The existence of parallel informal markets of money
43lenders who can advance funds on a short term basis at
very high-levels of interest rates. These markets will not
be able to satisfy the demand for funds since they are, by
their risky nature, unable to attract any significant
deposits from savers.
Financial repression can be dealt with by systematic
change of policies to move towards financial deepening.
Financial deepening means the accumulation of financial
assets at a pace, faster than accumulation of
non-financial wealth [Shaw (1973, p.vii)]. The policies
adopted which encourage the growth of financial
institutions and instruments are:
- Removing the institutionalised barriers of entry into
the financial markets. This, for example, calls for more
liberal policies on entry into organised markets and the
floating of financial institutions. The removal of
barriers may call for initial statutory legislation and
the synchronising of monetary and fiscal policies [IFC
(1984), Fischer (1989)].
- Action on existing interest rate policies.	 The
presumption in financial repression that fixed interest
rates may be desirable to move the economy towards higher
levels of investment is not well founded [Kitchen (1986,
p.80-83)]. This is due to the banking sector sometimes
being the only organised financial market. The Government
in such a case has no other access to ready borrowing
44other than the banking system thereby stifling funds
available to other borrowers. Financial deepening calls
for the liberalisation of interest rates so that an
equilibrium can be reached between savings and investment.
It is not clear how the market may react to liberal
policies on interest rates. It is nevertheless expected
that the rates of interest will adjust themselves to match
yield on other financial assets such as shares and also
match expected returns on retained earnings. The economic
power of financial intermediation will be in full play.
Removing institutional targeting of savings and
investments. This means that markets would be free to
exercise discretion on where to seek savings and where to
direct investments. One hypothesised effect of such a
policy change is that it will be possible for markets to
make funds available for highly innovative projects which
will play a major role in economic development.
2.6.2 The Supply of Securities
It cannot be continuously assumed that the size or number
of entities in developing countries are themselves a
hindrance to the growth of a capital market through the
non-issue of securities since they do readily fit into the
structure of the economies where they operate. It can only
be argued that the owners are unwilling to issue financial
instruments because, for example, of fear of dilution,
loss of control, disclosure of private information to
45competitors, of the fear that improved disclosure may lead
to an increased tax burden, and because the government may
artificially fix issue prices [Calamanti (1983)].
Perhaps, the issue of financial repression discussed
earlier make the banks identify only existing businesses
as the only ones worth the risk thereby offering them a
guaranteed credit line in the forms of permanent
overdrafts and other loans. Such businesses will have
access to cheap credit, interest rates having been
artificially suppressed. This itself will ensure that they
do not issue securities which, under such conditions, may
be more costly than bank credit.
Calamanti (1983) gives a good account of the policy
measures of intervention necessary to increase the supply
of securities. He identifies these as:
(i) Coercion:
- Here companies are automatically listed on the exchange
when they fulfil certain criteria, e.g. when they reach a
certain asset base or turnover or other measure that
policy makers may consider appropriate. Listing goes with
the requirement that a specific percentage of shares must
be issued to the public.
Another coercive means of expanding corporate share
issues would be to impose limits on borrowing from banks
46or other financial intermediaries. These limits could be
based on compliance with debt/equity ratios in the
borrower company or a limitation on the maximum indirect
credit limit [Calamanti (1983, p.67); Drake (1977, p.84)].
This kind of measure not only makes the issue of shares
necessary, but may also encourage issues in the bond
market.
Another means has been to require foreign firms to issue
fixed percentages of equity to locals. For example the
rule has been in existence in Nigeria and India, where
foreigners cannot invest in certain industries, or can
only own part of others [Odife (1984)]. Given the shortage
of foreign reserves in developing countries this may not
be particularly appealing, even at a policy level, unless
such foreign resources are targeted to only
specific areas of investment.
Coercive measures are not themselves acceptable under
conditions of economic liberty, but where voluntary action
by the companies is not forthcoming then such measures
could be used as a last resort.
(ii) Tax incentives and/or penalties
This calls for the use of fiscal policies to motivate
private companies to go public. The objective is both to
encourage companies to issue shares and investors to buy
such shares once issued. This is achieved by penalising
47companies which remain private. It can also be achieved by
tax discrimination with regards to dividend versus other
investment income [World Bank (1987)]. For example,
discriminating measures might be extended to:
- suspending tax on capital gains derived from share
ownership.
differential tax rates between private and listed public
companies.
- preferential treatment of dividend income by taxing at
lower rates than other investment income.
- changing practices where interest on loan capital is tax
deductible, whereas dividend payouts are not, resulting
in double-taxation of dividends.
- exempting companies which go public from tax for a
number of years.
- allowing share issue costs to be tax deductible.
- suspending stamp duty on issue and transfer of shares.
2.6.3 Demand for Securities
Parkinson (1984) and Drake (1985) conclude that the past
beliefs of inadequate demand for securities in developing
countries tend not to exist any more. The issue is not of
demand but one of not having adequate securities in the
market in the first place. Drake (1985) proposes that the
increase in demand arises from:
- Speculative interest and
48- The unsatisfied portfolio needs of financial
institutions.
The financial markets in developing countries are to be
found in urban centres which are well served by modern
communication facilities. This implies that the demand for
securities in developing countries tends to be centred on
elite institutions and investors only commonly found in
urban centres [Yacout (1981)]. This in effect means that
the small savers in the rural areas tend not to have
access or not to understand the importance of investment
in securities. Encouraging demand for securities among the
small savers in rural areas may itself require not only
education based policies (see section 2.4 above) but also
a concerted effort to show such potential investors that
financial assets are as valuable as tangible assets such
as land and buildings.
The other is the slow growth of pension and unit trust
funds through which savers can invest in markets for the
future. Measures aimed at encouraging the growth of both
individual and institutional demand for securities are
necessary. For example, in Kenya institutional investors
acquire shares and forget that they have them in their
portfolio, resulting in such shares not being traded in
the market [IFC (1984)]. They should not only acquire but
also trade in the securities acquired. If the activity of
the stock exchanges is to be increased, the growth of
49pension funds and unit trusts should be encouraged.
The demand for shares will of course also reflect the
level of confidence that investors have in the market in
the first place. The expectation of good performance and
professional management of portfolios without shoddy
dealing give rise to a belief that even a piece of paper
can represent real wealth. The Government and other bodies
must have a way of regulating the securities market in
order to establish and maintain public confidence.
2.6.4 Regulation and control
The confidence of investors in securities markets depends
on how well such markets are perceived to operate. It is
discouraging where the investors feel that the markets can
easily be manipulated or that insider trading,
preferential treatment or outright theft is possible in
the market. The level of protection can only be afforded
through regulation in the initial stages of development.
Excess regulation may nevertheless lead to financial
repression and may be costly to the public and to the
market in the long-run. The level of regulation will take
the form of statutory legislation and development of
disclosure rules by accounting bodies. The argument that
investors in securities markets of developing countries
do not have adequate information [Samuels (1981)] arise
because of inadequacy and weaknesses in existing
regulations. Improving existing regulations can overcome
50these shortcomings.
The role of accounting numbers in such markets is very
important. Accounting bodies (where they exist) should not
only follow the statutory requirements, but also attempt
to set out standards by which companies can disclose
information through financial statements. The effect of
adequate accounting disclosure is to reduce access costs
of information to investors.
2.7 CONCLUSION
We have seen in section 2.5 that securities markets in
developing countries have progressed steadily over the
years. The institutions of existing markets should be
improved and efficient information flows to such markets
established. As a result of improved operational
efficiency then it can be expected that the securities
market will play a greater role in the economic
development of the countries by ensuring the allocation of
resources to the best available alternatives. Hopefully,
when the development of efficient securities markets has
been achieved, such markets will play a significant role
in the internationalisation of markets, and ensure freer
flow of funds between developed and developing countries.
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THE NAIROBI STOCK EXCHANGE.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) is Kenya's only
securities market and one of the eight exchanges in
Africa. The other stock exchanges are in Egypt, Morocco,
Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Tunisia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.
It is one of the only two such exchanges within the
Preferential Trade Area of East and Central African
states. The other exchange is the one at Harare, Zimbabwe.
The NSE acts as an agency or medium for promoting and
facilitating contacts between buyers and sellers of
securities. It also provides a forum for the listing (not
trading) of Government Securities. This Chapter describes
the NSE as a formal background to the issues and the data
dealt with in the study. The chapter is organised in four
parts. Part 1 gives a review of the background of the
exchange. The historical part is only briefly treated
because detailed reviews are available in Lomas (1961) and
Munga (1974). Part 2 reports the economic and operating
features of this exchange. Part 3 presents a detailed
account of the organisation of trading. In Part 4
suggestions for improving the securities market in Kenya
are discussed.
52PART 1:
3.2 GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THE EXCHANGE
3.2.1 Brief history of the Nairobi Stock Exchange
The NSE was formally started by six brokers in 1954. There
existed trade in securities before this time, at least for
some twenty years previously, but trade was informal. In
the early stages, the Government and the brokers had
particular interest in forming a viable stock exchange.
The Government saw the exchange as a medium for raising
finances for its programmes locally. The brokers viewed
the exchange as an organisation for raising funds for the
expansion of the private enterprises. The brokers felt
that there should be as little Government involvement as
possible and their views prevailed. As a result, the
exchange was formed outside Government control in line
with the London Stock Exchange as it then was [Loxley
(1969)]. The direct interest of the Government on the
exchange gradually subsided and the exchange was left
entirely in the hands of private brokers.
3.2.2 Objectives of the exchange
The stated objectives of the exchange are:
(a) To improve the facilities available to the public for
53the purchase and sale of shares and the investment of
money.
(b) To regulate the dealings of members with their clients
and with non-members engaged in stockbroking activities.
(c) To standardise, from time to time review, and if
necessary or desirable increase or decrease charges to be
made by members for services rendered to their clients, or
modify the method or methods of assessing or calculating
such charges.
(d) To correlate the stockbroking activities of members
and facilitate the exchange of information to their mutual
advantage and for the benefit of their clients and to
offer advantage and facilities, for the information of the
public, or lists of prices dealt in by members.
(e) To co-operate with Associations of Stockbrokers and
Stock Exchanges in other countries and places and to
obtain and make available to members information and
facilities likely to be of advantage to them or to their
clients.
(f) To investigate, resolve, decide, deal with and take
steps to enforce its decisions and awards relating to, any
irregularities or alleged irregularities in the dealings
of members with their clients, non-members engaged in
stockbroking activities, any differences or disputes
54between members and non-members and any complaints made
against members by other members or any other parties if
such differences, disputes or complaints relate to or
touch on the stockbroking business or activities of such
members (NSE Rules, p.2).
3.2.3 The Committee of the exchange
To achieve the above objectives the exchange has organised
itself into a committee. This committee is responsible for
the administration of the Exchange. As a private members
organisation, the NSE is registered under the Societies
Act. The members of the Committee are the individual firms
or companies engaged in stockbroking in Kenya. To
facilitate efficient administration, the Committee elects
a Chairman and a Secretary from among its members. These
office bearers are to execute all the administrative
functions of the stock exchange.
3.2.4 The brokers
There are currently six brokers operating in the NSE.
These brokers are:
1) Francis Thuo & Partners Ltd. P.O.Box 46524 Nairobi
Kenya.
2) Dyer & Blair Ltd. P.O.Box 45396 Nairobi Kenya.
553) Chandulal Shah. P.O.Box 14686 Nairobi Kenya.
4) Francis Drummond & Company Ltd. P.O.Box 45465 Nairobi
Kenya.
5) Nyaga Stockbrokers Ltd. P.O.Box 41868 Nairobi Kenya.
6) Ngenye Kariuki and Company. P.O.Box 12185 Nairobi
Kenya.
In the advanced stock markets brokers do not deal with
each other directly but through intermediaries, for
example, jobbers and specialists who deal in certain types
of shares. At the NSE the brokers deal with each other
directly. The brokers are also jobbers. The brokers do not
specialise in specific types of shares or business and are
assumed to be conversant with a variety of shares and
business. The brokers in practice form a small elite group
with wide unchallenged power over such fundamental issues
as membership of the exchange, the shares to be quoted,
the terms and conditions upon which quotations will be
accepted.
Applications for membership of the exchange are from
individuals only. The qualifications and requirements for
such membership are:
(a) The applicant shall have a reasonable level of
education preferably School Certificate and above.
56Although not essential, professional qualifications of a
financial nature or a degree in economics or commerce
would be an advantage.
(b) The applicant shall have had at least three years
working experience at a senior level with a registered
member of Nairobi Stock Exchange or any other recognised
stock exchange.
(c) The applicant shall not conduct any business until
appropriate Government Licences such as Authorised
Depository, Trade Licence, Principal Licence, etc. are
obtained.
(d) Before confirmation of the full membership, the
applicant will be subject to a probationary period of at
least one year. During probationary period:-
(i) The applicant shall deposit with the Stock Exchange a
sum of K.Shs. 50,000/-. This deposit shall be refundable
without interest on expiry of the probationary period.
(ii)Business accounts shall be settled within two working
days after good delivery.
Besides the above, the members of the exchange shall pay
the following costs for membership (NSE RULES 58 & 102)
57(a) Members
1. Entrance Fee Shs. 2,500.00
2. Annual Subscription Fee
(payable half yearly) Shs. 4,000.00
(b) Registered Agents
1. Entrance Fee Shs. 1,000.00
2. Annual Fee Shs. 800.00
The Committee of the exchange is not bound to accept any
application for membership or to give reasons for refusing
such application. According to existing stock exchange
rules, no appeal is available on the decision of the
Committee. This has been one of the most controversial
rules of the exchange. It has been felt that such a rule
was devised to maintain the status quo of the existing
brokers. The Capital Markets Act (1989) erodes this power
of the Committee.
3.2.5 Conduct of brokers
The exchange sets out the various rules to be followed by
its members in dealing amongst themselves and with
outsiders. The most important of the rules can be
summarised as:
( i)	 No partnership in brokerage is allowed between a
broker and a non-broker unless authorised by the
58Committee.
(ii)The brokers are to charge the standardised brokerage
rates laid down from time to time by the Committee.
(iii) The brokers shall keep or cause to be kept proper
books of accounts in which shall be entered full
particulars of their dealings and transactions.
(iv) No fictitious transactions shall be made by or
between members.
3.2.6 Disciplinary provisions
Any member who does not charge fees in accordance with the
rules can be fined.
The Committee may either suspend or revoke membership for
any irregularities, non-conformity with the ethics, code
and conduct of stockbroking business, and non-observance
of the Rules and Regulations of the Exchange.
3.2.7 The Government's regulation of the exchange
The Government through direct and indirect means
participates in the operations of the market. For example,
Government agencies regulate financial institutions to
provide a secure financial system and to promote
competition. In Kenya this can be seen to be through
legislation and/or activity. Government agencies have
responsibility for implementation of monetary, fiscal, and
debt management policies in the interest of economic
stabilisation. Monetary policy is concerned with changing
59the growth rate of the money supply and the terms and
conditions of credit. Fiscal policy is concerned with
taxes and expenditure of government. Debts management
policy is concerned with the impact of the Government's
debt-issue decisions on the financial markets.
In carrying out those policy programmes, Government
agencies exercise tremendous influence on the cost and
availability of credit, an influence felt throughout the
entire structure of financial markets and institutions.
The direct influence on the exchange is felt through the
CAPITAL MARKETS AUTHORITY (CMA) from 1989 and previously
by its predecessor THE CAPITAL ISSUES COMMITTEE ( CIC ).
3.2.7.1 The Capital Issues Committee ( CIC )
Up to late 1988, the CIC was the most influential body
with respect to share issues in Kenya. The CIC was
initially set up within the Treasury in 1971 to monitor
and control the issue of securities. At that time its
stated aims were to prevent economically harmful capital
outflows from Kenya. The setting up of this committee
followed disinvestment by foreign companies which had been
urged to go public to allow local ownership of shares.
These companies would repatriate all the receipts of all
new issue to their home countries. The CIC was set up to
authorise among other things, the size, timing and pricing
of any new issues of securities, the capitalisation of
reserves and the transfer of securities by publicly quoted
60companies.
The CIC was heavily criticised as being an obstacle to
flotation of companies on the Nairobi Stock Exchange.
Swainson (1980) contended that the CIC was an effective
control measure for preventing the buying of local firms
by foreign firms, and as a consequence a hindrance to
external capital inflows. Langdon (1978) in his review of
foreign subsidiaries suggested that the CIC did not
represent an important control on the flotation or growth
of the multinational sector. The IFC (1984) report on
capital markets in Kenya was of the view that, in real
terms, the CIC provided the most severe supply side
restriction on the stock exchange. The World Bank (1987)
Report on Kenya's Industrial Sector stated:
'1 Such extensive powers (of the CIC) are unusual
even in countries, such as the United Kingdom, that
have had in the past similar Committees regulating
new issues. In such countries, pricing (if not
timing) has virtually been decided privately
between the firm and its underwriters."
We do not know whether the evidence available vindicates
the CIC or the multinational subsidiaries. The facts are
that the CIC process has been reputedly so slow and time
consuming that one issue - Barclays Bank's - was nearly
six years in process before conclusion. It should also be
noted that between 1980 and 1988 there have only been three
61public issues and one private placing. This has not been
an encouraging sign for a market expected to mobilise
savings and channel funds to important areas of
investment.
The sharp
International
Government's
Authority Act
1989.
criticism of the World Bank and the
Finance Corporation (IFC) led to the Kenyan
decision to enact the Capital Markets
and set up the Capital Markets Authority in
3.2.7.2 The Capital Markets Authority (CMA)
There have been suggestions over several years that the
Government makes a move towards injecting "life" into the
capital market in Kenya. The CMA was the body formed to
oversee this task. The formation of CMA came as a result
of recommendations made to the Government by the
International Finance Corporation. The Authority is
managed by a council of eleven members appointed by the
Government. There are no specific requirement for
appointment of a stock exchange member, and on this basis
it is supposed to be independent from the exchange.
The CMA was formed to promote and maintain an effective
and efficient securities market through:
(a) the development of all aspects of the capital markets
with particular emphasis on the removal of impediments to,
62and the creation of incentives for, the longer-term
investments in productive enterprises.
(b) the creation, maintenance and regulation, through
implementation of a system in which the market
participants are self-regulatory to the maximum
practicable extent, of a market in which securities can be
issued and traded in an orderly, fair and efficient
manner.
(c) the protection of investor interests.
(d) the operation of a compensation fund to protect
investors from financial loss arising from the failure of
a licensed broker or dealer to meet his contractual
obligations.
The establishment of the Authority is supposed to have
significant impact on the operations of the exchange
because:
(a) it will reduce the powers of the Committee of the
exchange. It will establish conditions for, and approve an
entity to operate as, a securities exchange. In addition
it will be within its powers to grant
person to operate as a broker. This was
Committee of the exchange. Aggrieved
recourse to appeal to it from the
facility was in existence before.
a licence to any
a function of the
parties will have
exchange. No such
63(b) it will have the responsibility for making rules
regarding the listing of securities on the exchange.
(c) it will regulate disclosure of security transactions
by brokers and dealers and the security exchange.
(d) it requires the proper maintenance of books, records,
accounts and the audit of such books and records of any
licensed broker.
The enactment of the security market law was a very
important step in the provision of responsible stock
market services in Kenya and for the protection of the
investor.
3.2.8 The role of the financial sector in the exchange
The process of accumulating and channelling savings into
real investment is performed by financial intermediaries.
The assets of these firms consist of financial claims
against others. Examples of such financial intermediaries
are banks, life insurance companies, pension and provident
funds. In financial intermediation, savings are gathered
from households and the intermediaries invest them in
financial assets such as shares, bonds, debentures and
mortgages. This section examines the nature of the
financial sector and its role in the exchange.
64The financial sector is made up of
3.2.8.1 Commercial banks
The country had by 1989, 24 banks with 217 full branches,
70 sub-branches and many agencies and mobile units. In
Kenya, the role of the Government in the drawing of bank
credit has increased over time. The Government's share of
bank credit has continued to increase, for example, from
2.9% in 1980 to 8.4% in 1985. This resulted from forced
bank lending to the Government through it demanding a
given liquid asset ratio and purchase of treasury bills.
This action has tended to produce a crowding-out effect on
the credit available to the private sector.
The commercial banks in Kenya have come to play a new role
in the issue of new shares. The last four new issues have
been greatly supported by the banking sector. The banks
have acted as collecting agents and have also in some
cases advanced funds to their customers for purchase of
the shares. The shares purchased are then used as
collateral for those advances. This has also changed the
hitherto unacceptable system where banks did not attach
value to share certificates. This share purchase support
scheme is probably one of the reasons new issues have been
over-subscribed.
Changes in the regulation of bank lending may have
important implications for the exchange. In 1989, the
65Central Bank changed the rules to allow commercial banks
to extend term loans to over three years. Previously banks
were restricted to term loans of 3 years maximum. The
reason is that, currently, the banks tend to favour
lending through rolling overdrafts to well-established
private and public companies. This has to do with risk
management of bank funds. The opening of long-term lending
means that the banks can make long-term lending to such
companies. These same companies will not find it necessary
to go public or to offer new securities to the public.
This will result in a very reduced level of activity on
the exchange's new issues market.
The new conditions may also make banks favour major
companies at the expense of small enterprises, which would
then face severe credit rationing. It might be argued that
this will provide motivation for small enterprises to seek
funds through the exchange operations. In any case
companies complaining of a credit squeeze by the
Government or the banks should exercise their right to
float equity or debt on the exchange. As will be discussed
later, the current state of the exchange does not make it
easy for small companies to make public issues.
Although the major banks do hold some equity in publicly
quoted companies as part of their portfolio, the extent to
which they invest on the exchange is not known. There has
been great reluctance to disclose the nature and extent of
the holding. The extent of their trading on the exchange is
66also unknown. The level of intermediation between the
banks and the exchange remains undocumented.
3.2.8.2 Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs)
There were 54 operational NBFIs with 94 branches operating
in urban areas. The formal role of NBFIs is
collecting savings and channelling these savings into
long-term investments. Their importance was recognised in
the direct competition they offered from the early 1980s'
to the banking sector which hitherto had been operating
as an oligopoly. The main distinction between them and the
banks was that they were allowed to charge higher lending
rates than the banks. Consequently they were able to offer
higher rates to savers.
Even though the NBFIs grew tremendously in the 1980's,
they did not seem to have had any significant impact on
the operations of the stock exchange. By 1986, serious
management problems had already been noted with respect to
some of the NBFIs. These problems cumulated to the
September 1986 bank crisis in Kenya. The underlying reason
was that the NBFIs which collapsed did not make sound
fund-channelling decisions. Their capital bases were weak
and management poor. In the publicly available list of
portfolio holdings of the collapsed NBFIs, none had made
any investment in quoted securities. In future, NBFIs may
be expected to specialise in long-term finance and hold
long-term based portfolios. A consequence of this would be
67their increased participation on the exchange.
3.2.8.3 Development banks
The role of development banks is that of providing
long-term finance through arranging local and
international loans for major industrial undertakings.
There are at present four development banks concerned with
industrial finance in Kenya. It is expected that given the
constraints on commercial banks and the weaknesses of the
NBFIs, the development banks offer an alternative to
industrial finance. It is true that the development banks
play a key role in providing long term finance to
industry [World Bank (1987)]. The reasons for this have
been:
(a) The formal restrictions on the commercial banking
sector
(b) The inability and unwillingness of the NBFIs.
(c) The non-activity and lack of dynamism of the stock
market.
The funds available to these development banks are
limited. This means that they are constrained in their
industrial lending. The problem of constrained funds of
the development banks may be resulting from their use of
the stock exchange. No notable attempts have been made by
these banks to raise funds through the organised exchange
either by way of debt instruments or equity issues [World
68Bank (1987)]. Their role in the exchange remains remote.
One of them, Industrial and Commercial Development
Corporation (ICDC), nevertheless, did float a public
company in 1978 through its subsidiary, ICDC Investment
Limited. It may be argued that the objectives of the issue
was not to raise finance through the organised exchange
but to fulfil a social objective in its original charter,
that of distributing its share ownership nationally.
3.2.8.4 Insurance companies
Kenya had a total of 39 locally incorporated insurance
companies by the end of 1988. Since the role of insurance
companies is to manage risk over long-term periods, we
should expect particular interest in long-term
investments, especially those offered by the exchange.
There is scarce information on the level of investment of
life and non-life insurance companies. Their investments
have been observed to be of short-term nature. The World
Bank (1987) report on industrial development in Kenya
states that life-insurers argue that their investments are
biased towards the short -term because of:
(a) Very high interest rates paid by NBFIs
(b) restriction on lending to, and investing in, non-
publicly quoted companies; and
(c) the absence of any new supply of publicly-traded
equities and bonds.
69The observation that insurance companies would wish to
invest in quoted securities is interesting, and suggests
that the insurance companies have a major role to play in
a revitalised stock exchange system. The Insurance Act
imposes formal directions into which investments should be
put. It provides for at least 20% of the investment to be
put in quoted securities. There is also a provision that
requires increased local ownership of all foreign
controlled insurance companies. It requires 51% local
ownership of such companies. This may revitalise the stock
exchange's new issue market by having such companies make
public offers of equity shares. We are unable now to
determine the effectiveness of the insurance companies in
financial intermediation and their level of activity on
the organised exchange. The only evidence is
circumstantial and may be inferred by examining the
investment account in published annual accounts of the
insurance companies. We do, of course, believe that they
are probably the most active single group of institutional
investors but the Exchange did not have published evidence
on their level of participation.
The above discussion shows that the level of participation
of the financial sector in the exchange is at a very low
level. This does not augur well for the stock exchange's
development in the future, unless increased participation
by this sector is forthcoming.
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3.3 ECONOMIC AND OPERATING FEATURES OF THE NAIROBI STOCK
EXCHANGE
3.3.1 The Activity Of The NSE
The NSE deals in three types of securities. These are
ordinary shares, preference shares and debentures. The
listing of a security qualifies it for trading on the
exchange. Government securities are, however, listed but
not traded. Their trading is managed by the Central Bank,
and distribution is done through the help of one of the
six brokers who at that time is the Government broker. In
discussing the performance of the NSE, Government
securities will be omitted because their activity is not
within the organised exchange. The statistics of the
exchange are given in Table 3.1.
3.3.2 Size of the Markets
The size of the market may be defined in terms of
capitalisation and the number of securities listed. Table
3.1 reports the summary statistics for 1979 to 1989.
71TABLE 3.1: THE NAIROBI STOCK EXCHANGE STATISTICS
(currency amount in Millions)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
A. Number of listed companies
Nairobi Stock Exchange 54 54 55 54 54 54 54 53 53 55 57
B. Market Capitalisation
1)	 In Shillings 137 134 226 404 546 721 624 698 757 852 1296
2) In USA dollars 20 18 25 37 41 50 38 43 46 48 63
3) Percentage change -10.0 38.9 48.0 10.8 22.0 -24.0 13.2 7.0 4.3 31.3
C. Valuation Indicators
1) NSE Index (Jan 1966=100) 416.3 378.3 350.4 349.8 382.7 386.4 421.1 506.0 735.3 858.6
2) Change in Index (%) -10.0 -7.4 -0.2 9.4 1.0 9.0 20.2 45.3 16.8
3) P/E ratio 6.1 5.0 9.4 7.7 1.5 1.5 6.8 3.5 10.4 7.0 11.5
4) Dividend yield (%) 7.4 6.6 4.7 7.1 4.5 6.8 5.5 5.0 5.1 8.4 10.1
D. Economic Data
1) Gross Domestic Product(GDP) $7023 6949 5882 5446 5545 5564 6037 7268 8011 8940
2) Growth GDP -1.1 -15.4 -7.4 1.8 0.3 8.5 20.4 10.2 11.6
3) Growth GDP(constant prices) 4.3 3.3 5.5 2.3 2.3 0.7 4.9 5.5 4.8 5.2
SOURCES: Nairobi Stock Exchange
Company Accounts- Various issues
IFC statistics 1990
Kenya Economic Survey - Various issues
723.3.2.1 Capitalisation
Market capitalisation for the NSE grew by 2.5 times
compared to the growth of all emerging markets of 6.695
times and that of developed markets of 3.183 times between
1980-89. This can attributed to the low growth in value of
quoted companies in the agricultural sector. This growth
was nevertheless reasonable considering that, like many
other African countries, Kenya was experiencing
difficulties in its internal structures and external debt
management, which also affected the generation of wealth.
From 1986 the increase in growth can be attributed to
increased investor confidence in the market following the
Government's announcement of its intention to revitalise
the stock exchange. During that year there was also a
declared intention by at least three companies to go
public, and this was given wide publicity by the national
media.
3.3.2.2 Listings
The number of securities listed has remained constant over
the period 1979 to 1988. The lowest number listed was in
1986 when one company was reprivatised. Two listings in
1988 increased the number to 55. The shares listed are
from different industrial groupings, utilities, and
financial institutions. The types of the listed securities
were:
73Ordinary Shares
At the end of 1988 there were 52 ordinary shares listed.
For the period 1979 to 1988, 4 shares were delisted: 3
were delisted because of company failure and one company
became private. During the same period, four new ordinary
equities were listed. All four new ordinary share listings
were financial institutions: two banks, one NBFI, and one
insurance company. The current legal requirements are that
the shares must be denominated in par values, which have
no relationship with the market price. Any special
features such as special rights, restrictions, and class
of the shares must be disclosed.
Preference Shares
The number of listed preference shares remained constant
throughout the period 1979 to 1988. Two issues were
delisted with the failures of the issuing companies. One
preference share was issued by an industrial company
within this period. The nature of the preference shares is
always disclosed, for example, whether the shares are
redeemable and if so, when, cumulative or non-cumulative,
their convertibility, and the coupon rate of dividend and
any special rights.
74Loan Stock
Two loan stock issues had been continuously listed for the
entire study period. There were no new issues. These were
the only loan stocks available for trading. Other loan
stocks listed were for local authorities and the
Government, but they were not available for trading.
3.3.3 Trading Volume (Turnover).
The level of activity in the market is best measured by
the value of securities traded and the relationship
between the value traded and capitalisation (turnover). No
official statistics are available on trading volume. The
last official figures available were in 1979 when 5,496
trades were concluded. The number of shares that changed
hands or the nature of the investors who dealt in the
transactions in that year was not available. The volume of
trading cannot as for now be determined until the exchange
starts to report it again formally.
3.3.4 Valuation Details
The valuation ratios are the price/earning and dividend
yield. The figures for 1979 to 1989 are presented in Table
3.1. The P/E ratios and dividend yields were similar to
those of other emerging markets. The dividend yield was
75stable over the period which was good for investors
relying on dividend income. The P/E ratio and the dividend
yield gives future value signals to investors. The higher
the P/E ratio, the higher the expected future income
relative to current income [Foster (1986)]. It may be
concluded from the ratios that the NSE shows reasonable
prospects.
3.3.5 The Nairobi Stock Exchange Index
The NSE-Index enjoys extensive coverage in the public
media in Kenya as a barometer that monitors changes in the
economy.
3.3.5.1 Computation
The computation of the weekly index is at present done by
the broking firm of Dyer and Blair. They took up the
exercise in 1968. The original index (then known as the
East African Industrial Share Index) was done by T.L.
Champion. The base of the current index is January 1966.
The NSE index is unweighted. An arbitrary figure of KE2000
is assumed to be invested equally at K100 except for
Kenya Breweries and Kenya Power which are allocated KE250
each. The index is constructed using the formula:
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	 (SP) (B)	
(1)
2
Where:
Ic = Ordinary share price index in the current week
n = Number of companies (17 companies currently).
S = Number of shares outstanding for each company
P = Middle market price for the ordinary shares of each
company in the current week.
B = The base index as at 3rd October 1968 = 170.86
3.3.5.2 Composition
The companies whose shares are used for the computation of
the index are:
1. B.A.T. (K) Ltd.
2. Brooke Bond
3. Car and General
4. Consolidated Holdings
5. C.M.C. Holdings
6. Diamond Trust of Kenya
7. E.A. Portland Cement
8. Elliot Bakeries
9. Jubilee Insurance
7710. Kakuzi Ltd.
11. Kenya Breweries
12. Kenya National Mills
13. Kenya Power and Lighting.
14. Barclays Bank
15. Motor Mart and Exchange
16. National Industrial Credit
17. Sasini Tea and Coffee Ltd.
3.3.5.3 Movement in the NSE-Index
The year-end index and the changes in the index are given
in Table 3.1. The index has increased considerably over
the 10 years from 416.3 in 1979 to 858.6 in 1988. The
percentage changes from year to year were erratic.
Negative changes were recorded for 1980 and 1981
reflecting the impact of the oil crisis on the economy.
Improved performance of the economy and the easing of the
oil pressure on the industrial sector are reflected in the
index between 1986 and 1988. The percentage changes in the
index compares well to those of the Gross Domestic Product
shown at the bottom of Table 3.1.
783.3.6 Information Reporting By Quoted Companies
3.3.6.1 Reporting Requirements of the Stock Exchange
The stock exchange has its own rules for reporting by
quoted companies. It requires that during the continuance
of its quotation the company will:
(a) Present half yearly interim statements, the
Chairman's Annual Report and Accounts to the Nairobi Stock
Exchange immediately these have been approved by the
Directors.
(b) Notify announcement of dividends, rights and
bonus issues at least three weeks before the closing
of the register.
(c) Notify any sale or purchase of assets which could
materially alter the company's business or capital
structure.
These provisions have to be complied with. Any company
that fails to comply with them will have trading in its
shares suspended.
3.3.6.2 The Companies Act
The Companies Act makes it mandatory for all registered
companies to produce annual accounts. It also prescribes
the minimum amount of disclosure that must be made by
companies in those accounts. The accounts must be audited
79before publication.
3.3.6.3 Other issues in reporting
The nature of financial reporting by Kenyan quoted
companies is a research issue in its own right but it
suffices to say here that public companies are required to
follow Kenyan Accounting standards in the formulation of
their reporting. Where standards have not been formulated,
the current rules by the Institute of Certified Public
Accountants of Kenya are that International Accounting
Standards should be adopted.
There has also been increased attention by the public
media on the activities of companies in Kenya. The
companies also do from time to time make public disclosure
of activities and events which they consider to be of
importance. One may argue, a priori, that the level of
reporting by companies is reasonable.
3.3.7 Fiscal Environment Of The Exchange
The levels of taxation have been argued to affect the
demand and supply of securities on exchanges [Calamanti
(1983), Kitchen (1986)]. This section examines the fiscal
environment of the NSE. Exchange related taxes are:
80(a) on transactions
Transactions on the exchange are subject to stamp duty.
The current rate is at 0.5% of the value of the
transaction in the security. The tax is payable by the
person to whom the security is transferred.
(b) on income from listed securities
The dividend received from quoted securities is considered
to be income chargeable to tax in Kenya in the hands of
the recipient. The tax rates differ depending on whether
the recipient is an individual or company.
An individual will have dividend income added to his other
income and taxed at the individual rate of tax whose
maximum currently stands at 45%.
A company will have the dividend treated as corporate
income and taxed at 45%. The dividend may nevertheless be
exempt from tax if the company owns 12.5% or more of the
shares or voting power of the dividend issuing company.
Similarly, dividend income (unless exempt from tax) is
subject to with-holding tax of 15%. The tax is deducted by
the issuing company before making the dividend payments to
its shareholders. The withholding tax on interest is 10%.
This means that interest has a more favourable tax
treatment than dividends.
81(c) on quoted companies
The profit of quoted companies is subject to tax at 45%.
This is the same tax rate charged to all companies, both
private and public. It should be recalled from above that
the dividend received or paid out by such companies is
also subject to tax. This represents double taxation of
dividends and is arguably one of the main issues hindering
the development of the capital markets [IFC (1984)].
(d) tax treatment of certain expenditure of raising
capital.
There are certain costs incurred in raising capital which
are not tax deductible. The costs of raising share capital
and of issuing debentures, for example, are not tax
deductible.
An effect of the current tax regime is that no tax
advantages are gained by a company going public.
3.3.8 The Demand For Securities
Demand for securities in Kenya comes from two distinct
sources: individual shareholders and institutional
investors. Individual shareholders have now recognised the
attractiveness of holding securities as an alternative
investment to real assets such as land and buildings.
82Evidence of the high demand for securities is provided by:
(i) Oversubscription of new issues.
Recent experience with the Barclays Bank, Kenya Commercial
Bank, and Jubilee Insurance issues, suggests that there
exists an unsatisfied demand for securities in Kenya.
These issues, which were restricted only to individuals,
were all oversubscribed by between two to five times. To
ensure what the issuers call "equity" subscribers were
allotted only 100 shares each irrespective of the number
of shares applied for. This of course had a social
advantage that the shares were widely distributed to many
people.
(ii) Unfulfilled buy orders
Information from the brokers suggests that they are never
short of purchase orders and have more customers willing
to buy shares than there are shares available for sale in
the market. This is supported by evidence provided by the
price list information of the exchange. This suggests
that, had there been an adequate supply of securities at
the right prices, the market would transact in almost all
securities each week.
83(iii) The demand from institutional investors
The last public issues of shares have tended to
discriminate against institutional investors. They have
not been allowed free subscription, and in some cases they
have been barred from subscribing (Kenya Commercial Bank).
This is in spite of the fact that such investors have been
very much interested in investment in financial assets.
The unfulfilled demand from this group of investors has
forced many of them to adopt short-term investment
strategies. For example, The World Bank (1987) report on
industrial development in Kenya states that life-insurers
argue that their investments are biased towards the
short-term for two exchange-related reasons: restriction
on lending to, and investing in, non-publicly quoted
companies; and the absence of any new supply of publicly
traded equities and bonds.
Hopefully this will change, since the Government has
recognised these weaknesses and, through the CMA, has
devised steps aimed at revitalising the exchange. The
increased awareness of the attraction of financial assets
represents one of the dynamic forces not exploited fully
in the Kenyan Capital market. There seems little doubt
that an adequate demand for securities exists.
843.3.9 The Supply Of Securities
There are two sources of supply of securities to the
exchange. The first is the primary market, where new
securities are issued. The second is the secondary market,
the stock exchange itself, where existing securities are
traded.
3.3.9.1 The New Issues Market
The key role of the capital market is that of financial
intermediation and capital formation. This role is
fulfilled by being a catalyst in the mobilisation of
savings, and by channelling those savings into profitable
investment. The primary market segment of the capital
market deals with any new issues of shares and bonds.
In Kenya the new issues market for shares has been
dominated by the stock brokers. This is probably because
they have the advantage of close contact with the
companies willing to go public. Without sophisticated
financial analysts and investment advisory services, they
are also seen as the only ones who understand the rigour
and technicalities of issuing securities. The Government
manages the issues of its stock and bills and does not
involve brokers directly.
85Procedure for new issues of shares.
When a company decides to go public, the management
approaches a selected Broker or Underwriter. The broker or
underwriter may be selected by introduction, knowledge, or
in some cases - by association. The role of the
underwriter will be to look at the financial needs and
plans of the company wishing to issue securities. He will
advise on the best strategy to use in raising the funds.
When the strategy is agreed, the managing underwriter or
sponsoring broker will start managing the process of
floating the securities.
To be able to raise funds on ordinary shares from the
public, the company must be a registered public company
under the Companies Act. For this purpose, a private
company must be converted into a public company.
With the help of the managing underwriter, the company
will apply for formal authority to the CIC (now CMA). As
discussed earlier, the role of the CIC is to determine the
terms of the issue, including the pricing. It also
approves the timing of the issue. Once permission is
granted by the CIC the company makes an application for
listing to the Committee of the exchange. The company
making the new issue is helped by a sponsoring broker, who
must be a member of the exchange. The necessary
requirements for quotation must be fulfilled. These
requirements are (NSE: RULE 104):
861.Every company wishing to go public will be required to
provide a certificate from its Auditors stating that the
company has been properly registered within the terms of
the Companies Act (Cap. 486).
2. The minimum issued and fully paid up capital of a
company wishing to obtain a quotation should be a total of
at least K.E.100,000 in Ordinary and/or fixed interest
capital.
3. In order to obtain a public quotation, a company must
issue or offer for sale to the public not less than 20% of
its authorised share capital, or shares to the nominal
value of K.E.50,000, whichever is less.
4. Certain details are required in the accounts submitted
before a company offers its shares to the public,
particularly concerning:
(a) All Directors, the Company's Secretary, Auditors and
Legal Advisers, and the date of the financial year end.
(b) Particulars of any subsidiaries or associated
companies together with their profit and loss accounts.
Any subsequent changes to the above must be notified
immediately to the Nairobi Stock Exchange.
875. The Nairobi Stock Exchange requires seven copies of the
company's audited balance sheets for the previous five
years, or for all years if the company has been in
existence for less than five years, together with
sufficient copies of its Articles of Association for
retention by the members of the Nairobi Stock Exchange.
6. The Nairobi Stock Exchange requires to be informed in
detail of the existing and intended distribution of the
company's Ordinary share capital with regard to whether
control is, at the time of new issue of shares, held
locally or overseas, and on any intended alteration. Where
a company has Certificates of Approved Enterprise in
relation to capital imported, an Auditors' statement
giving details of such Certificates has to be produced.
7. A public quotation for a company is dependent upon the
making of a minimum issue or offer of shares, as above, to
the public. This issue or offer must be sponsored by a
stockbroking firm which is a member of the Stock Exchange.
The sponsoring broker is responsible for making an
application to the Stock Exchange for a public quotation
and for the preparation of a prospectus for an offer or
issue to the public which meets the requirements of the
law. The prospectus must gain the approval of the Nairobi
Stock Exchange Committee and the New Issues Committee.
8. A Hearing Fee of Shs. 1,000/- is payable by any company
applying for a first quotation of its shares. This fee is
88payable immediately the application is submitted by the
sponsoring broker.
9. A fee of Shs. 1,000/- for each class of shares or
debentures for which a quotation is required must be paid
to the Exchange within 30 days of the quotation being
granted.
10. Separate applications for additional quotations must
be made to the Nairobi Stock Exchange for any further
alterations of capital, subject to a quotation fee Shs.
1,000/-.
11. Companies are required to pay an annual quotation fee
according to the rate of charges set from time to time by
the Stock Exchange in General Meeting. The current rate of
charges are as follows:
quoted share capital Annual Fee
Up to K.E. 1,000,000 Shs. 1,000/-
Up to K.E. 2,000,000 Shs. 1,400/-
Up to K.E. 3,000,000 Shs. 1,800/-
Up to K.E. 4,000,000 Shs. 2,200/-
Up to K.E. 5,000,000 Shs. 2,600/-
Up to K.E. 7,500,000 Shs. 3,200/-
Up to K.E.10,000,000 Shs. 4,000/-
Over	 K.E.10,000,000 Shs. 6,000/-
8912. Companies are required to recognise and register only
those transfers of the quoted shares where the
transactions have gone through one of the members of the
Nairobi Stock Exchange.
13. The quotation of any share may be cancelled or
suspended by the Committee without giving any reason for
such decision.
14. Companies with quoted shares must abide by the rules
and regulations of the Nairobi Stock Exchange.
In order to comply with the above requirements a
prospectus must be prepared. The prospectus must also be
filed with the registrar of companies.
Once the above procedures are completed, the shares are
offered to the public. After the processes of offering are
completed, the shares are listed on the stock exchange and
can be traded from then on.
New Issues 1979 TO 1988
The market for new issues cannot be said to have been very
impressive over the past decade to 1988. From the
inception of the CIC very few public offerings of debt and
equity securities have taken place. Table 3.2 shows the
new issues for the period 1979 - 1988.
90TABLE 3.2 LIST OF NEW SHARE ISSUES 1979 - 1988
COMPANY YEAR OF
ISSUE
NO. OF
SHARES
PAR
VALUE
ISSUE
PRICE
CAPITALISATION
kshs. kshs. kshs.
Pan African Paper 1979 1000000 10.00 20.00 20000000
Jubilee Insurance 1984 800000 5.00 14.50 11600000
Barclays Bank 1986 5000000 10.00 16.00 80000000
Kenya Finance 1988 500000 10.00 17.50 8750000
Kenya Corn. Bank 1988 7500000 10.00 20.00 150000000
All issues were over-subscribed. This may be an indication
that there exists an ample demand for securities in Kenya.
The supply side seem to represent the major problem in the
issues market. This problem may have arisen from:
(a) the ability of the private companies to get funds
cheaply from the banking sector without diluting control.
The current interest rate policies tend to favour the
large well-established companies. The fixing of the
maximum interest rates directly by the Government amounts
to financial repression. This tends to assure that the
banking sector can obtain cheap funds from the public
generally, and channel such funds to selected companies.
The companies on the other hand have a major source of
cheap funds from the financial sector. There is no need
therefore to seek funds from the organised exchange, and
91thereby dilute control or be forced to comply with more
stringent disclosure requirements.
(b) the operations of the financial sector outside the
exchange. The financial sector does not currently have
adequate money market instruments which it can use on the
organised exchange. The absence of such instruments as
commercial paper, short-term bills of credit, and
negotiable certificates of deposit means that no trade can
emerge to deal with them on the exchange.
(c) the existing restrictive tax practices. Firstly,
underwriting expenses are not tax deductible. Secondly,
dividends are double-taxed. Thirdly, there are no
corporate tax advantages to be gained from a firm going
public.
(d) Government's intervention in the new issues market
through the operations of the Capital Issues Committee
(Replaced by the Capital Markets Authority in 1989). This
Committee has been so slow and time consuming in its work
that it has been causing substantial delays in share
issues.
(e) the nature of the stock exchange itself. We noted
earlier that the brokers have greater control over the
market and that there are no jobbers or specialised
merchants bank underwriters. This is demonstrated by the
92fact that the underwriters in the Jubilee and Barclays
issues were two sister companies. In the Barclays issue it
was Barclays Industrial, and in the Jubilee Insurance
issue it was Diamond Trust of Kenya. While in each case
the issue was a success, being over-subscribed by between
two and five times, in a more developed equity market and
without regulated under-pricing being imposed by the CIC,
new issues may fail [World Bank (1987)]. In such a case
the risk bearing and management functions of the
underwriter become important. Without such a group of
specialised risk bearing agents an extensive new issues
market is difficult to establish.
(f) the NSE's listing requirements. We noted above that,
to be listed, a firm needs a five year record of
continuous trading. This militates against making of
public issues by new venture capital firms.
3.3.9.2 Secondary Market
There is little doubt that the supply of securities in the
secondary market is thin. This is evidenced by the number
of sell orders received by brokers, and the occurrence of
transactions on the exchange [Table 7.1]. Several factors
may contribute to the inadequate supply of securities in
the secondary market:
(a) The weaknesses of the new issues market discussed
above.
93(b) The costs of transactions, which are fixed by the
exchange and increased by Government taxes, may affect
supply in that they reduce the returns from equity
investments. These costs include purchase/sale commission
of two percent or more, stamp duty, and transfer fees.
(c) The nature of some of the market participants. In
particular, insurance companies are only allowed to invest
in stocks of firms publicly traded on the NSE. As a result
any shares that become available are instantly bought up
by these institutions and held in their portfolios. Since
changing such a portfolio is costly and difficult, given
the thinness of the market, it takes quite a while for
such securities to reappear in the market for trading.
(d) The listing requirements also affect the secondary
market. To be listed, a firm only has to make available
20% of its total shares for trading purposes. In many
cases 80% of the shares are retained by holding companies,
many of which are based overseas or are in the hands of
family groups. These groups are unlikely to trade these
major blocks of shares. This clearly restricts the
aggregate supply of tradable stocks in the secondary
market.
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3.4	 ORGANISATION OF TRADING ON THE EXCHANGE
3.4.1 Introduction
The NSE deals with two classes of securities. These are
the variable income securities and the fixed income
securities. The ordinary shares predominate in the
variable income class while preference shares, debenture
stock, and municipal and Government bonds form the
portfolio of fixed income securities.
Shares in quoted companies can only be purchased through a
registered broker. We stated earlier that this market does
not have any specialists or dealers. Brokers deal with
each other directly on day to day basis. Nevertheless,
brokers do not buy or sell on their own account, but on
behalf of their clients.
The minimum level of trading on the exchange is for 100
shares or more, and the quotations on the stock must be
for lots of such amounts. Any transaction in a lesser
number of shares is known as an odd-lot transaction (NSE
Handbook). The broker is a major player in the price
setting process, as all transactions take place at a price
asked or offered by him.
95We examine how a transaction originates, how it is handled
and concluded and what is involved when shares are
purchased cum- and ex- div, with rights and with bonus
issues. We then look at the costs of transacting on the
NSE, short selling, and the reporting system.
3.4.2 The origins of a transaction
According to the NSE Handbook, potential customers contact
the brokers either by mail, telephone, personal visits or
through registered agents, and give their buying or
selling orders. The brokers receive from their clients
either a market or limit order.
3.4.2.1 Market Orders
This is an order given by a person to his broker for
purchasing or selling a security. The broker is expected
to execute the order at the best market price that
occurred on that particular day. Hence a sell order
should be at the highest price for the day and a buy order
should be at the lowest price. The broker exercises his
discretion on the transaction and the investor has no
control over the price at which the transaction occurs.
3.4.2.2 Limit Orders
An investor placing a buy or sell limit order expects the
broker to execute the order at a proposed price. Hence, a
96sell limit order is executed if the market price for a
particular share rises to that price. A buy limit order is
executed if the market price for a particular share moves
to that price. The investor has complete control over the
price of limit orders.
The nature of the above orders may vary depending on the
individual needs of the client with respect to time,
quantity of shares, type of securities, etc. With the
orders in his possession the broker proceeds to the next
stage: that of making the transaction.
3.4.3 Making transactions: bidding and offering
The NSE, unlike markets in developed countries has no
trading floor or mechanised trading systems. It has been
labelled a "telephone market" in that brokers are supposed
to communicate with each other on telephone.
The broker with the buy market or the buy limit order will
be interested in obtaining a low price. On the other hand,
brokers holding sell orders will be interested in getting
the highest price. The broker with the order will ask for
a quote from another broker(s). The broker contacted will
make a quotation on a buy and sell. The broker quoting
does not know if his counterpart has a buy or sell order.
It is important to recognise that the rules are that once
the quotes are established no bid or offer at a lower
price can be made. Similarly when an offer is established
97no offer or bid at a higher price can be made until the
market clears on that stock between the two brokers. The
broker may nevertheless decide not to do business with
this broker and ask for a quotation from the next broker.
The process of quotation is then repeated. If the broker
decides to do business after receiving a quote he will
make a counter offer but restricted within the original
quote. At this time he will disclose whether it is a buy
or sell order. The other broker may decide to accept the
counter offer, otherwise the counter offering continues
until a transaction price is struck. Limit orders do
restrict the freedom of the prices at which the
transactions are concluded. When the first deal is
concluded any new order is treated as new business and the
process starts afresh.
The nature of the market and the number of brokers means
that sometimes a broker may have both buy and sell orders
for the same share. In such situations professional ethics
demand that the broker seeks to transact with other
brokers first on the stock before crossing the orders.
There are, however, no rules laid down that the broker
should not cross the order immediately himself, and it
will then be entirely an internal transaction.
When the broker has struck a price, the deal with the
other broker(s) is concluded, and the purchase or sale can
be formalised.
983.4.4 Purchase of shares
When the broker concludes a buy order for his client he
issues a Purchase Contract Note to that client. The note
is a legal document that acts as proof of ownership of
shares until the share certificate arrives. The note will
show the number of shares purchased, the price per share,
the commission chargeable in accordance with the rates
stipulated by the Committee of the stock exchange, the
contract stamp, transfer fee chargeable by the company for
the processing of transfer documents and the Government's
stamp duty. The final figure will show the total amount to
be paid to the broker immediately on receipt of the
contract note (NSE Notes p.9).
All purchases are deemed to be for cash unless there is
agreement between the brokers in writing within twenty
four hours of the offer. Any purchaser who fails to settle
his account within the stipulated time of the Purchase
Contract Note can be charged interest at the ruling bank
rate.
The stock broker shall complete the transaction of
purchase by forwarding to the buyer a transfer deed,
having been signed in blank by the seller. The buyer is
expected to complete his name in full, with address and
signature, and the deed must be witnessed by an
independent person. The duly executed transfer deed,
99together with the relative share certificate(s), are
lodged with the Registrar of the company whose shares were
purchased and the Registrar records the name and address
of the shareholder in the place of the previous owner
whose name is deleted. A new share certificate is sent to
the buyer via the stock broker.
3.4.5 Sale transactions
In a sale transaction the seller receives a Sale Contract
Note from his broker. The note shows the net sales
proceeds available to the seller. The seller bears the
administrative charges of the sale, which include
commission to the broker and contract stamp.
The seller is assumed to sell for cash, unless he has
allowed for credit in writing. The seller of shares shall
make or tender delivery within sixty days after the date
of the transaction except:
(a) by agreement with the buyer, or;
(b) where the contract note is endorsed 'for quick
delivery' in which case delivery shall be made or
tendered within ten days after the date of the
transaction, or;
(c) where the seller is doubtful as to his ability to
deliver within sixty days and declares so at the time
of making the transaction (NSE Rule 90).
100Once the stock broker sells shares, a blank transfer form
is sent to the seller for signing and the signature shall
be witnessed by an independent person. The executed
transfer together with the share certificate are returned
to the broker for delivery to the buyer.
3.4.6 Transactions involving Dividends, Bonus and
Rights issues
Dividends announced by quoted companies are payable to
shareholders who are on the register at a particular date.
The date depends on when the dividend is declared. When
dividends are declared shares are quoted on the exchange
cum-dividend from this date for twenty one days. After
this date the register is closed and shares are quoted
ex-div. Any investor purchasing shares during the cum-div
period will be entitled to the dividend even if he is not
in the register. After the register is closed shares are
on ex-div basis.
Any person who sells shares cum-dividend shall forward the
dividend to the buyer even though the buyer's name had not
been entered into the register at the time the register
was closed. The same principle applies to bonus and rights
issues.
1013.4.7 Cost of transacting on the NSE
The direct costs of transacting are:
(a) Commission
Both buyers and sellers of securities pay commission to
brokers at predetermined rates fixed by the Committee of
the Exchange. The current rates of the commissions are:
(i) On Companies Shares and Stocks
Consideration per share
Up to Shs.	 1.50
Brokerage per Share
cents	 10
%age
7%
Over Shs.	 1.50 to 2.50
II 15 7.5%
11 Shs.	 2.50 to 5.00
II 20 5%
11 Shs.	 5.00 to	 7.50
II 25 4.2%
II Shs.	 7.50 to 10.00
II 30 3.3%
It Shs.10.00 to 15.00
II 35 3%
II Shs.15.00 to 20.00
II 40 2.2%
It Shs.20.00 2% on the consideration
(ii) On Government and Municipal Stocks
On nominal amount
Up to KE. 10,000	 1.5%
Over K. 10,000	 1.25%
102(iii)On short-dated stock with one year or less to
maturity - on the nominal amount - 1%
(iv)Rebates - A return commission of 25% is allowable to
registered agents on business done for their clients
at the discretion of the members.
(v)Minimum Commission on one transaction is as follows:-
Consideration	 Minimum Commission
Below Shs.200/=	 at members' discretion
Shs.200/= to Shs.600/=	 Shs.40/=
Over Shs.600/=	 Shs.60/=
(iv) Portfolio Valuations - Shs. 20/- per item with a
minimum charge of Shs.40/- for every valuation.
(vii)For professional advice a fee shall be charged at a
minimum rate of Shs.400/- per hour.
(viii)On take-overs, new issues and rights in which
commission exceeds K.E. 50,000, a member at his
discretion may charge three-quarters of the normal
commission shown in (i) above.
(b) The stamp duty on the transfer of shares currently
standing at 0.5% of the consideration.
103(c) Contract stamp. This is a Government revenue stamp
that must be affixed on each contract note as
follows:
Consideration	 Amount
Below	 Sh.2000	 Sh.1.00
Between	 Sh.2000 and Sh.10000	 Sh.2.00
For every other Sh.10000 or part	 Sh.2.00
These are negligible in percentage terms but they do add
to the cost of transacting.
(d)The transfer fees charged by companies on issue of new
share certificates and on entry into the shareholders
register. These are nominal and fixed.
3.4.8 Short-selling
A short sale is a procedure by which an investor or
speculator sells securities that he does not own, hoping
to "cover" the transaction later at a lower price and make
a margin on the difference between his selling price and
the new lower price net of transaction costs [IFC (1984)].
This procedure works well in exchanges where there is
settlement by account and the exchange itself does not bar
the practice. The Nairobi Stock Exchange does not allow
short selling. A broker may refuse to enforce a
transaction if he believes it is intended  for this
104purpose.
3.4.9 The reporting of stock exchange activity
The broker report to each other through a call system.
Each day members meet and the securities are called out in
alphabetical order. When the particular security is
called, the members indicate the highest order to buy and
the lowest order to sell received and whether any
transaction have been struck. The highest buy order price,
the lowest sale order price and the transaction price are
then recorded in a daily call-over sheet to indicate the
state of the market. This daily call-over sheet is not
available to the public.
A main call-over is held every week on Thursdays at 10.30
am. From information available from the exchange all
securities are called over and the closing buy order price
(bid), the closing sell order price (offer/ask) and the
closing transaction price relating to each security in the
week are recorded. The highest and lowest transaction
prices for the week are also recorded to indicate movement
of the prices for the particular security. The document
recording such information is the weekly call-over sheet
and is thereafter handed to the Secretaries of the
exchange who distribute it to the media and other parties
as public information. The document ( Appendix 2) does not
contain any information on the volume of trading for the
week.
105The methods of reporting may not look very impressive to
persons who have encountered the current computerised
exchange systems with automatic price listings. It must
nevertheless be realised that given the current level of
activity the existing system works very well. It has also
the advantage of minimising the cost to the investor and
may, given the circumstances, offer the most accurate and
speedy way of dealing with transactions. It may also
reflect accurate information on the bid of all buyers and
all sellers at a particular point in time [Hirst and
Wallace (1974)3.
The stock exchange also issues detailed information on the
accounts of quoted companies on a quarterly basis. This
information was previously available on an annual basis
through the NSE year books. The information is available,
immediately it is released, to subscribers on record.
With the above price reporting system a problem arises,
however, where the public does not participate or have
access to the information. There are reasons to believe
that the planned Government's initiative to revitalise the
stock exchange and the monetary system will require that
the current method of trading and processing information
on prices be changed, hopefully for the better.
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3.5 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Previous sections have examined in detail the background
and the operations of the exchange. Arising from these
discussions several recommendations can be made to improve
the operating efficiency of the exchange. These will be
through, firstly, improving the demand and supply of
securities in the market, that would in the long-term
increase the quantity of new issues, both primary and
secondary and secondly, improve the dissemination of
information and the quality of professional services on
the exchange.
3.5.1 Activating Demand and Supply of securities
The IFC (1984) and the World Bank (1987) reports have
highlighted the issues that are required to be addressed
on the demand and supply side. We re-emphasise some of
them, and add those which have arisen since.
3.5.1.1 Activating Demand
(i) The Government should seek ways to encourage
indigenous ownership of shares [IFC (1984)]. This can be
done in a number of ways. One of the most attractive
would be to encourage small investor share ownership
schemes similar to those tried with success in the
107Jubilee, Barclays and Kenya Commercial Bank issues. Under
these schemes a proportion of shares were pre-allocated to
Kenyan citizens. In all the issues banks arranged finance
so that small investors could borrow funds to buy shares.
These loan were to be re-payable over 18 to 24 months
with the share certificates used as collateral.
(ii)Tax incentives should be changed to encourage demand.
In particular the double taxation of dividends should be
adjusted so that equities are taxed at the same rate on
the margin as investments in bank deposits and treasury
bills.
(iii) The market could be made more efficient and
attractive through reductions in the level of "fixed"
commission costs [World Bank (1987)]. The Government
should require that all brokers compete for commissions
and prohibit a commissions cartel. To ensure this occurs,
there should evolve competing intermediaries and even
banks should be encouraged to enter into retail discount
brokerage in competition with the established brokers.
This could not only have the benefit of reducing the
average level of commissions, but, through the branch
networks, would likely result in a greater dispersion of
share ownership among Kenya's regional areas;
(iv) Stamp duty tax should be reduced and if possible
abolished for share transactions. The tax may be retained
for loan capital.
108(v) There should evolve specialised investment
institutions like unit or investment trusts. The
investment trust holding a diversified portfolio will be
an attractive investment to risk-averse investors. One
important proviso is that a sufficient number of shares - is
made available for trading, otherwise, market pressure for
these firms' stocks would increase prices and reduce
returns to unattractive levels. Other investment trusts
based on groups of mature development projects might also
prove attractive [IFC (1984)].
3.5.1.2 Activating Supply of securities
(i)Tax incentives should be given to firms going public.
This may mean publicly traded firms having to pay a lower
corporate tax rate than private firms. If evasion could at
least be partly controlled, the Government could guarantee
a steady supply of new public issues by simply imposing
high tax rates on privately controlled firms.
(ii) The Government powers of control of stock exchange
share issues should be reduced [World Bank (1987)]. The
central authority should have no say in price setting
decisions. Prices should instead be based on the best
instincts of merchant bank underwriters and the issuing
firm. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that the
country contains the resources that could quite quickly
produce an adequate supply of merchant bankers utilising
109employees knowledge and skills at already established
financial institutions.
(iv) Greater ease of access to the market should be
allowed for new venture firms. The NSE's requirement of at
least five years trading history is unduly restrictive and
should be reduced or left to the discretion of the
exchange [IFC (1984)].
(v) Privatisation of self supporting and profitable
parastatals would widen the choice of quoted investments
for the investors and generally increase the supply of
securities.
3.5.2 Information Dissemination
The amount and quality of information disseminated to the
public would require to be increased. This will take the
form of increased market statistics, for example, volume
of trading, nature of investors, value of transactions and
changes in the nature of operations of quoted companies.
Daily listing of prices should be provided. There will
also be need to improve the quality of disclosure in
accounting reports issued by companies.
3.5.3 The nature of the exchange operations
The brokerage system must be made more efficient. The need
110for instantaneous trading to reduce the possibility of
conflict of interest needs to be addressed. This would
require the establishment of either a centralised trading
floor or perhaps more realistically the establishment of a
computer screen market for "over the counter" trades among
brokers [World Bank (1987)]. Indeed, the computer
technology is readily available for the latter type of
trading arrangement and has been applied in many markets.
3.5.4 Professional Advisers
The operating efficiency would be improved if more
professional services were available for use by investors.
These services would be rendered by underwriters,
financial analysts and dealers. The existence of these
professionals would not only provide more insight on
operations but also lower the costs of transacting by
providing quicker access to information and at competitive
rates.
All the issues addressed in chapter 2 and this chapter
have concentrated on operating efficiency of stock
exchanges. The next part of the dissertation will devote
itself to issues of information efficiency, that is, the
relationship between the information disseminated in these
markets and the share prices.
111WEAK-FORM EFFICIENCY: THEORY
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The main focus of this study is to examine issues related
to weak-form market efficiency. This chapter provides the
theory underlying the weak-form Efficient Market
Hypothesis (EMH).
4.2 MARKET EFFICIENCY: DEFINITION
The word efficiency in economics and finance has been
assigned different meanings depending on what is
emphasised. It is important to understand what definition
of efficiency one is dealing with in order to develop a
rationale for empirical tests. It is a prelude to an
interpretation of empirical research offered as tests of
market efficiency [Beaver (1981a)]. Stiglitz (1981), for
example, states that there are three aspects to the
analysis of the efficiency of the market:
(a) Exchange efficiency
Given the set of assets which are available and the
information (beliefs) of the various participants, are the
112available assets traded in such a way that there is no
re-arrangement of ownership claims which would increase
the expected utility of one individual without decreasing
that of some other?
(b) Production efficiency
In exchange efficiency, the set of assets (securities)
which are available is assumed to be given. Here, the
concern is with the determination of the supply of various
assets, given the available technology, resources, and
information. The analysis of production efficiency turns
on three questions:
(i) If firms maximise their market value, will the
resource allocation be Pareto optimal?
(ii) Would all shareholders wish firms to maximise their
market value? If not, will there be unanimity in the
actions they wish the firm to pursue? If there is
unanimity, will the actions which are unanimously
preferred be Pareto optimal?
(iii) Are there any control mechanisms which ensure that
the managers of firms will in fact pursue the policies
which are in the interest of shareholders?
(c) Information efficiency
Information efficiency requires that (i) the market
must provide the correct incentives for gathering the
right amount and kind of information, (ii) the market
113price must reflect the information available to the
various traders, and (iii) firms must be able to
convey efficiently information about their prospects
to potential investors (p. 236-237).
Another way to look at efficiency is to adopt West's
(1975) two way classification of efficiency. He coined the
terms Internal and External efficiency.
With respect to Internal efficiency he explained; "... a
well organised and internally efficient real world
securities market should not only establish price levels
which are right in the sense that they reflect available
information, but also should provide the type of
transaction services buyers and sellers desire at prices
as low as possible given the costs of providing these
services."
Concerning External efficiency he explained; "This notion
of efficiency implies that a market's equilibrium
conditions are such that trading decisions based solely on
existing information do not yield expected returns in
excess of expected equilibrium returns" (p. 30-31).
In market based research the concern is mainly with the
information efficiency of Stiglitz (1981) [external
efficiency as defined by West (1975)]. This does not mean
that other types of efficiency are unimportant, but
they pose serious methodological problems with regards to
114empirical testing. To achieve information efficiency, the
securities market may require also to be economically
efficient to facilitate the trade in the securities in the
first place and the creation of wealth through production
to support the true value of the securities. Foster
(1984), for example, argues that market efficiency may
be attained because of:
(i) Competitive activities of security	 analysts.
Each analyst is seeking to detect mis-priced
securities and create perfectly hedged portfolios with
zero net investment, but non-zero expected return.
As each analyst identifies a significant information item
it is rapidly impounded into security prices.
(ii) Incentive effects of insider trading. This
explanation argues that the level of the informational
efficiency of a market can be improved by relaxing
prohibitions against inside trading by management.
(iii) Quality and quantity of information made
publicly available. This is taken to be that adequate
disclosure of information minimises ignorance in the
market and causes the market price to reflect the true
value of the security.
(iv) Aggregation phenomenon. Each individual analyst
can make mistakes of judgment or estimation. Where the
mistakes made are independent, the consensus, which is the
115price reflected in the market, is the best possible
[Beaver (1981, p.160-162].
The above aspects deal with features which are more
closely related to internal efficiency of the market, but
which play a fundamental role in information efficiency.
Efficiency in this study is concerned with how
successful the stock exchange is in establishing
security prices that reflect the worth of the securities;
success being defined in terms of whether the market
incorporates all information in its security prices in a
rapid and unbiased manner. Efficiency, therefore,
refers to the two aspects of a price adjustment to new
information, direction and magnitude (the speed and
quality), of the adjustment [Keane (1983, p.9)]. Many
definitions of market efficiency do exist. Foster
(1984) discusses some of them but, for our purpose, the
key issue is that no one person should in an efficient
market be able to consistently out-perform the market,
that is, earn an abnormal return given some information
set.
In a discussion of market efficiency it is critical to
specify the information systems for which the market
efficiency condition is being defined. This is
because the market may be efficient with respect to
some information systems, but not others [Beaver
(1981, p.148-149)].
116Following Fama (1970), tests of informational efficiency
have been categorised into three major levels depending on
the type of information assumed to be used by the market
in setting prices. These are:
(i) Weak-form efficiency tests:
The weak-form of the EMH states that the sequence of past
price returns contains no information about future
price returns. The tests here are designed to show that
successive price returns are random and no
trading strategies based on a study of past prices can
yield abnormal returns.	 The information set used in
empirical tests is the vector of past security prices.
(ii) Semi-strong form efficiency tests:
The semi-strong form of the EMH states that the
security prices fully reflect all available public
information. The empirical tests here are designed
to show that no trading strategies based upon the
release of any publicly available information, for
example, accounting earnings, will enable an investor to
generate abnormal returns except by chance. The basic
conclusion is that, if the market is semi-strong
efficient, then it will instantaneously impound all
information as it becomes publicly available into
security prices.
117(iii) Strong-form efficiency tests:
The strong-form of the EMH states that the security
prices reflect all the information available, both
public and private, at each point in time. The
consequence of it is that no investor, even where such
an investor possesses inside information, may be
able to device trading strategies based on such
information to consistently earn abnormal returns.
Strong-form efficiency implies semi-strong form
efficiency, and semi-strong efficiency in turn implies
weak-form market efficiency. The empirical implications of
efficiency with respect to a particular information set
are that the current price of the security embodies all
the information in that set. Since the categories of
information set are nested, rejection of a weaker type of
efficiency implies the rejection of all stronger forms.
Fama (1976), defines efficiency in its testable form.
Attempts have been made to refine this original form
[Leroy (1976); Jensen (1978); Beaver (1981a); Latham
(1986)]. One important clarification was the addition of
the subset property, which is that efficiency with respect
to an information set necessarily implies efficiency with
respect to any subset of that information set. It is by
this principle that if the market is semi-strong form
efficient then it must be weak-form efficient since past
118security prices are a subset of all public information. It
is also by this principle that an event study based on
published earnings figures is a test of semi-strong form
efficiency. Not all public information is used, only a
small subset, yet any abnormal returns associated with
the earnings are taken to imply that the market is
inefficient. Market efficiency requires that in setting
prices at t-1, the market correctly uses all
available information to assess the joint distribution
of prices at t. Formally in an efficient market;
f ( Pt 1 0t-1 ) .	 fm ( Pt l ent_l )
	 (2)
where,
Pt	= (P1,t/ 	 Pn,t ) is the vector of prices of
securities at time t, and
f(.) = the probability density function.
and
°t-1
	 is the set of information available at t-1,
ent -1
	 is the set of information used by the market,
fm (	 le Pt	 t-1 ) is the market assessed density function
for Pt
and,
f ( Pt 10t_i ) is the true density function implied by
119E ( Ri ,t I Ot_i ) =	 E	 (R. m	 3,t 1 °
m
t-1 ) (4)
øt-1
In its testable form, (2) becomes;
E ( Pi , t	 1 øt-1 )
	 ... _	 Em	 (Pj,t	 l omt-i )
	
(3)
and
where
E is the expected value operator; and
Pi ,t
	 is the price of security j at time t,
E ( Pi ,t 1 Ot_i ) is the true expected price of security
j implied by f ( Pt 1 Ot_i )
E ( Ri,t 1 Øt-1 ) is the true expected return implied
by E ( Pi ,t 1 Ot_i ) and
The implications of (4) are that,
(a) In an efficient market, trading rules with
abnormal returns do not exist and
(b) there is no way to use information O available
at t-1 as a basis of correct assessment of the expected
return on security j which is other than its
equilibrium value.
120In this study, the set of information considered
distinctly as forming part of Ot_i is:
*
P t-1	 = (P1,t , 	 Pn,t ), the vector of prices of
securities at time t-1.
This is the information set used as a test of weak-form
efficiency.
4.3 MARKET EQUILIBRIUM MODELS CONSISTENT WITH WEAK-FORM
EFFICIENCY.
Market efficiency is viewed as a property of an
equilibrium mechanism or process by which security prices
are formed. Under uncertainty, stock market equilibrium
can be characterised as a mapping from the endowments,
preferences and beliefs into prices. Individuals' beliefs
will be conditioned upon the information which each
receives. Hence, equilibrium price at the time t will in
part depend upon the signal received at time t by each
individual [Beaver (1981a, p.24,26)].
Any test of market efficiency is simultaneously a test of
efficiency and the assumptions about the characteristics
of the market equilibrium. Fama (1976) states:
"If the test is successful, that is, if the
121hypothesis that the market is efficient cannot be
rejected, then this implies that the assumptions
about the market equilibrium are not rejected. If
the tests are unsuccessful, we face the problem of
deciding whether this reflects a true violation of
market efficiency or poor assumptions about the
nature of the market equilibrium" (P.137).
Fama (1976) proposed two models of market equilibrium of
security prices assumed to apply in tests of weak-form
market efficiency. These models are:
4.3.1	 Expected returns are positive.
This model states that the market always sets Pj,t-1 -
the price of security j at time t-1, j = 1,2,....,n; where
n is the number of securities in the market - so that the
mean of the resulting distribution of returns [  Ai,t] is
strictly positive. That is, the market always sets Pj,t-1
so that, given its assessment of the expected price at t,
Em (5i , t I øm _1 ) then,
= Em(i 5 j , t I Omt_i) -
>	 0	 (5)
7 t ,	 1 -
where the tildes (	 ) are used to denote random variables.
122An efficient market uses all available information and
uses it correctly in assessing the distribution of future
prices, thus:
fm (Pj,t 1 eit-i ) = f	 I Ot_i ),	 (6)
which implies
Em (i5j,t 1 Omt_l ) = E (i5j,t 1 Ot_l )
	
(7)
and
EM (3 1., 6- 4-10111t_1)=-E (7.,t1 Ot_l )•	 (8)
Equation (5) does not say that a positive return on
security j will be observed at time t. Rather the
combined hypothesis of the model and efficiency of the
market implies that at time t-1 the true expected return
of any security j, E ( Ai,t 1 Ot_l ), is positive. This
means that if the hypothesis is correct any investor or
market analyst who disagrees with the market and posits
a negative expected return on a security is incorrect.
This model is best applied in the testing of market
efficiency using trading rules. The proponents of trading
rules, the chartists and technical analysts, claim that
market prices only react slowly and over long periods to
123new information. The chartists also claim that the
reaction of the market to news is so slow that one needs
not be concerned with the information itself. The study of
past patterns can indicate the price response to new
information. This claim therefore means that the market is
inefficient in setting prices and in its use of past
information on prices.
From the chartists perspective trends in prices tend to
persist or recur. When prices have moved up in the recent
past, they expect the trend to continue, and likewise when
they start to decline. The chartist rules therefore use
percentage changes in prices to determine buying and
selling strategies. If the market is efficient in setting
prices then trading rules would not hold.
4.3.2	 Expected returns are constant
Under this equilibrium model, the market sets the current
price of security j so that, given its assessment of the
expected value of the future price Em (i5j,t 1 øm_1
then;
Em (Ri,t 10mt .. 1 ) = Em(pi, t I 'p 	 Pi,t_i
	- E(Ai)
Where E ( Ai ) is some constant which represents the
expected return of security j from time t-1 to t.
(9)
124This model implies that E ( Ai ) is constant through
time but different	 securities	 are allowed to have
different expected returns.
If the market is taken to be efficient then
E (A j ,t 10t_i) = Em (A j ,t ) = E( A j )	 ( 10)
This means that since the market correctly uses all
available information in setting prices then the expected
return on the security is the true expected return of that
security.
If the market is efficient, the above model implies that,
there is no way of using available information at time t-1
as the basis of a correct assessment of the expected
return on security j which is other than E( Ai ).
Tests of market efficiency based on the above equilibrium
model focus primarily on a subset of information O, the
potential information about expected return, that appears
in the time series of past security returns. When the
market is efficient, the past returns are not a new source
of information about the expected value of return of
security j.
125The assumption that equilibrium expected returns are
constant through time implies that the auto-correlation of
the returns on any security j are zero for all values of
the lag k. This assumption is assumed to hold when
statistical rules of testing efficiency are applied.
4.4 EMPIRICAL TEST MODELS OF WEAK-FORM EFFICIENCY.
The analysis of return equilibrium models assumed in
weak-form efficiency tests gives rise to two distinct
methods of empirical testing of the EMH in the finance
literature. These are:
(a) The use of statistical methods and;
(b) The formulation of trading rules designed to determine
whether it is possible to beat the market.
4.5	 STATISTICAL THEORIES IN WEAK-FORM EFFICIENCY TESTS.
Statistically based tests for testing weak-form efficiency
have largely been classified as random walk tests. There
have been several ways of phrasing the random walk
hypothesis in statistical terms [Granger (1972)]. The
earliest effort in studying the random behaviour of prices
is attributed to Bachelier (1900) who in his work implied
that the price changes have independent and identical
distributions. In market studies dealing with share price
126returns, the random walk hypothesis has been the most
widely researched. Empirical evidence on the random walk
hypothesis is available for many of the world's stock
markets. The random walk hypothesis holds that price
returns are unpredictable and do not follow any known
direction. This means that one cannot use past series of
prices to predict the direction of change of future
prices. According to Fama (1965) the theory of random
walk in stock prices involves two separate hypotheses:
(1) Successive price returns are independent
and
(2) the price returns conform to some specified type of
probability distribution.
4.5.1	 Independence of share price returns
Two events A and B are statistically independent if the
chance of one occurring is unaffected by the occurrence of
the other, that is, Given that
P[A 1 B]	 =P [A]
so must the following
P[B 1 A]	 =P [B]
This means that the distribution of A is in no way
dependent on the distribution of B. Several events may
also be collectively independent. In stock price research
it is usual to state that the probability distribution of
a change in prices during any time period is independent
127of the sequence of changes of prices in the previous time
periods. This means that knowledge of previous price
changes cannot be used to predict price changes in the
current period. The price changes would therefore be
expected to be random across time.
Independence of share price returns has mainly been tested
by using the following:
(a) Serial correlation tests.
(b) Run tests.
(c) Spectral Analysis
4.5.2	 Serial correlation tests
In using serial correlation techniques it is assumed that
the time series consist of two parts, one containing the
structural part and the other the random (stochastic)
variation. In statistical terms it can be expressed by the
relationship:
( 1 1 x
Where fit is the structural part; and
Pt is the random part.
128From a security price perspective, this model, in its
simplest form, is given by Granger and Morgenstern (1970,
p.71,73) as;
Pi ,t
	
= pj,t-1	 Et; t= 1, 	 ,n	 (12)
where,
Pj,t
	 is the price of stock j at time t
is the price of stock j in the immediately
preceding period and,
is a random error.
and where
E (Et ) = 0,	 (13)
Coy EEtct_s3 = 0, all s 4 0.	 (14)
Further they state that:
(i) if Et, Et_s are uncorrelated, then P t is a second
order martingale.
(ii) if t t , ct—s are independent, then Pt is a strict
random walk.
(iii) if Et, Et-s are independent, and Et (t=1,...,n) are
all identically normally distributed, then Pt is a Wiener
129process.
Most of the empirical investigations of stock prices are
on the martingale form and concentrate on the observed
correlation between Et and Et -S P S 4 °' Random Walk
models may be tested by showing that there is no linear
relationship between the error terms (Et) as exemplified
by lack of serial correlation. Granger and Morgenstern
(1970, p.73-74) show that (12) gives the same results as
its logarithmic form of:
Log Pt = Log Pt-1	 ut
	 (15)
Where
E ( ut) = 0	 (16)
COV ( ut , ut_s ) = 0,	 s	 0	 (17)
This can be seen by writing (12) as:
Pt/Pt-1 = 1 Et/Pt-1
	 (18)
and so the models would be identical if:
log (1 + E t/Pt-1) = ut
	 (19)
130Expanding the right hand side as a power series and
ignoring terms of higher order other than the first,
one has:
tt /Pt-1 = Ut	 (20)
for the two equations to be essentially the same:
E t = Pt-1 Ut
	 (21)
The residual series t = Pt-1 ut will have zero mean and
will be uncorrelated with earlier values, as:
F(E t ) = E (Pt_l) E(ut) = 0
	 (22)
and
cov ( ct Et_s ) = E (Et Et_s)	 (23)
= E (ut, ut_s). E(Pt_i , Pt_5_1)
= 0, s 4.0
from the properties of ut.
The implication of the model is that the best predictor of
tomorrow's price is today's price. It also follows that
the best predictor of any future price is the current or
most recently available price.
131Further, Granger and Morgenstern (1970, p.77-78) show that
if the price series Pt is recorded at time intervals of
unit T, the first difference of this series will be:
ut = Et (T) = Pt - Pt-1 , t= 1, 	  ,n.	 (24)
where Et(T) is the price change over the time interval T.
If now, instead of simply forming the first differences,
the differences over non-overlapping intervals of length
kT are taken then:
Ej(kT) = Pkj - 1'k(j-1), j= 0,1,	 ,n.	 (25)
where the values Ej(kT) are the first differences of the
price series if the price series had been recorded at time
interval of length kT. It can be shown that:
j+k-1
ej (kT) = E	 col-)
	
(26)
t=i
If the random walk model holds true then Et (T) will be
uncorrelated with all other values of this series:
correlation LE(T), c t_s (T)] = 0, s * 0	 (27)
and, as non-overlapping intervals have been used, it
followsthate-(kT) will be uncorrelated with other values
a
of itself:
132Pk
= (29)
correlation Ce j (kT), e j _5 (kT)3 = 0, s	 0	 (28) 1
The implications of the above are that:
The serial correlation between the return of a security in
time t, and its return recorded at a time interval of unit
T is zero. This in turn implies that the serial
correlation of returns separated by k time periods (lag k)
within a time series is zero for all  k.
To test the random walk model, the sample serial
correlations for the stock price series and for values of
T are calculated. The population correlation coefficient,
pk , between the return of a security in time t, and its
return t-k periods earlier, is given by:
Coy ( ut , ut _k )
Variance ( ut )
Where
Pk = the serial correlation (autocorrelation) between the
return of a security in time t and its lagged return
t-k periods earlier. The sample serial correlation
coefficient, rk, is assumed to be a consistent and
unbiased estimate of the true serial correlation in
133the population, pk•
Coy ( ut , ut_k ) = the covariance between the return of
a security in time t and its lagged return t-k
periods earlier.
Variance (ut) = the variance of the return of a security
in time t.
The serial correlation coefficient, pk , measures the
direction and strength of the statistical relationship
between ordered pairs of observations of two random
variables. The standard deviations of returns are
positive. It follows therefore that the sign of the
correlation coefficient between u t and u -t-k is the
same as that of the covariance between ut and ut-k• If
the correlation is positive, we say that the return of
security in time t is positively correlated with its
return t-k periods earlier. If negative, we say that the
return of security in time t is negatively correlated with
its return t-k periods earlier. The correlation is always
between +1 and -1. When ut and u t_k are uncorrelated,
then the sample correlation coefficient is expected to be
equal to zero.
If the distribution of ut has finite variance, then for
large samples, according to Kendall (1948, p.412), the
standard error of the sample serial correlation
coefficient, rk, may be computed as:
134= 1/-1( N - k ).	
( 30 )
Where N is the sample size.
4.5.3	 Runs tests
A run is defined by Siegel (1956) as "a succession of
identical symbols which are followed or preceded by
different symbols or by no symbols at all" (p.52). The
runs tests are concerned with the direction of changes in
the time series, that is, with the signs of the first
differences of the series.
There are various reasons for using runs tests in market
research. Run tests being non-parametric, do not depend on
any finite variance assumption. It is well known that
large errors in prices either at the publication or data
preparation stages may generate negative and significant
serial correlations in stock returns [Praetz (1976)]. The
observation of such correlation may be used erroneously as
evidence of market inefficiency. Runs tests are, however,
not greatly affected by such errors [Cooper (1982)].
The question of whether the sequence of observed series of
share price changes is a random sequence is studied by the
number of runs observed in the series. The number of runs
is computed as a sequence of the price changes of the same
135sign.
In share price series, we expect to observe the following
categories of price changes: a plus or minus change
according to whether the price change in the given time
interval has either risen or fallen respectively, and a no
change category where there has been no change in price
over the time interval. This results in three mutually
exclusive types of run. The series of changes are replaced
by the series of symbols.
The total number of runs of the price change series will
serve as an indicator of the degree of randomness of the
sample. In a series of security price changes, either few
or many runs are unlikely if such security price changes
are truly random over time. Clustering of symbols of the
same sign also shows the existence of a trend.
If the assumption holds that the sample proportions of
positive and negative changes are good estimators of the
population proportions, and the independence hypothesis
applies to the sequence of price changes, the total
expected number of runs, with three symbols, Plus, Minus
and Zero is given by:
3
N (N + 1) -	 n2] / N
i=1
M = (31)
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[
2 i + N	 (N +	 1) - 2 N E
--3
il i - N-
i = 1 J i=1
-
Where N is the total number of price changes and
ni are the numbers of price changes of each kind
(Plus, Minus, No-change)
The standard error of in is
(32)
N 2 (N - 1)	 -•
Wallis and Roberts (1956) have shown that for large N, the
sampling distribution of in is approximately normal. The
standardised variable (V) can then be calculated from the
formula:
V = r+i- m
(33)
CT 
RI
Where r is the actual number of runs
m is the expected number of runs
and where the continuity adjustment requires the  addition
of i to r.
1374.5.4 Spectral analysis
Spectral methods are applied to test for seasonal and for
cyclical patterns in stock market price series. Spectral
analysis provides a characterisation of the
autocorrelation function in terms of its Fourier
transform, the spectral density function. A stochastic
process ( xt ,-w ( t < ), may adequately be described by
the mean, variance, and autocorrelation function in the
time domain, and in the frequency domain by the Fourier
transform of the autocorrelation function, the power
spectrum [Sharma and Kennedy (1977)].
Spectral analysis is concerned with the decomposition of a
time series into sinusoidal components. In spectral
analysis the investigated series are assumed to be
stationary. Economic time series are not normally
stationary, but often have a trend in both mean and
variance. However, some studies have shown that so long as
the underlying structure of the series is not changing
quickly with time, spectral analysis may be used with
confidence. Trends in the mean can be removed, but not
trends in the variance [Granger and Morgenstern (1964,
p.169)].
Any trend in a price series will give high values to the
spectrum at low frequency bands. Series of considerable
lengths are needed in order for the spectrum to reveal any
cycle of long duration. Any seasonal variation existing in
138the series will show peaks and concentrations of variances
at some or all the seasonal frequencies. An estimate of
the spectra of an economic series should only be made
after a visible trend has been removed. Various methods of
removing trends are available.
It should be recognised that spectral methods are an
alternative to studying autocorrelations. Granger and
Newbold (1977) describe the spectral theory relevant to
economic studies. Praetz (1979) discuss practical problems
encountered when testing returns for a flat spectral
density. Spectral methods are mainly used to emphasise
autocorrelation results [Taylor (1986)].
4.5.5 Issues on the Use of the statistical models
The statistical based methodologies discussed have been
questioned on two grounds. Firstly, there are statistical
problems in using serial correlation as a measure of
independence. To test the sequence of price changes, ut, t
= 2, 	  n, for serial correlation, it should be shown
that the variance of ut is finite [Taylor (1986, p.25);
Conrad and Juttner (1973, p.587-588)]. If the variance of
the price changes is not finite, then the correlation
coefficient will be an unsuitable test statistic for
resolving the issue of correlation, since the variance of
ut appears in the denominator of the formula of
139calculating the correlation coefficient and it therefore
biases the value of the sample correlation coefficient
(rk) toward zero.
Even though researchers have noted this problem, serial
correlation tests have been used extensively to test for
efficiency in stock markets and evidence of this is
provided in chapter 5. Fama (1965, 1976) and Granger
(1972, 1975) also give support for their use in efficiency
tests. Fama (1965) states that for large samples, the
sample statistic, r k , is a consistent and unbiased
estimator of the true serial correlation in the
population.
Granger (1972) also observes that:
"The fear about the usefulness of standard
statistical techniques seems to have been greatly
exaggerated. There is little or no evidence that
observed serial correlation coefficients are
unreliable. Both theoretical considerations and
simulation studies suggest that least square
techniques work perfectly well when ratios of
quadratic forms of infinite variance stable random
variables are involved provided the sample size is
large enough. Thus, correlation coefficients and
regression methods seem to be unaffected by long
tailed distributions for large enough sample"
(p.486).
140Secondly, doubts have been raised as to whether the models
are powerful enough to reject the EMH when it is not true.
The use of serial correlation and runs tests have
dominated the testing of the EMH at weak-form level. There
have arisen arguments that these traditional tests have
little power against alternatives to the null hypothesis
of market efficiency, and that it is as a consequence of
this weakness that the EMH has not been rejected.
Proponents of this argument have suggested what they
regard as stronger tests of the EMH [Shiller (1981);
Summers (1986); Taylor (1986); Poterba and Summers
(1988)].
Taylor (1986), for example, claims that the standard
statistical methodology used for random walk tests has
often been inappropriate, and that some of the reported
conclusions from it are questionable. He argues that
autocorrelation coefficients calculated from returns have
variances greater than 1/n. This, he argues, is a
consequence of the changes in the return variance or
conditional variance. When the true variance is greater
than the autocorrelation variance (1/n), random walk tests
are unreliable. He suggests that re-scaling the returns
produces a series whose autocorrelation variances are
generally satisfactory. Although the results obtained when
returns are re-scaled are similar to those obtained when
unscaled returns are used he nevertheless argues that the
interpretation when unscaled returns are used is unclear.
141Shiller (1981) has argued that the traditional statistical
tests that have been employed are too weak to properly
examine the EMH and, moreover, that they are mis-focused.
Shiller adopts the intuitive perspective that if stock
prices are discounted expected dividends, they then ought
not vary over time as much as actual dividends. He argues
that since the price is an expectation of the dividends
and future prices, the actual outcome will be this
expectation plus the error in the forecast. The error in
the forecast should vary over time more than the price.
This leads him to formulate statistical tests of the EMH
which are based on the volatility of stock prices and
which are claimed to be more powerful than the traditional
tests.
His alternative test has faced criticism, notably from
Flavin (1983), Kleidon (1986) and Marsh and Merton (1986).
These critics have taken issue with Shiller's
specification of the statistical tests of nolatilitu
more important, with the basic intuition [Ross (1986)].
They particularly contend that the single realisation of
dividends and prices that is observed is only a sample of
one from all the random possibilities and that the price
is based on the expectation taken over all these
possibilities. A little information, they argue, can have
an important influence on the current price. They argue
further that, when smoothing of dividends and the finite
time horizon of the data samples are taken into account,
142volatility tests do not reject the EMH.
Shiller's idea popularised the use of variance ratios in
efficiency test methodologies. There has been a growing
number of tests using variance ratios in a variety of
contexts [Ball and Kothari (1989); Lo and MacKinlay
(1988); Poterba and Summers (1988); French and Roll
(1986)]. These studies have focused on what is known as
"mean reversion" in security prices. The mean reversion
hypothesis proposes that stock prices swing wildly back
and forth across some trend line measure of intrinsic
value. The difference between the market and fundamental
values is eliminated by speculative forces and the stock
prices revert to their mean. This implies that stock
prices have a permanent and a transitory component
[Fama and French (1988)]. The variance-ratio tests
exploit the fact that, if the logarithm of the stock price
follow a random walk, then the return variance should be
proportional to the return horizon.
These studies use a huge amount of data extending over
significantly long periods of time. They are also designed
to challenge the fundamental findings of the traditional
tests of EMH established for developed markets, but not
for developing markets. Research might usefully be
extended to these methodologies once the traditional tests
of the EMH in emerging markets are well grounded. It is
worth noting that volatility tests have not produced
evidence against the random walk hypothesis for individual
143stocks, which suggests that the extent of predictability
of returns is economically insignificant. It follows,
therefore, that although volatility tests are interesting
they have not been able to challenge effectively the
results obtained from using serial correlation and runs
tests, that is, the stock markets are efficient.
4.6	 NON-STATISTICAL TESTS (TRADING RULES)
Fama (1965) specifies that the use of serial correlation
and runs as tools for testing dependence do not provide
adequate tests of either practical or statistical
dependence. He points out that the chartist would not
regard either type of analysis as an adequate test of
whether the history of the series can be used to increase
the investor's expected profits. He points out that the
chartist would use a more sophisticated method of
identifying price movements, a method that does not always
predict the termination of the movement simply because the
price level has temporarily changed direction. The trading
rules provide superior methods in this respect. Another
short coming of the statistical tests is that the methods
test for dependencies which are present through-out the
data. It is possible that price changes are dependent only
under special conditions, or in particular ways. For
example, large changes may tend to be followed by large
changes of the same sign or large changes of the opposite
sign.
144The non-statistical tests in security market research are
directed towards testing whether mechanical trading rules
can be devised to beat a naive buy-and-hold strategy. The
strategies are based on buying and selling securities at
the "right time". The rules are explicit and can be easily
tested where market conditions allow their formulation.
The rules are founded on the assumption that there may be
patterns in price changes which may not be detectable by
statistical tests. Many investigations have tested the
strategies which investment analysts and advisers claim
have been successful in generating abnormal returns for
their clients. The strategies tested have included, among
others, filter rules, moving average, fixed-proportion
maintenance strategies, and the relative strength rule.
These strategies are separately discussed in the ensuing
subsections:
4.6.1	 Filter rules
These provide buy and sell signals when share prices have
moved a certain percentage away from a high or low point.
Alexander (1964, p.338) proposed the first filter rule
strategy. The rule suggested was: Rif the price of a
security moves up by at least X %, buy and hold the
security until the price moves down by at least X % from a
subsequent high, at which time simultaneously sell and go
short. The short position is maintained until the price of
the security rises by at least X % above the subsequent
low, at which time one covers the short position and buys.
145Moves of less than X % in either direction are ignored."
This X % filter rule is a "one security and cash" trading
rule, and the results it produces are relevant for the
random-walk expected return model.
Brealey (1970) tested an alternative filter rule. The rule
was:
"If by the end of the day the market has risen,
purchase any share whose price has remained
unchanged. Conversely, if the market has fallen,
sell short the shares whose price has not changed.
In either case close the position at the end of the
subsequent day" (p.38).
4.6.2	 Moving average
The moving average strategy involves the buying and
selling of securities as the prices move up and down a
predetermined average. The buy-hold-sell strategies depend
on the percentage chosen by the investor. The
portfolio building rules under this strategy assume (i)
perfect knowledge of the statistics of the ex-post
distribution of annual holding period returns and (ii)
that the statistics remain constant over time so that the
probability beliefs do not change as actual results become
available over time.
1464.6.3	 Fixed-proportion maintenance strategies
The fixed proportion strategy may be defined as the
purchase of M securities at time t, with the sale of these
securities at time t+n, where n is again some
predetermined holding period. It is assumed that equal
monetary amounts will be invested in each of the M
securities, and that during the holding period all
dividends are re-invested, although not necessarily in the
securities on which they were paid. Rather, it is assumed
that at regular intervals throughout the holding period,
the investor reallocates his fund so as to maintain equal
monetary amounts in each security in the portfolio [Evans
(1970, p.561)].
4.6.4	 Relative strength rule.
The rule was first proposed by Levy (1967). The rule is as
follows:
"Define j,t to be the average price of the j th security
over the period t-n prior to and including time t. Let
PRi,t = Pi,t / Pj,t be the ratio of the price at time t to
the t-n period average price at time t. Define percentage
X ( 0< X <100 ) and a cast out rank H and invest an equal
monetary amount in the X % of the securities under
consideration having the largest ratio PRiit at time t.
147Then in week t+k ( k = 1,2 .... n ) calculate PRj,t+k for
all securities, rank them from low to high, and sell all
securities currently held with ranks greater than H.
Finally, immediately re-invest all proceeds from these
sales in the X % of the securities at time t+k for which
PRj,t+k is greatest" [Jensen and Benington (1970, p.470)].
4.7	 PROBLEMS IN TESTING FOR WEAK-FORM EFFICIENCY
The results obtained when applying models for testing
weak-form efficiency may be affected by certain problems
in the data. These problems are:
4.7.1 Thin trading
Thin trading arises whenever an asset is not traded at the
end of the period over which its return is measured. There
are many indicators of thinness of stock markets. Some of
the factors which have been identified include: the market
value of shares outstanding for a security, the value of
shares traded, number of shares traded, number of
shareholders, frequency of transactions, density of limit
orders, arrival rate of limit and/or market orders and the
number of securities listed on the particular exchange
[Cohen et al (1978)].
Thin trading can affect the results of empirical work on
weak-form and other higher level efficiency tests.
Infrequently traded shares can introduce serious biases
148into the results of empirical work. The major source of
bias is the tendency for the prices recorded at the end of
a time period to represent an outcome of a transaction
which occurred earlier in, or prior to, the period in
question. Non-trading also introduces widening of the
bid-ask spread and increases measurement errors
[Dimson (1979)].
Serial correlation tests are widely used in testing for
weak-form	 efficiency.	 Thin trading will	 induce
autocorrelation in the time series of returns which would
otherwise exhibit serial independence. It follows that
erroneous conclusions could be deduced regarding the
results of tests of weak-form efficiency. A problem also
arises with the runs test if thin trading causes several
non-change runs. These may be responsible for less total
runs than expected thereby refuting independence
[Taylor (1986)].
The problem of thin trading is difficult to solve for
economic data which cannot be replicated. In this study,
it is hoped that taking a 10-year rather than the usual
5-year span might reduce the effect of thin trading on the
results.
4.7.2 Distribution of share price returns
We discussed in Section 4.5.2 that to test the sequence of
price changes, ut , t = 2 	  n, for serial correlation,
149it should be shown either that the series is normally
distributed or that the variance of u t is finite. When
this assumption is violated the results obtained may be
misleading.
Many of the tests carried out in the fields of accounting
and finance also rely upon parametric tests which are
based on the assumptions of the normal distribution. If
the returns are not normally distributed, the inference
drawn from studies which have used tests that assume
normality may be subject to doubt [Theobald (1986)]. The
normal distribution is useful in market studies because it
is stable under addition and therefore any arbitrary
portfolio of stocks formed from the market will also be
normally distributed [Kon (1984)].
There has been considerable academic interest as to
whether the distribution of price returns in speculative
series is normal or not. Most of the early empirical work
tended to believe in the hypothesis that distribution of
rates of return on common stocks were adequately
characterised by the normal distribution. This view has
not been supported by empirical evidence [Fama (1965);
Officer (1972); Blattberg and Gonedes(1974); Praetz and
Wilson (1980)].
In order to characterise and summarise the behaviour of a
random variable, it is necessary to describe it in terms
of a distribution function. The properties of the sampling
150distribution are compared with the properties of
theoretical distribution functions so that a
representative distribution can be selected.
In hypothesis testing a test maps the values of a random
variable into a sample space dichotomised into regions
where a hypothesis is either accepted or rejected. In
constructing parametric tests of the hypothesis it is
necessary to assume some distribution for the underlying
data. As a result, when using parametric tests rejection
of the null hypothesis is only equivalent to rejection of
at least one of the underlying hypotheses, that of
weak-form efficiency or that relating to the distribution
assumption [Affleck-Graves and McDonald (1989)]. In fact
certain distributions have been used to challenge some of
the fundamental findings in stock market research. Ashton
(1986), for example, uses a methodology based on
multivariate normality to criticise the findings of Jensen
(1968) on the performance of mutual funds.
Secondly, Fama (1965, p.41) explains that:
(i) the shape of the distribution of the price change is
helpful from the point of view of the investor. This
is because the form of the distribution is a major
factor in determining the riskiness of investment in
common stocks.
( ii) The form of distribution of price changes is also
151important from an academic view point in that it
provides descriptive information about the nature of
the process generating price changes. It will help
in determining the extent to which returns vary with
changes in information.
Empirical work on the distribution of share price returns
has mainly been concerned with testing whether the
distributions are best explained by:
(i) a Normal distribution
(ii) a Stable Paretian distribution [Fama (1965);
Officer (1972)]
(iii) a Student distribution [Praetz and Wilson (1980);
Blattberg and Gonedes (1974)]
(iv) Other distributions [Press (1967); Affleck-Graves
and McDonald (1989)].
Various specific models in each of the above general
families have been tested in search of that which best
fits the observed security returns.
In this study, the validity of the assumption of normality
of price changes is examined as part of the results of
weak-form efficiency in chapter 8. Alternative security
return distribution models are nevertheless not tested
here as they are beyond the scope of this study.
1524.7.3 Timing problems
The returns are supposed to be measured over specific time
intervals. When the prices are not realised
simultaneously, it follows that we are measuring returns
over different time intervals. We might therefore expect
returns calculated over these different intervals to have
a distribution perhaps differing from that of the fixed
period returns. This will in turn mean that the variances
of the returns will differ as they are calculated over
different time lengths [French and Roll (1986); Gibbon and
Hess (1981)].
According to Working (1960) the correlation of first
differences of averages in a random chain can induce
correlations not present in the original, especially when
working with index data. It is also noted that the first
order co-efficient will be biased upwards if the prices
used do not occur simultaneously. Brealey (1970), for
example, found that the first order serial correlation
coefficient fell from 0.32 to 0.19 when he used a share
price index based on simultaneous price observations. We
noted in Chapter 3 that the prices reported at the weekly
call-over may have occurred any time during the week. Since
they were not occurring simultaneously this could cause a
timing problem by biasing the serial correlation
coefficients.
As stated above, Brealey (1970) presents evidence which
153shows that the problem may be reduced by obtaining price
observations that occur simultaneously at specific points
in time. The nature of the prices and the manner of their
recording on the NSE preclude the performance of tests
based on simultaneous price observations as in Brealey
(1970). Nevertheless, as discussed in section 3.4, in this
market prices of all shares are released to the public at
the same time each week. This may reduce the effects of
the timing problem on the overall results. In future,
hopefully, as their interest in research develops,
stockbrokers may avail data on simultaneous price
recordings from which a case study may be undertaken.
The next chapter provides empirical evidence on weak-form
efficiency from various stock markets around the world.
154CHAPTER 5
WEAK-FORM EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS: EVIDENCE
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 4 it was shown that tests of market efficiency
are concerned with whether the market uses all the
available information in setting security prices. This
Chapter provides a summary of empirical evidence on
weak-form efficiency.
The emergence of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) and
the cumulative evidence generated in its support has been
great challenge to the chart theorists, fundamental
analysts and, to a large extent based on existing
evidence, the inside dealers. The chart theorists believe
that the past behaviour of security prices is rich in
information about its future behaviour. This means that by
looking at past patterns of price changes one would be
able to predict future patterns. The fundamental analysts
hold the view that by using publicly available information
(for example, corporate financial reports or economic
indices) it is possible to determine the real value of a
security and to therefore conclude whether it is either
under or over-priced, and as a consequence to change ones'
portfolio position. The inside dealers believe that using
price sensitive information which is acquired from the
155companies issuing securities and which is not in the public
domain, will enable them to increase expected gains.
Empirical analysis show that the holding of the above
positions is at least naive, and that at no time should
one expect to obtain a higher than normal return by
holding any of the above positions [Keane (1983); Poterba
and Summers (1988)].
In a stock market which is efficient, prices are good
indicators of value. The firms issuing securities to
finance their operations obtain "fair" prices and
investors who purchase securities pay "fair" prices for
them.
Empirical evidence resulting from tests of weak-form
efficiency is available for many stock exchanges and for
tests using daily, weekly, and monthly data. This evidence
is presented first for developed exchanges where weak-form
tests started, followed by evidence arising from the
extension of research to emerging markets.
5.2 EVIDENCE FROM DEVELOPED STOCK MARKETS.
The bulk of the evidence on the weak-form of the EMH is
available for developed stock markets since the  1950s'.
Three reasons may be cited for this. One was the awareness
of researchers in those countries of the need to
understand the nature of stock exchanges which were
important features of the economy. Secondly was the
156development of statistical methodologies which could be
applied in a variety of fields and which was extended to
the economics and finance. Thirdly was the
availability of large masses of stock price data in an
accessible form and with which researchers could work.
Kendall (1964), for example, examined the temporal
dependence of UK industrial share prices. He used weekly
data for 18 industrial and one composite U.K. stock market
indices over the period 1928 - 1938. Kendall found that,
contrary to the general impression among share market
traders and analysts that share prices followed trends,
the knowledge of past price changes yielded substantially
no information about future price changes. More
specifically he found that each period's price change was
not significantly correlated with the preceding period's
price changes, nor with the price changes of earlier
periods. The serial correlations present in the series
were so weak that they could not be used for predictive
purposes and hence were of little investment value and
investors could not expect to make money on the stock
exchange by watching price movement unless they possessed
some extraneous information. This was significant support
for the random walk theory.
Fama (1965) carried out a comprehensive study of 30
companies using daily data. These were the stocks of the
Dow-Jones Industrial Average Index. He found that the
sample serial correlations were small in absolute value.
157The average value noted was 0.026. He further checked
whether it was possible that price changes across longer
differencing intervals would show stronger evidence of
dependence. He carried out tests for differencing
intervals of four, nine and sixteen days. He again found
that the sample serial correlation coefficients were quite
small. The average value noted was -0.039 for four days
and -0.057 for sixteen days. He concluded that, from the
evidence produced by the serial correlation model, the
dependence in successive price changes was at most
slight. He also carried out runs tests to confirm the
results obtained from the serial correlation tests. He
found that the differences between the actual and expected
number of runs were all very small. In addition he found
no important patterns in the sign of differences. He
concluded that the actual breakdown of runs by sign
conforms very closely to the breakdown that would be
expected if the signs were generated by an independent
Bernoulli process. Fama also examined the distributional
evidence of his sample of companies. He concluded that the
returns were not characterised by the normal, as had
previously been held, but by stable paretian distribution.
The results of Fama's work may have been biased due to the
type of securities used. The blue-chip shares he used,
because of their size and importance are highly unlikely
to be used by anyone to make returns greater than the
market.
Brealey (1970) examined the distribution and independence
158of successive rates of return from the British equity
market. His random walk tests involved carrying out both
serial correlation and runs tests. The tests were on the
daily changes in the Financial Times All Share Index for a
period of 1665 days. Brealey at first found a significant
first order serial correlation coefficient of 0.219. He
noted however that the correlation coefficients could be
biased upwards because the prices used in calculating the
FTA Index did not occur simultaneously. Brealey tried to
overcome the problem by constructing a new index made up
of button quotations obtained at approximately 2 pm. each
day. The new index provided a serial correlation of 0.19
which was significantly different from zero at 95% level
for the year 1968. Using the FTA Index for the same
period resulted in a correlation coefficient of 0.32. The
use of the new index resulted in a reduction in the serial
correlation coefficient, but the results still showed a
slight but not significant dependence between market
returns on successive days. To complement the results
obtained using the serial correlation tests, Brealey
further conducted runs tests. He found some differences
between the actual and expected number of runs. The use of
the new index noted above produced a sharp narrowing, but
not the complete disappearance, of the gap between
expected and actual runs. After looking very closely at
the results of all his tests he concluded that the
observed persistence in the market movement was weak, and
insufficient to yield any profits to one who wanted to
exploit it. The results therefore did support the random
159walk hypothesis. Brealey's examination of the nature of the
distribution of returns revealed a marked departure from
the normal distribution. He observed that the
distributions were characterised by high peaks and fat
tails not characteristic of normality.
Dryden (1970) examined the statistical dependence of daily
prices of three series of price indexes, FTA 500 Share
Index, FTA Capital Goods Index and the Daily Mail
Industrial Share Price Index. Daily data of over 1000
prices were collected for each series. The results of the
study of the serial correlation coefficients of the prices
revealed on the whole no statistically significant
departure from randomness though each of the index series
had a statistically significant first order serial
correlation coefficient. The runs tests also provided
little evidence for rejecting the random walk hypothesis.
Dryden therefore concluded that the behaviour of the
shares studied was consistent with the random walk theory.
It may be concluded therefore that Dryden's evidence
largely supported the efficiency of the securities market
in its weak-form.
Kemp and Reid (1971) tested the random walk hypothesis
using a random sample of shares quoted on the London Stock
Exchange. Their study used 52 daily price observations.
They carried out both the tests of runs and of serial
correlation. They concluded that the share price movements
were conspicuously non-random over the period considered.
160They found that most of the shares that exhibited the
non-randomness were those of small and less known firms.
These firms might not have received much attention from
analysts. The interpretation of their results as
contradicting the random walk theory is questionable since
the period the study covered was very short.
Conrad and Juttner (1973) studied 54 stocks from the 340
stocks listed on the German exchange. They chose stocks
which had the highest number of quotations. The study
covered a time period of 825 days. They found that the
values of the serial correlation coefficients for the
majority of stocks deviated significantly from zero. A
high proportion of the stocks diverged to such an extent
that the dependence revealed was not only significant from
the statistical point of view, but also from an investor's
point of view. They concluded:
"The non-parametric and parametric tests applied to
daily price changes suggest that the random walk
theory is inappropriate to describe the behaviour
of recent prices in Germany. The empirical evidence
we produced does not stand up well in the theory
that stocks being are traded in an efficient
market" (p.591).
Their results from runs tests were rather inconclusive.
According to their results, 19 stocks exhibited a trend,
whereas for the other 35 stocks, the differences between
161the runs did not stand in contradiction to the number of
observations consistent with a random sequence. General
conclusions on the results are difficult to draw since it
is not stated whether they considered the extent of
transaction costs in the German market. They also examined
the distribution of returns along the lines of Fama(1965).
Their tests relating to the observed structure of the
frequency distribution support the hypothesis that the
returns follow a stable paretian distribution.
Solnik (1973) tested whether European stock prices follow
a random walk. He used a sample of 234 securities from 8
major European stock markets. The data consisted of daily
prices and dividend data for the 234 common stock over a
period covering 1310 days. Serial correlations for weekly,
bi-weekly and monthly returns were also computed. He
concluded that the serial correlations were small, and
probably negligible from an investors point of view.
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and Benjamin (1975) carried out a study of the
properties of U.K. share prices using a sample
share prices covering a period of 600 days.
obtained showed that 20% of the shares studied
in a non-random manner. However, these results,
like those of Kemp and Reid's study, covered too short
a period and the firms showing some evidence of
non-randomness were the small ones. The results were
heavily criticised by Marsh (1977). He noted that they had
failed to design their study to take into account the fact
162that their technique was valid only if share price changes
were continuous and symmetric. The superior vertices and
index of maximum distance tests employed by them also
disregarded the effects of "no-change" observations.
Jennergren and Korsvold (1975) examined the applicability
of the Random Walk Hypothesis (RWH) to the share prices of
the Oslo and Stockholm Stock Exchanges. They used daily
closing prices of a sample of 45 stocks traded on the two
exchanges. They tested for the independence of the
successive price changes by serial correlation and runs
tests. The results led them to conclude that the
independence hypothesis could not be supported. This meant
that the RWH was not a very accurate description of share
price behaviour on the Norwegian and Swedish Stock
Markets. They also did point out the practical
difficulties they faced with respect to data, in that most
stocks were infrequently traded. Their tests on the
possible relationship between level of trading and
efficiency did not however support the existence of such a
relationship. They also looked at the distributions of the
share price changes, and their evidence showed that the
distributions were non-normal. They concluded that the
deviation from randomness found was insufficient to offset
the transaction costs incurred in trading. They suggested
the need to probe more deeply into the specifics of price
formation in small markets and for infrequently traded
stocks.
1635.2.1 Recent studies using a variety of statistical
methodologies
The weak-form of the EMH, based upon traditional tests of
serial correlation and runs, has become accepted with
regards to developed markets. Nevertheless, by the
beginning of the 1980's, several researchers sought to
apply more powerful methodologies to investigating
weak-form efficiency. This section highlights some of
these studies.
Shiller (1981) argued for the use of a variance-ratios
methodology in testing for weak-form efficiency. He
provided empirical evidence that appeared to suggest that
price changes in the securities market are much more
volatile than can be justified by standard asset pricing
models. By implication, such evidence implies that the
securities market's pricing ability is inadequate or that
the model of price formation is inappropriate. This
evidence regarding excess volatility in the financial
markets was questioned by Flavin (1983). Flavin provided
evidence that the volatility tests tend to be biased very
severely towards the acceptance of the alternate
hypothesis of market inefficiency. He argued that the
apparent violation of market efficiency was probably a
reflection of the sampling properties of the volatility
measures rather than a failure of the market efficiency
hypothesis itself.
164Rosenberg and Rudd (1982) used serial correlation tests to
study returns of common stocks on the New York Stock
Exchange. They decomposed the total excess return of a
security into what they called factor-related return and
specific return. They found positive serial dependence in
the factor-related component and negative dependence in
the specific component which nearly off-set each other,
resulting in zero correlation in total excess returns.
They nevertheless state that the findings could be due
to recording error in the prices. They could not therefore
reject the hypothesis of randomness.
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) investigated whether the stock
market over-reacts to information. Their focus was on
shares that had experienced large capital gains or losses,
rather than some firm-generated piece of information.
They termed those firms experiencing extreme capital gains
as "winners" and those that had experienced extreme
capital	 losses as "losers".	 They then formed two
portfolios based on winners and losers. 	 Their reported
results indicated that over the last 50 years, loser
portfolio outperformed the market on the average by about
19.6% thirty six months after the portfolio formation
while the "winner" portfolio underperformed the market on
the average by about 5%. They interpreted their results
as being consistent with the overreaction hypothesis,
which postulates that extreme movements in share prices
are followed by reversal movements that adjust for the
165initial movement.	 If the initial movement is very
extreme, the adjustment process will be very large. If
prices behave in such a manner, it clearly implies a
weak-form market inefficiency. De Bondt and Thaler (1987)
examined the issue of market overreaction and stock market
seasonality further, and concluded that the hypothesis
still held in spite of the criticism that the market's
overreaction and the seasonality in share prices could be
due to the market's response to the changing risk
characteristics of firms. Their results, however, are not
statistically robust. What is clear is that their two
studies did not control for the competing hypothesis of
stock market risk changes. Ball and Kothari (1989) show
that when this competing hypothesis is not controlled for
it could cause erroneous acceptance of the overreaction
hypothesis.
Taylor (1986) tested the random walk hypothesis and an
alternative class of models containing trends in prices.
Random behaviour was rejected for all the long series
tested. The results of his analysis, however, need to be
accepted with caution. Firstly, although the results did
reject the RWH, they were not significant enough to
generate profitable rules. He stated that the statistical
dependence was very small and therefore prices reflected
most information accurately and quickly. Any ordinary
citizen using such results was certain to incur trading
costs far greater than any gross profit. Secondly, the
statistics were significant for every series having less
166than 2000 observations. As he puts it, these results showed
that it is highly desirable to study series
containing at least 2000 returns. Studies of shorter
series gave some significant and some non-significant test
results. He finally concludes that "it would then be
difficult to state clear conclusions" (p.161).
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) tested the RWH for weekly stock
market returns using variance-ratio methodology. They
claimed that the RWH was strongly rejected for the entire
sample period (1962 - 1985) and for all subperiods for a
variety of return indexes and size sorted portfolios. They
could not reject the RWH for individual stocks. The
rejection of the RWH for index and portfolio returns was
largely due to the behaviour of small stocks. They
dismissed the idea that it could be attributed completely
to the effects of infrequent trading or time varying
volatilities. Nevertheless, they concluded that the
results did not necessarily mean imply that the stock
market is inefficient or that prices are not rational
assessments of fundamental values. Their test results,
they said, should be interpreted as a rejection of the
economic model used in their study.
Poterba and Summers (1988) examined the extent of mean
reversion in stock prices. They analysed monthly and
annual data on real and excess returns of the New York
Stock Exchange. They also analysed 17 other equity
markets. Their results consistently suggested the presence
167of a transitory component in stock prices, with returns
showing positive autocorrelation over short periods, but
negative autocorrelation over longer periods. They claimed
that persistent, but transitory, disparities between
prices and fundamental values could explain the findings.
They reported that random walk price behaviour could not
be rejected at conventional statistical levels. Ball and
Kothari (1989) provides evidence that this observation
does not result from stock price mispricing.
Ball and Kothari (1989) investigated the basis of negative
serial correlations in returns. They tested two competing
hypotheses: (1) stock market mispricing, with prices
taking long, but subsequently corrected, departures from
fundamental values, or routinely overreacting to
information and (2) changing expected returns in an
efficient market. They controlled for the behaviour of the
market index and then computed serial correlations in
abnormal returns, thus allowing a discriminating test
between mispricing and changing expected returns
hypotheses. They obtained evidence that suggested that
negative serial correlation in relative returns was due
almost entirely to variations in relative risks, and
therefore expected relative returns, through time. The
market mispricing hypothesis, supported by the findings of
De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 87), was rejected.
Jegadeesh (1990) examined the predictability of monthly
returns of the New York Stock Exchange. He used over
168half a million observations in fitting regression
equations for predicting security returns. He found that
the negative first order serial correlation in monthly
stock returns was highly significant. Significant positive
serial correlations were found at longer lags and the
12-month serial correlation was particularly strong. He
concluded that the predictable pattern of stock returns
observed appeared to be a pervasive phenomenon and
therefore reliably rejected the hypothesis that the stock
prices follow random walks. He nevertheless specified
that the predictability of the returns can be attributed
either to market inefficiency or to systematic changes in
expected stock returns. The models he used in the tests
could not discriminate between these two competing
hypotheses, and therefore the results were inconclusive.
The conclusion from the review of all the above studies
is that the findings concerning on the applicability of
the weak-form EMH obtained from the use of traditional
statistical methodologies still hold as strongly as they
did in the 1960s in spite of the use of new methodologies.
1695.2.3 Non-statistical tests (trading rules)
The non-statistical tests in security market research are
directed towards testing whether mechanical trading rules
can be devised to beat a naive buy-and-hold strategy. The
rules are founded on the assumption that there may be some
pattern in price changes not be detectable by the
statistical tests. Many investigations have tested the
strategies which investment analysts and advisers claim
have been successful in generating abnormal returns for
their clients. Evidence from studies using this
methodology is reviewed in this section.
Alexander (1964) conducted extensive tests of filter rules
using daily data. He used filters of one to fifty percent.
He concluded that there was no possibility of making any
significant gains unless one was a floor trader (in other
words a person exempt from paying dealing costs). It was
not possible to beat the buy-and-hold strategy.
Fama and Blume (1966) carried out tests which compared the
profitability of various filters to the naive buy-and-hold
strategy for individual stocks of the Dow-Jones Industrial
Average. They did notice that the results of small filters
of between 0.5% and 1.5% indicated that it was possible to
devise trading schemes based on very short term, say
daily, price swings that would on average out-perform the
buy-and-hold. The average profits were nevertheless small,
and they concluded that when one takes account of even the
170minimum trading costs, the profit identified disappeared.
They also stated that when the serial correlation tests
failed to uncover some dependence in price changes, no
dependence was noted when filter tests were used, that is,
"... this same dependence has also remained hidden from
the scrutiny of filter tests" (p.240). There would be no
justification therefore for declaring the market
inefficient.
Levy (1967) tested a trading rule he called the relative
strength rule. He found that two policies he adopted based
on the percentage amount invested and the number of
securities yielded higher returns than those of the
buy-and-hold strategy. Based on his results he concluded
that the theory of random walks had been refuted. Jensen
and Benington (1970) reviewed Levy's work and concluded
that there were several errors in the strategy which
tended to overstate the excess return earned by trading
rules. It was therefore not possible for the evidence
provided by Levy to strictly invalidate the random walk
hypothesis.
Latane and Young (1969) tested the Fixed Proportion
Maintenance strategy and found inconsistent and
contradicting results that, where significant and
persistent differences existed among security  growth
rates, the Buy-and-Hold strategy tended to yield superior
results across time. They were therefore unable to show
that their strategy was superior to the buy-and-hold.
171Jensen and Benington (1970) carried out tests to review
the earlier work of Levy (1967). They directed their
effort to those rules which seemed to earn substantially
more than a buy-and-hold policy. Their replication of
these rules on 29 independent samples of 200 securities
each over a period of 5 years did not support Levy's
results. They concluded that the performance of the
relative strength rules were very close to the results
predicted by efficient market theories of security price
behaviour.
Evans (1970) was not able to discriminate effectively
between the buy-and-hold and the Fixed Proportion
Maintenance strategy (FP). He contended that the FP tended
to show significantly superior risk-adjusted returns
without considering transaction costs and taxes. However
when he considered transaction costs and taxes he could
not discriminate in favour of any one strategy.
Dryden (1970) used trading rules to check the results
obtained when he used statistical procedures. He found a
higher rate of return with small filters which was above
the buy-and-hold returns. However, no adjustment had been
made for transaction costs. He concluded that the trading
strategy used as the filter rule did not seriously
infringe the weak-form of the efficient market
hypothesis.
172Brealey (1970) used a sample of 29 shares to test the
profitability of trading rules. He reported that in 15 out
of the 29 cases the shares provided a lower rate of return
after they were purchased than after they were sold. The
average return was marginally higher for purchases than
sales, however the median return was lower. He was unable
to obtain results that were significantly superior to the
naive buy-and-hold strategy. He concluded that the
findings did not support the hypothesis of dependence in
market rates of return.
Griffiths (1970) used the relative strength rules tests on
weekly data. He carried out his study on 200 shares and
reported that the top 10% shares outperformed the market
during the year by 3%. The bottom 10% also underperformed
the market by 3% with the rest performing more or less in
line with the market. The magnitude of the reported
profit was, however, insufficient to cover transaction
costs. The efficient market hypothesis could therefore not
be rejected.
Girmes and Damant (1975) carried out an analysis of 484
shares quoted on the London stock Exchange for a period
covering 1304 days. They stated that they found
significant "head and shoulder" patterns in their
simulated data. This, they claimed, showed that a trading
strategy could be developed from the knowledge of the
series of past prices that could out-do the buy and hold.
They, however, pointed out that the period covered by the
173study showed a marked head and shoulder movement of the
market index itself. This could therefore have resulted
from a selection bias. Marsh (1977) also criticised them
of "data mining" in their choice of smoothing technique
and in their definition of "head and shoulders".
Jennergren (1975) carried out filter tests of the Swedish
market share prices. He aimed at verifying earlier work on
the Norwegian and Swedish markets which had tested
weak-form efficiency using statistical random walk
theories. Unlike the studies in the USA and UK, Jennergren
faced technical problems because short-trading was not
allowed on the Swedish market. To overcome the problem, he
introduced the bank account strategy where proceeds were
deposited or withdrawn for the stock market operations.
The differences between the filter rule he used and that
of Fama and Blume (1966) and Dryden (1970) were that:
(i) the investors alternated between the long position and
the bank account, whereas in other studies, the trader was
always in the market, holding either a long or a short
position. Since there was no organised short trading on
the exchange, the filter rules involved no short
positions.
(ii) the transactions on shares did not take place the
same day but were assumed to take place the next day
because information on prices of a day's trading was only
available to the investors the next day.
174Jennergren was not definite in his conclusions. He stated
that there seemed to exist profitable mechanical trading
rules for certain institutional investors, but only on the
assumption that the prices do not become affected by the
trades generated by the trading. This assumption may be
unrealistic in open market operations. He also noted that
filters did not seem profitable for ordinary private
investors who formed a very important investing group.
Given his assumptions on price movements, one may not hold
his findings as sufficiently significant to challenge the
hypothesis of the market being weak-form efficient.
The review of the evidence from trading rules provides
support for the validity of the efficient market
hypothesis. It can, therefore, be concluded that these
results are consistent with those obtained from the use of
statistical methodologies [Fama (1965); Dryden (1970);
Brealey (1970); Jennergren (1975)].
The research evidence presented indicates that developed
stock exchanges are substantially efficient in the weak
sense. The few studies which showed departure from
efficiency were identified as suffering from several
methodological weaknesses which made their conclusion
untenable. It is apparent that there is no opportunity for
consistently earning excess profits by using statistical,
technical, and chartist approaches.
1755.3 EVIDENCE FROM EMERGING MARKETS
Published evidence on the weak and other levels of
efficiency of developing stock markets has appeared
sporadically. This evidence has been scanty. The main
motivation underlying many of the studies of emerging
markets was to see whether such markets exhibited the same
characteristics as developed markets, such as those of the
USA and UK. The debate on the relationship between
economic and stock market efficiency was instrumental in
making researchers examining the developing markets to
believe a priori that they were not efficient [Samuels
(1981)]. The dominant school believed in the strength of
the relationship between the development of the economy
and that of the financial system [Goldsmith (1970)].
Since many of the small exchanges were in economically
less developed economies ( and still are) then it followed
that they were and are less developed. This relationship
has been difficult to test but it had a significant impact
on the design and emphasis of the studies of developing
markets and the interpretation of the results [Parkinson
(1984)]. Many of the studies, including some presented
here, concentrated the bigger part of their effort on the
reporting of economic variables and relationships rather
than on prices and information. In this part we only
report on the evidence from tests of weak-form efficiency,
which relates price with information, as that is the
theme of the current study.
1765.3.1 Evidence from markets (excluding the NSE)
Niarchos (1971, 1972) carried out a study of the Greek
Stock Exchange. The purpose of the study was to see
whether the results from a small stock market like the
Greek one compare with those obtained from New York and
London stock markets. He tested for randomness using
serial correlation and runs tests. The data used were the
closing price series for the industrial index, the bank
and insurance index, fifteen industrial stocks and twenty
bond issues. The study period was for 12 years (1957 to
1968). The results obtained suggested that the prices were
random walks. The average value of the serial correlation
coefficient of 0.036 for the 15 stocks studied was not
significant. There was nevertheless some slight, but
insignificant, departure from the random walk for the
industrial price index and for some bonds. The serial
dependence with regards to the index may have been due to
some inactive stocks included in its computation. He
concluded that the prices of individual stocks and the
index are random walks, i.e. they obeyed the same
model found for other stock markets in the world. Thus it
is not only impossible to predict a price series from
its own internal behaviour, but it seems equally
impossible to do it from the behaviour of other price
series.
Affleck-Graves and Money (1975) studied weekly share price
177series of 50 stocks of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange for
a period of five years to 1973. They carried out serial
correlation tests over 20 lags. Only 35 out of 500 serial
correlation coefficients were significant and in excess of
two standard deviations from zero. They concluded that the
amount of correlation was not sufficient to reject the
applicability of the weak-form EMH.
Sharma and Kennedy (1977) tested the applicability of the
random walk hypothesis to the stock market of India and
compared the behaviour to that of the stock markets of USA
and Great Britain. They used (a) a non-parametric test of
randomness, by an analysis of runs and (b) a parametric
test of independence by an examination of serial
correlation coefficients and (c) the spectral densities of
the data. They concluded:
"...it is evident that the stocks on the Bombay
Stock Exchange obey a random walk and equivalent in
this sense to the behaviour of stock prices in the
markets of advanced industrialised countries"
(p.411).
Roux and Gilbertson (1978) carried out extensive tests on
both the distribution and independence of price changes
for 24 mining and industrial shares listed on the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. They applied both serial
correlation and runs tests to investigate the independence
178of the price changes. They concluded that the tests,
especially the runs tests, provided some evidence that the
price changes were not completely independent. Their
results differed slightly from those of Affleck-Graves and
Money (1975). Although apparent deviations from
independence were small, they were consistent with a
situation in which a time trend or bunching of
observations occurred. They nevertheless added that the
findings did not imply that investors could utilise such
small market dependence to consistently increase their
profits over a naive buy-and-hold strategy.
Ang and Pohlman (1978) tested weekly prices of 54 stocks
of five Far Eastern countries using serial correlation and
runs tests as in Fama (1965). The time period covered
were: September 1967 to November 1974 for Hong Kong; May
1970 to November 1974 for Australia and Japan; May 1972
to November 1974 for Singapore; September 1973 to
November 1974 for Philippines. Stock prices were
corrected for capital adjustments. The study concluded
that, in general, the degree of the serial correlation
coefficients were similar to those of European stocks as
reported by Solnik (1972) and, for Japan, quite comparable
to the USA. The study also examined the distribution of
the returns and concluded that they exhibited greater
standard deviation and departure from normality than
American stocks.
D'Ambrosio (1980) used price indices of the stock exchange
179of Singapore to test for their conformity with the
weak-form EMH. In order to determine the presence of
trends and the degree of price dependence, this study
applied runs and serial correlation tests to daily closing
values of the six major indices, Industrial; Financial;
Tins; Property; Rubber; and Hotels. Three of these
indices, Industrial, Hotels, and Tins showed dependence
based on the runs test, but exhibited low serial
correlation coefficients especially at short lag
intervals. At longer intervals the indices were highly
correlated from one period to the next. In all instances
the serial correlations were greater than those found in
other equity markets. He concluded that the Singapore
exchange did not behave in a manner consistent with a
random walk. The conclusions were rather strong given the
observations of Working (1960) and Fisher (1966) that
stock market indices tend to produce biased results,
especially if infrequently traded stocks are included in
their computation.
Gandhi, Saunders and Woodward (1980) studied the Kuwait
Stock Exchange. The study covered the period December
1975 to May 1978. The data consisted of stock market price
indices published by the Central Bank of Kuwait. They used
regression analysis to determine whether 	 serial
correlation existed. They found that the slope
coefficients were statistically different from zero at any
meaningful levels of confidence. They also carried out
runs tests on the data. They found that the results of the
180tests were statistically significant and therefore the
market tended to show some level of inefficiency. The
results indicated that share prices tend to move
systematically over time. This would enable investors,
who are able to identify share price movements, to
consistently "beat the market". They attributed the
results to "thinness" of the market. They conclude:
"there is evidence of inefficiency in price
determination 	  as might be expected in a
thin market" (p.347).
It should be noted that the above results may have been
biased due to the fact that only the indices were used.
When inactive stocks are included in the indices they tend
to produce dependence as noted in Niarchos (1972). The
source of the dependence may be attributed to the use of
indices rather than to the inefficiency of the market.
Samuels and Yacout (1981) considered the economic
characteristics and weak-form efficiency of the Nigerian
stock exchange. They tested for serial correlation using
weekly share prices for the period 1977 to 1979. They
found slight traces of serial dependence which were not
statistically significant. They concluded that the price
series followed a random walk and the market was efficient
in the weak sense.
Yacout (1981) carried out serial correlation tests of
181twenty companies of the Egyptian stock exchange. He found
significant dependence with regards to 25% of the
companies. He attributed this to data problems and
concluded that even though the market did not seem to
follow the random walk for the period and shares tested,
considering transaction costs the market was reasonably
efficient.
Cooper (1982) carried out random walk tests on a series of
50 World stock markets that included the Nairobi Stock
Exchange. Using serial correlation, runs, and spectral
tests on monthly, weekly and daily data, he was unable to
reject the random walk hypothesis. From the serial
correlation tests he found that the first order serial
correlations were small in magnitude. Results for all
exchanges, except for Japan, exhibited some serial
correlation which were statistically different from zero
up to a lag of 25. The runs tests on monthly, weekly and
daily data supported the random walk when transaction
costs were taken into account. Cooper (1982, p.528)
concludes:
	 the findings reported in this paper do
lend further weight to the random walk hypothesis
for those particular markets at least for the
samples and time periods studied for the USA and
the U.K. markets. For all other markets, the 
evidence is less clear" 	 	 on (p.530) he
continues "....if we do reject the Random Walk
182Hypothesis ( thereby Weak-form efficiency) because
of some dependence in successive price or index
changes, the question then arises whether or not
non-randomness is of a sufficient magnitude for an
investor to make profits in excess of a
randomly selected portfolio,....the actual amount
of dependence is so small as to be unimportant,
given transaction costs.N
Al-Mudhaf (1983) examined the efficiency of the Kuwait
Stock Exchange and those factors which affected the market
directly. He gave complete coverage to some of the issues
in the organisation of the exchange. He also carried out
statistical tests of the weak-form efficiency using thirty
companies listed on the exchange. The data used was for
the period 1976- 1980. He adjusted the price for bonus,
dividend and rights. He carried out serial correlation
tests over 10 lags. The largest serial correlation
coefficient was (-0.192). The mean was 0.055. He concluded
that there were no significant correlations in stock
returns.
Barnes (1986) studied the 30 stocks of the Kuala Lumpur
stock exchange using serial correlation, runs, and
spectral analysis. Serial correlation showed only 2
stocks exhibiting a departure from the weak-form.
Significant runs results were only for one stock. The
spectral results indicated confirmation with the weak-form
EMH. He concluded that the exchange exhibited a high
183degree of weak-form efficiency.
Yong (1987) carried out a study on all stocks which were
traded on weekly basis on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
from January 1977 to May 1985. Based on the serial
correlation test for individual lag, a high percentage of
stocks exhibited independence between price changes. Based
on the overall serial correlation test of the Q-statistic,
a high percentage exhibited independence among the
percentage price changes. A small percentage did exhibit
non-randomness in the percentage price changes. He
attributed the results to stocks which were thinly traded.
The runs test gave results which exhibited non-randomness
in the percentage price changes. The relationship between
the level of trading and efficiency was non-evident from
the results of the Spearman's rank coefficients.
Distributional evidence also indicated that the returns
were not normally distributed.
5.3.2 Studies of the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE)
The pioneering work on the NSE may be attributed to Lomas
(1961). He investigated the indices of ordinary share
prices on the NSE. The study's objectives were to show the
trend and magnitude of changes in the NSE from 1955 to
1961 and to measure the effect upon the share prices of
the politically induced depression that came about because
of the process of decolonisation following the Lancaster
House Conference of 1960. This study gave a vivid account
184of the historical development of the NSE and its stated
aims and objectives at inception. Besides this, it
examined the nature of the trading activity on the NSE and
found significant evidence of non-trading which he
concluded could lead to imperfections in the process of
price determination on the exchange.
To gauge the effects of the political change on share
prices, he constructed indices weighted on the issued
ordinary share capital on monthly basis using 40 companies
and examined their trend. His results indicated that:
(a) From 1956, the trend of ordinary share prices was
downwards and that, on average, ordinary shares lost over
half their value between 1956 and 1961.
(b) between 1956 and the Lancaster House Conference in
1960, ordinary shares lost on average approximately one
quarter of their value.
(c) From the Lancaster House Conference in 1960, ordinary
shares prices had fallen much more rapidly than in the
preceding years, and by July 1961 they had lost over one
third of their value.
These declines were attributed to the changing political
climate at the time. This study was not a test of the EMH
as we know it today but one would be tempted to say that
from the evidence given, the hindsight which Lomas did not
185have then was that such changes in share market prices
could be explained by the efficient market hypothesis. The
behaviour of the market then was consistent with the EMH.
The decline in share prices was not in itself evidence of
market imperfection. Keane (1987, 1990) argues that when
economic prospects are interpreted to be suddenly and
dramatically altered, the revision of the prices will show
because it will also be correspondingly sudden and
dramatic. If the market does not respond as such, but
delays reaction, then it will be acting irrationally. The
political events of the time and their attendant economic
consequences had a dramatic effect on the riskiness of the
investments and this was properly reflected in the speed
of response of the market prices.
Arowolo (1971) examined the development of capital markets
with specific reference to Kenya and Nigeria. He studied
the economic details surrounding the NSE. The main
contribution of his study lies in the identification of
the crucial part that the NSE could play in the
investment-development process. He did not concern himself
with the exchange trading and pricing activities.
Munga (1974) re-examined Lomas' (1961) contribution but
concentrated on the history and organisation of the NSE
and its role in the Kenyan economy. He particularly gave
a good historical account of the NSE, how it evolved, and
the complexities involved. The study also examined the
raising of funds and gave a theoretical treatment of the
186role of the exchange in development. Unlike Lomas (1961) no
attempt was made even to carry out fundamental analysis of
the prices of the exchange.
Cooper (1982) included the NSE as one of his sample
exchanges. He studied the NSE weekly indices using serial
correlation, runs, and spectral analysis. He found eight
cases of significant serial correlation. The standardised
value of the runs test was -5.58. Spectral analysis
revealed 39 readings outwith the 95% confidence band. This
evidence may be considered to indicate that the RWH was
not a good description of the successive changes of the
NSE-Index. These types of results for indices should be
interpreted with caution, however, because index data may
introduce autocorrelations not present in the original
series [Working (1960)]. He did not have an adequate basis
for rejecting the RWH when transaction costs were
considered.
Runyenje (1985) studied the impact of capital gains
taxation on the prices of ordinary share using a sample of
20 companies quoted on the NSE over the period 1973 to
1983. Tables and graphs were used as the principle tools
of analysis on annual, monthly, and weekly data. He
reported that ordinary share prices on the NSE exhibited a
significant trend between 1973 and 1983. He sought a trend
on the NSE-Index as a basis for drawing conclusions about
the impact of the tax, and a trend was noted. It should be
recognised that this was not, however, a statistical test
187of the share prices of the NSE. Of particular importance,
nevertheless, was the manner in which it was able to show
graphically the movement of the share price index over the
period 1973 to 1985. Such an analysis is a contribution in
its own right [Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1987)].
Parkinson (1984) provides, perhaps, the most serious
empirical work on the NSE to-date. He examined the NSE for
the period 1974 to 1978 with the objectives of showing its
role in the development process and the degree to which it
conformed to the patterns of stock exchanges elsewhere.
To undertake the study he obtained his data from several
sources:
(i) economic indices data was obtained from published
official government statistics.
(ii) company specific information was obtained from
annual stock exchange fact books.
(iii) stock price data was obtained from one of the
stock brokers of the exchange.
His comprehensive review of the economy revealed that for
the period covered, negligible new funds had been raised
through the NSE. There was also evidence to show that
there was an unsatisfied demand for new securities, but
that companies had failed to tap that demand.
He also carried out various tests of the EMH. These tests
covered 50 stocks which were listed on the exchange for
188the period 1974 to 1978. He used monthly price
observations. The results of his serial correlation tests
showed that the signs were predominantly negative for 80%
of the shares. He found first order serial correlation of
more than 0.3 for eleven (22%) of the fifty shares. He
concluded that, for some companies, there was a noticeable
pattern of share price behaviour over time. This would
violate the extreme random walk hypothesis. He also noted
that since he had used extrapolated prices for six out of
the eleven companies with high serial correlation, this
could have been the cause of such high correlation.
Parkinson carried out further tests on the data using the
non-parametric method of analysis of runs up and down. He
used both one tailed and two tailed tests of
significance at 5% level of significance. He found that
forty nine (98%) of the fifty companies exhibited fewer
runs than would be expected from randomly distributed
prices, and was forced to reject the hypothesis of
randomness. The results of basic tests of the distribution
of successive share price changes were also reported. They
indicated considerable evidence of positive skewness. The
level of kurtosis was also high suggesting a considerable
degree of leptokurtosis. No other tests on the
distributions were undertaken.
He concluded that the random walk hypothesis was not a
valid description of the share price changes of the NSE.
The study was therefore not conclusive on whether there is
189evidence consistent with weak-form efficiency. There may
be ground for questioning the results obtained and the
conclusions reached, firstly on the quality and quantity
of data, and secondly on the level of analysis.
Parkinson used data only of stock broker, thereby
restricting his data source. The structure of the NSE is
such that complete sets of market price information are
available only when all brokers exchange information at
the weekly call-over. The price lists of individual
brokers are incomplete to that extent. This therefore
restricted the amount and quality of the data used in his
analysis.
The quantity of the data could have been affected by the
length of time covered. Parkinson carried out his tests
over a five years period (1974-1978). Given that the
exchange faces a high incidence of infrequent trading,
this would have introduced data limitation problems to his
study. The problem was probably compounded by the use of
monthly return intervals. This means that he could only
expect to obtain a maximum of sixty observations which,
with thin trading, was not possible for some of the
companies sampled.
The other issue concerns the control of data errors. Data
errors have been identified as important sources of
significant results if not controlled [Praetz (1976)]. The
effort and cost required to achieve high level data
190accuracy through editing is enormous. Parkinson admits the
problems he had in dealing with his data. Cost
considerations did not enable him to pursue thoroughly the
completeness and accuracy of his data. He, for example,
does not explain how he dealt with suspect data or his
editing procedures. The existence of extreme values, some
probably caused by suspect data, may produce evidence not
consistent with randomness.
Secondly, the depth of analysis and resulting evidence,
was not sufficient for him to arrive at strong conclusion.
In the analysis, the serial correlation tests covered only
one lag. This is insufficient to make valid conclusion on
the applicability of the independence hypothesis [Niarchos
(1972); Yong (1987)]. Any dependence, as in many other
studies before and after, would have to be shown to exist
consistently across lags.
Another issue in the analysis that he failed to include
was the "no price change" position in his runs test. The
results of Conrad and Juttner (1973, Table I) tend to show
that there may exist significant differences in results
when either including or excluding the no change position.
Another problem is that the result may have arisen because
extrapolated data were used. As Parkinson noted himself,
the extrapolation of the data may cause problems in the
results obtained. He extrapolated data for a total of 20
(40%) of the fifty companies.
191It would therefore not suffice to make any clear
conclusions on the validity of the EMH on Parkinson's
evidence only. The study needs to be challenged, taking
into consideration its fundamental weaknesses and the
problems inherent in EMH studies in the emerging markets
reviewed above.
192CHAPTER 6
METHODOLOGY: RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 2 the nature of stock markets in developing
countries was discussed. It was concluded that there have
been major improvements in the operating characteristics
of the markets, but that more attention is still required
to increase the level of activity. In Chapter 3 the
structure of the NSE was examined. The nature of the
trading activity was identified and discussed in detail.
Many features inherent in emerging markets were seen to
apply in this market. In Chapter 4 the theory underlying
weak-form efficiency was explained. In Chapter 5 evidence
on efficiency from both developed and emerging exchanges
was presented. This Chapter looks at the implications of
existing literature and evidence from emerging markets on
methodology. The research question and hypotheses to be
tested are also developed.
6.2.1 THE EMPHASIS OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH
It is apparent from the literature that major emphases in
the studies of emerging markets have been placed on
forging a theoretical link between economic and market
efficiency [Drake (1977, 1985); Samuels (1981); Samuels
193and Yacout (1981); Al- Mudhaf (1983); Kitchen (1986, 1987);
Parkinson (1984, 1984a, 1987)]. There seems little doubt
that there exists a relationship between the
competitiveness of capital markets and the efficiency of
the economy. The more efficient the economy the more
competitive the market [Stiglitz (1981)]. In a fully
efficient economy the capital markets will also be
perfectly efficient. In an efficient economy the
allocation of the resources generated in that economy is
Pareto optimal. Of course no economy is likely to achieve
this optimal level of efficiency. Developing countries are
worse-off when compared to developed countries because the
distribution of resources is often highly skewed to only a
small percentage of the population.
The approach to defining the efficiency of capital markets
from the perspective of the efficiency of the country's
economy is appealing. The problems arise when it is
desired to test the approach empirically. As Stiglitz
(1981) says, it would be very difficult to define what a
set of feasible resource allocation represents. In a
perfect market an asset would have a price that is exactly
equal to its present value, and, as a consequence, the
sale of an asset in such a market is a zero Net Present
Value (NPV) transaction. [Watt and Zimmerman (1986, p.21-
23) provide a summary of assumptions underlying a perfect
capital market.]
Like a perfect market, an efficient market involves zero
194NPV transactions. However, an efficient market does not
have to be perfect. In other words, perfect markets are
efficient markets, but efficient markets are not always
perfect markets [Ross and Westerfield (1988)]. In the
finance literature, efficiency refers to efficiency with
respect to information. A market is efficient with respect
to a particular set of information. A market where
prices quickly reflect all available information is
efficient. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH)
maintains that the total market is quite sophisticated
in the way it digests all available information and
arrives at equilibrium security prices.
There are no rigid rules or assumptions about market
efficiency. There are those who do not believe, for
example, with Samuels (1981 p. 129) assertions that the
nature of emerging markets is such that:
prices cannot be assumed to fully reflect all
available information. It cannot be assumed that
investors will correctly interpret the information
that is released; and it cannot be assumed that
insiders cannot operate on a scale sufficient to
influence the price. The corporation, on the one
hand, has greater potential to influence its own
stock market price, and yet, on the other hand,
there is a greater possibility that its price will
move about in a manner not justified by the
information available."
195Officer (1980) stated that an efficient stock market does
not require that every buyer and every seller be fully
informed. He adds:
"In the limit, one informed trader may be
sufficient to ensure market efficiency providing
the share market is thin (few trades being made)
and/or he has sufficient capital to trade until he
considers the full effect of the information is
reflected in the price and there is no further
reward from acting on this information" (p.8).
Beaver (1981), for example, states very clearly that
market efficiency does not connote social desirability or
any other normative connotation. Market efficiency, he
points out, is concerned with the relationship between
information and share prices. He continues to add:
"No value laden or normative connotations are
implied. For example, a society might choose to
have a securities market that is efficient with
respect to a coarser information system over one
that would be efficient with respect to a finer
information system. Similarly, there is no direct
or simple relationship between the 'greater' market
efficiency and 'improved' allocation of resources.
Hence, a distinction must be made between
196allocation and informational efficiency. They are
distinct concepts and the relationship between them
has not been rigorously derived" (p.168).
Keane (1983), on his part, argues that there is only one
significant assumption upon which the validity of the
market efficiency depends and that:
"it is not a proposition premised on a particular
view of the world. It is not conditional upon there
being a certain proportion, let alone a majority,
of skilled investors. There is no assumption that
the most or indeed any investors have access to or
comprehend all available information, or are in
agreement about the significance of the
information. The only assumption that the EMH can
be said to depend upon is one which states that it
is possible notwithstanding the existence of naive
investors, and despite the activities of
speculators and claim by analysts to possess
superior skills, that the market is nevertheless
successful in generating prices that
instantaneously and correctly capture all new
information" (p.13).
Ross and Westerfield (1988) provide further support for
this position. They argue that many persons are skeptical
that the market price can be efficient if only a fraction
of the outstanding shares change hands on any given day.
197They further explain that:
m the number of trades in a stock on a given day is
less than the number of people following the stock.
This is because an individual will trade only when
the value of the stock to him differs enough from
the market price to justify incurring brokerage
commission and other transaction costs.
Furthermore, even if the number of traders
following the stock are small relative to the
number of outstanding shareholders, the stock can
be expected to be efficiently priced as long as a
number of interested traders use publicly available
information even if many stockholders never follow
the stock and are not considering trading in the
near future and even if some stockholders trade
with little or no information m (p.308).
The concept of efficiency put forward in the finance and
accounting literature deals with information efficiency.
Irrespective of the persuasiveness of the arguments
advanced for or against efficiency of any market the best
judgment can only be made when empirical evidence is
presented. Efficiency is purely an empirical issue [Keane
(1983, p.13)]. This means that previous research in
emerging markets would usefully have placed more emphasis
on providing strong evidence on information efficiency
through the nature and structure of empirical tests. This
study places emphasis on the empirical evidence for
198information efficiency.
6.2.2	 Issues of data
There is no doubt that many studies of emerging markets
have had to contend with significant data problems
[Yacout (1981); Parkinson (1984)]. These problems arise
from at least three sources. One is the non-existence of
computerised databases which the researchers can use. The
second is the unavailability of data due to the nature of
the stock market activities in developing countries. The
third is the cost and effort required to assemble adequate
data for meaningful research.
The non-availability of computerised databases has had a
significant effect in market studies in developing
countries and consequently on published evidence. One
particular approach to this problem has been the use of
indices which, for many exchanges, are published and
therefore available at lesser cost [Cooper (1982);
D'Ambrosio (1980); Gandhi, Saunders and Woodward (1980);
Sharma and Kennedy (1977)]. The evidence from the indices
is itself a very significant contribution, as demonstrated
by Cooper (1982). There are, however, problems that arise
when indices are used and when results not consistent with
efficiency are obtained. Fisher (1966), for example,
showed that infrequent trading causes an index
constructed from such resulting share price data to induce
positive serial correlation into returns which are
199calculated from the index and the estimated variance of the
returns on the index to be biased downwards.
Another major problem with the data is its cost of
acquisition. The costs are quite high in relative terms.
Parkinson (1984) notes that his decision to use monthly
data was based on the pragmatic criterion of the time
available for data collection, and on the mass of data
which had to be physically transported many thousands of
miles (p.259). Experience from the current research has
also proved that adequate resources have to be put at the
disposal of the researcher otherwise the quality of the
findings may be greatly affected.
Even when the cost of acquiring the data is manageable,
there arises the problem of the availability of that
data. Thin trading can affect the results of empirical
work with regards to weak-form and other higher levels
of efficiency. Infrequently traded shares introduce
serious biases into the results of empirical work. The
major source of bias is the tendency for the prices
recorded at the end of a time period to represent an
outcome of a transaction which occurred earlier in, or
prior to, the period in question. It follows that
erroneous conclusions can be made regarding the results of
tests of efficiency.
Recognising this problem in studies of emerging markets
requires the extension of the study periods to generate
200more data. Taylor (1986) argues that longer price series
improve variance estimates, increase the power of random
walk tests, and are essential for investigation of trading
rules. He states that the duration of a time series should
be as long as possible. He recommends that at least four
years of daily price data with about 1000 observations are
required to obtain worthwhile results and if possible
eight years of data providing about 2000 observations or
more should be investigated. This is itself a costly
exercise and many researchers with limited budgets may not
be able to afford it. For some markets it is a technical
impossibility. This probably explains the use of monthly
returns in, for example Parkinson (1984), and why, where
weekly returns are used, very short time durations are
taken [Yacout (1981)].
This study attempts to deal with the data problems in two
ways. The first is by establishing a high qualitative
database for the stock exchange. The second is by using a
longer time (10 years of weekly data) than that adopted by
many of the previous studies. Lo and MacKinlay (1988)
argue that weekly data is preferable in that the biases
associated with non-trading, the bid-ask spread, and
asynchronous prices are avoided. The nature of the data
used is described in Chapter 7.
6.2.3 The nature of the price series used
Very little attempt has been made in previous studies to
201identify, leave alone study, all the price series in the
market. In a market, three price series are usually
observed, the transaction, the bid, and the ask price
series. The first represents the trading price in that
market and the other two represent the quotations made on
particular securities. Few studies mention the price
series used.
This research investigates all the three price series
concurrently for two reasons. The first is because of the
views held about the pricing system in emerging markets.
Samuels (1981), for example, tends to suggest that due to
their very nature, prices in emerging markets fluctuate
non-randomly. This is because, he argues, in such markets
ill-informed investors are more numerous than the informed
investors, and the trading activity is low, meaning that
prices do not instantaneously adjust to information. He
contends that inadequate corporate disclosure is likely to
lead to a range of expectations by investors and therefore
to increase the fluctuations in the market price of a
share.
It is true that investors' behaviour in a market is not
only reflected by the price at which securities are traded
but the price quotations. Jang's (1987) study of the
microstructure of securities markets illustrates that the
bid and ask prices are determined by the expected return
of each trader. The ask price increases with respect to
both the buyer's expected return and the seller's expected
202return. The ask price will decrease as a buyer becomes more
risk averse and his subjectively estimated variance of the
future price increases. It also decreases when a seller
becomes more risk averse. For the bid price it increases
with respect to the buyer's expected return as well as the
seller's expected return. It increases as the seller
becomes more risk averse and as the buyer becomes more
risk averse Nang (1987, p.11)]. One would therefore
expect, a priori, to find that all the three price series
exhibit the same characteristics. Nevertheless, in a
market characterised by a dominant group as in Samuels'
argument this may not be the case. Empirical evidence from
the returns of the three series will shed light on this
problem.
Secondly, a variety of prices are commonly used in market
studies. There have been studies based upon either
transaction prices or closing bid and ask quotations. Keim
(1989), for example, states that stock returns used in
most empirical financial research are computed with
closing bid or ask prices. These may not represent 'true'
prices and may introduce measurement errors in portfolio
returns if investor buying and selling behaviour displays
systematic patterns.
There are many studies which have used transaction prices.
The stock returns from the Center for Research in Security
Prices at the University of Chicago are widely used in
market studies in the USA. These returns are computed
203using the last transaction price of the day on days when
the stock trades.
Cohen et al (1978) conduct their investigation on the
effect of thinness in security markets by using both
transaction returns and returns based on bid/ask
quotations. They argue that studying all the prices is
justified in that demand shifts need not trigger
transactions, and hence closing transaction prices, unlike
closing quotes, need not reflect all current information.
They show that the expected quotation and transaction
returns are equal, but that drift in the aggregate demand
shift process causes the estimator of transaction returns
variance to be greater than quotation returns variance.
Some studies use a series created by averaging the buyer
and the seller prices. Parkinson's (1984) study of the
NSE, for example, used some version of the average price.
The price of a share was taken to be the mid-way between
the buying and the selling prices. To make the series
complete, where only the buying or selling price was
available, and therefore the average could not be
computed, that price was used. Where only the transaction
price was available, then that price was used.
Opong's (1989) study of the London Stock Exchange used
Datastream historical prices. These prices are based on
the average between the buy and sell prices. He noted that
the spread for small and infrequently traded securities
204could be large and it might introduce noise in the price
return observations.
In many of the studies that use the average of the bid and
the ask, it is assumed that it is the "true price" since
the quoted price is either at the bid or the ask price.
Unless both trader have the same subjective variance with
regards to the future of the risky asset, the average of
the bid and ask prices is either positively or negatively
biased from the "true" price according to the relative
size of the trader's subjective variances [Jang (1987)].
The above analysis provides reasons for the need to have
clear evidence on whether any of the price series is
efficient or not. The study of the efficiency of the whole
pricing system of the NSE will hopefully also contribute
significantly to the understanding of the market
micro-structure.
6.2.4 Issues in the interpretation of results
There are several reasons why interpretation of results
requires attention. We have observed that there are some
particular problems associated with stock market studies
of emerging markets. These problems need to be recognised
in the interpretation of results. For example, results not
consistent with the random walk hypothesis and therefore
weak-form efficiency tend not to recognise that problems
in the research design may be the cause [Gandhi, Saunders,
205and Woodward (1980); Yacout (1981); Parkinson (1984)] and
not necessarily the possibility that the market is
inefficient. There may of course be no incentive to deal
with this issue because of the a priori held notion of
inefficiency. This position has not been helped by the
fact that results tend to have resulted from single
studies of particular markets. Keane (1983) argues that
for inefficiency to be exploitable it should, among other
things, be persistent. This means that any existing
inefficiency should also be exploitable in future, and
that the market will not learn from the experience. The
fact that it is not possible to exploit the market
consistently has also been a cardinal point in the
definition of market efficiency. Al-Mudhaf (1983), for
example, showed that Kuwait Stock Exchange is efficient in
contradiction to the results of Gandhi, Saunders, and
Woodward (1980). We believe that emerging stock markets
have been judged without providing the weight of evidence
which proves inefficiency beyond reasonable doubt.
Another issue concerned with interpretation is of those
results that claim to be consistent with efficiency. Given
the host of problems inherent in undertaking research in
emerging markets, should these results be interpreted as
strongly as those of developed markets? In this study we
have taken the view that efficiency is purely an empirical
issue. The results obtained should be viewed in this
light. We find no basis for interpreting results, if
consistent with efficiency, differently.
206Much of the published evidence from emerging markets does
not derive from detailed analyses of the price series. In
randomness tests, for example, the results are often
generalised on the findings of the coefficients of one
lag. The results at lag 1 may suggest serial dependence,
but it should also be shown whether such dependence is
consistent across more lags before a case can be made for
or against independence. This study will examine the
serial coefficients across 30 lags consistent with Cooper
(1982) and Taylor (1986). Many of the studies, both for
developed and emerging markets, that have attempted to
compute coefficients for more than one lag have failed to
apply appropriate statistics for interpreting the joint
significance of the results across lags. This fact was
recognised earlier by Taylor (1986) and Yong (1987). In
contrast to those studies, methodology is presented in the
present study appropriate for interpreting results across
lags.
6.3 SELECTION OF WEAK-FORM EFFICIENCY TEST MODELS-
In Chapter 4, the various models for testing weak-form
efficiency were discussed. This section presents the
models which are used in this study, and the basis of
their selection.
Taylor (1986, p.14) argues that any model will only be an
approximation to the rules which convert relevant
207information and numerous beliefs and actions into market
prices. We found in Section 4.3 that in testing for market
efficiency it might be necessary to specify the model that
is assumed to hold in the market. Some of the models
assumed will be more accurate in describing the market
than others. The model chosen should, firstly, be
consistent with past prices. Secondly, the hypothesis
implied by the model ought to be amenable to rigorous
testing so that, in principle, the model is capable of
validation. Thirdly, the model should be as simple as
possible. Fourthly, the model should provide forecasts for
future returns and prices, which are statistically optimal
assuming the model is correct. Fifthly, the model can be
used to aid rational decision making.
The statistical tests used to test for weak-form
efficiency are assumed to be applicable in this market.
The trading rules approach was not selected for two
reasons. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter 3, short-selling
is not allowed on the NSE. Any study wishing to adopt
trading rules would have to set up a filter strategy which
overcomes this problem. This would require also a
specific link of the financial system with the exchange to
see how such a mechanism can overcome the technical
problem. As Jennergren (1975) has shown, the results might
not be worth the effort.
Secondly, if statistical tests tend to support the
assumption of independence, then one can conclude that
208there are no mechanical trading rules or -chartist
techniques which would make an investor's expected profits
greater than they could be if he followed a simple
buy-and-hold strategy [Fama and Blume (1966); Niarchos
(1971, p. 81)]. This position has been supported by
evidence from many of the world's stock exchanges.
The tests of serial independence follow closely those
adopted in earlier studies conducted by Fama (1965);
Solnik (1973); Cooper (1982); Parkinson (1984). In
statistical terms the hypothesis tested is that successive
price returns are independent random variables. The basis
of the random walk model was presented in chapter 4. The
logarithmic form will be used and it was presented in
(15) as:
Log Pt = Log Pt_l + ut
that is
sl.
Log pt - Log Pt-1 ' Ut
	 (34)
Where
ut represents the first difference of log prices and is
defined as the change in the logarithm of stock prices,
from one point in time t-1 to the time t.
209Note that randomness requires the change in returns to be
serially independent such that,
E ( ut) =0	
(35)
COV ( ut , ut_k ) = 0 , k	
(36)
COV ( ut , ut )	 au	 (37)
The logarithmic transformation is justified because,
(a) Absolute price changes suffer the disadvantage that
they are to some extent dependent on the actual price
level of the stock and
(b) The change in the natural logarithms of the price of a
stock is the yield with continuous compounding from
holding that stock over the period of time the change is
measured [Fama (1965, 1976); Cooper (1982)].
The serial correlation analysis and the runs tests
are conducted on the price transformation of all the
sample stocks selected as provided in Chapter 7.
2106.4 RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES
This section develops the research question and the
hypotheses to be tested in the study. For many of the
published studies the hypothesis(es) tested are implied
but not stated [Fama (1965); Yacout (1981); Parkinson
(1987)].
6.4.1 Independence and randomness of share price returns
It was discussed in section 6.2.1 that the issue of
whether a market is efficient or not is purely an
empirical one. Of particulai' interest at the weak-form
efficiency level is the need to provide more evidence that
sheds light on the nature of stock markets in developing
countries. Two reasons makes this issue important. The
first is the need to challenge empirically the notion held
that the pricing systems in emerging stock markets are, a
priori, inefficient. Secondly, the literature review has
indicated that existing empirical evidence is not clear
cut in its support of efficiency at weak-form level. This
means that because of the status of the emerging markets
they, unlike the developed ones, still attract attention.
This study examines the Nairobi Stock Exchange, an
emerging market in a developing country, Kenya. Evidence
provided by Parkinson (1984) is not conclusive on the
validity of the random walk hypothesis on the NSE. He
asserts that, "there is evidence that prices in the market
211violate the random walk hypothesis, though probably not
in the practical sense" (p.302). We believe, therefore,
that due to the inconclusive nature of the evidence
available and the methodological problems inherent in
Parkinson's study, the applicability of the random walk
hypothesis and the validity of the EMH at the weak-form
level at the NSE should be examined.
The theory of random walk applied to the valuation of
stocks says that the future path of individual stock
prices is no more predictable than a path of a series of
random numbers. Each share of stock is assumed to have an
intrinsic value based on investors' expectations of the
discounted cash flows generated by that stock. In effect,
it is not possible to predict this week's price from last
week's stock price. Knowledge of the sequence of the past
price returns prior to the current time period is of no
help in defining the probability distribution of price
returns in any current or future period [Rose (1989)]. In
this case, the question which this research attempts to
answer with respect to the Nairobi Stock Exchange is the
following:
Are successive share price returns on the Nairobi
Stock Exchange independent random variables so
that price returns cannot be predicted from
historical price returns?
This study answer the question by testing the following
212hypotheses:
Ho : The observed price return series on the NSE is
an independent random series.
Ha : The observed price return series on the NSE
is not an independent random series.
The aspects being examined in the above Hypothesis are the
independence and randomness of the price series. To
examine these issues more clearly, the above hypotheses
can be separated into three distinct hypotheses.
The first of the hypotheses is designed to test for
independence of successive price returns at individual
lags by company. It was shown in section 4.5.2 that, if
successive price returns are independent then, p k, the
population serial correlation of returns separated by k
time periods (lag k) within a time series is zero, hence:
Hol: pk = 0, i.e. the correlation coefficient of
successive price returns on the NSE at lag k
is zero.
Hal: pk 40, i.e. the correlation coefficient of
successive price returns on the NSE at lag k
is not zero.
213The second of the hypotheses is formulated as a test for
independence of successive price returns across all lags
by company. It was shown in section 4.5.2 that, if
successive price returns are independent then, p l = p2
	 = pk = 0, that is,	 the population serial
correlations coefficients at all lags of the return series
are zero, hence:
H02: pl = p2 = 	 = pk = 0, i.e. the correlation
coefficients of successive price returns on
the NSE at all lags are zero.
Ha2: The correlation coefficients of successive
price returns on the NSE at all lags are not
all zero.
The third of the hypotheses is intended to test for
randomness of successive price returns by company.
H03: The successive price returns of a company's
shares on the NSE are random.
Ha3: The successive price returns of a company's
shares on the NSE are not random.
To test the above hypotheses only the sample coefficients
can be computed and they are assumed to be consistent and
unbiased estimates of the true population coefficients.
214For Hypotheses 1 the sample serial correlation
coefficients, rk, are computed for each company across 30
lags as in other studies of weak-form efficiency [Cooper
(1982); Taylor (1986)]. The individual coefficients are
then tested by examining whether their values are
consistent with the population value of zero. The level of
significance used for interpreting individual serial
correlation coefficients results in this study is 5%. A
two tailed test is used because the dependence hypothesis
does not stipulate the direction of the deviation from
randomness. A coefficient is considered statistically
significant if it exceeds +1.96 of its standard error,
-/E1/(N - 103, where N is the number of return observations
and k is the number of lags. (Results at the 1% level of
significance, +2.57 of the standard error, are given for
comparison purposes.)
Hypotheses 2 requires that one test statistic be used to
form an opinion on the results of all 30 lags for
individual companies.	 The decision on individual
coefficients looks straight-forward. A significant
coefficient means that the series is non-random at that
lag. However, obtaining a few significant coefficients at
individual lags may not shed much light on serial
correlation coefficients of a company computed over many
lags, say 10, 20, or 30. To make a decision on the
independence of the price series of a company when, for
example, 30 serial correlation coefficients are computed
over 30 lags requires an overall statistic be used. Taylor
215(1986), for example, argues that the binomial distribution
may be used to obtain the probability of N or more out of
K coefficients being significant at a given level, say 5%,
when Ho , the hypothesis of independence, is true. Taylor
(1986, p.138) shows that such a test, at 5%, will require
numbers K and Nr (Nr represents the number of
statistically significant coefficients) for which
K!
a(K, Nr ) = E	
	 (0.05) i (0.95) K-i - 0.05	 (38)
i=Nr i!(K-i)!
Where
cr(= the probability of obtaining Nr	significant
coefficients out of K coefficients (in this case,
co equal to 5%).
From this it obtains that Ho is rejected at 5% if the
number of significant coefficients (N r) across all lags 1
to 30 for each company is either equal to or greater than
4, i.e. Nr > 4
The above statistic may be affected where some
coefficients are significant due to chance or are
significant, but small in absolute values. Box and Pierce
(1970) show that an overall test for a flat serial
correlation function can be carried out using the
Q-statistic. Under the null hypothesis that all serial
coefficients are zero (Ho : pl = p2 = 	 = Pk = ()), the
216Q-statistic (Qk) is given by:
ok = N Ej= 1 rj2
	
(39)
Where N is the number of coefficients and	 rj = sample
serial correlation coefficient at lag j.
v2
The Q-statistic is distributed as Chi-square ('X, ) with k
degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis is rejected if Q
2.
is greater than A.	 with k degrees of freedom at the
corresponding significant level 00. In this study 30
coefficients will be computed for each company and H 02 is
rejected if Q30 > 43.77 for OC=0.05. Taylor (1986); Yong
(1987); and Schwert (1990) use this statistic
successfully.
Hypothesis 3 is tested by examining sample runs. The
existence of fewer runs than expected suggests the
existence of a time trend or some bunching of prices due
to lack of independence. This is evidence of positive
dependency. Negative dependence exists where the actual
number of runs is significantly more than the expected
number of runs.
It was explained in Section 4. 7. that the test statistic
for runs, (V), is computed as:
217V	 r
(40)
o-m
Where r is the actual number of runs
in is the expected number of runs and
Where the continuity adjustment requires the addition of
to r.
For independence, the standardised variable is normally
distributed with mean 0 and variance 1. A 5% level of
significance is used. The computed value, V,
(labelled Z-value in Tables 8.8, 8.9, and 8.10) is a
standardised normal variable and is significant at a 5%
level if it lies beyond its critical value of +1.96.
Results obtained from the Z values also indicate the
nature of the dependency. The negative Z value is a sign
of positive dependence while a positive Z value is a sign
of negative dependence.
6.4.2 Frequency of trading and the size of weak-form
efficiency test statistics
One of the main characteristics of smaller stock exchanges
is the existence of a large proportion of shares that are
infrequently	 traded. Granger (1972), Solnik	 (1973),
218Jennergren and Korsvold (1975), Samuels (1981), Yong (1987)
proposes that the less frequently traded a share the more
likely for it to show results not consistent with
efficiency. At the weak-form level one would expect to
find that the size of the sample serial correlations
coefficients and the sample standardised variables for the
runs tests would increase as the level of trading
frequency decreased. Solnik (1973), for example, argues
that the sample serial correlation coefficients for
European stocks were on average slightly larger than their
USA equivalents due to thinness of the market and
discontinuity of trading. Ang and Pohlman (1978) also
provided evidence that tended to show higher weak-form
efficiency coefficients according to the sophistication of
the market. This position has been given prominence by the
recent evidence in semi-strong form efficiency tests of
abnormal returns observed for small companies (Dimson,
1988), which also characterise developing exchanges. One
would therefore expect that statistics from weak-form
efficiency tests would also reflect close association with
the level of trading in the market. The following
hypotheses are tested to examine this relationship:
Ho 4: The size of the sample serial correlation
coefficients of the price series on the NSE
are independent of the continuity in trading.
219Ha 4: The size of the sample serial correlation
coefficients of the price series on the NSE
are dependent of the continuity in trading.
Ho 5: The size of the absolute sample standardised
variables for the runs tests of the price
series on the NSE are independent of the
continuity in trading.
Ha 5: The size of the absolute sample standardised
variables for the runs tests of the price
series on the NSE are dependent of the
continuity in trading.
The hypotheses are tested to see whether there is a
relationship between the sample serial correlation
coefficients and the sample standardised variables for the
runs tests and the level of trading. The level of trading
is measured by the number of share price return
observations.	 The test of the hypotheses is carried out
as follows:
The 30 stocks are ranked from 1 to 30 according to:
(a) The number of trading days ( with rank 1 for the
stock with the most trading days).
(b) the value of the Q statistic of the correlation
coefficient for each company over the 30 lags (with rank 1
220for the stock with the smallest absolute Q-statistic). The
overall	 serial correlation coefficient	 statistic
(Q-statistic) is used instead of the serial correlation
coefficients at individual lags (rk) because the
Q-statistic represents the general results of the rk test.
(c) the absolute value of the standardised variable for
the runs test (with rank 1 for the stock with the lowest
absolute standardised variable).
Spearman's rank correlation test are then performed for
the rankings of (a) and (b) and (a) and (c).
A rank coefficient, rs , is given by
6 E d. 2 1
rs	=	 1 -	 (41)
n(n2 - 1)
Where di is the difference between the two ranked data
sets and n is the sample size ( Daniel and Terrell, 1989,
p.698).
If the computed value of rs exceeds +0.3620 then it can be _
concluded that there is a relationship between either the
level of trading as measured by the number of share price
return observations and the sample correlation
coefficients or the level of trading and the sample
221standardised variables for the runs test.
The test approach is similar to those of Jennergren and
Korsvold (1975, p.52) and Yong (1987). The test here
differs from theirs in that they examined the relationship
between the level of trading and efficiency. Such a test
can be criticised on at least two counts. Firstly, if the
market is weak-form efficient, the expected value of all
the coefficients is zero and they therefore cannot be used
for ranking. Secondly, whether weak-form efficiency is
present cannot be measured on a scale. Our test attempts
to circumvent these two difficulties.
The nature of the data for testing these hypotheses is
presented in Chapter 7.
222CHAPTER 7
METHODOLOGY: DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION
7.1	 INTRODUCTION
This Chapter explains how the database for this study was
created and identifies the problems faced in its creation.
Some of the problems encountered did not have solutions,
but an attempt was made to minimise their impact on the
quality of the findings. The criteria and procedures for
selecting the sample for this study are also discussed.
Finally, the issue of availability of data is addressed.
7.2	 IMPORTANCE OF COMPUTERISED DATABASES.
There are gains in research to be derived from having a
sound database. The magnificent advances of security
market research in the USA have been facilitated by the
existence of computerised databases on large number of
stocks over a long period of time. It has enabled much
light to be thrown on the behaviour of stock market
prices. Russell (1972) and Dryden (1969) noted that the
absence of comparable historical data in machine readable
form on the London Stock Exchange by the turn of the 70's
restricted research investigations to those for which a
limited amount of data could be reasonably easily
extracted from the printed tabulated sources. They were
was supported by Solnik (1973) who noted that, at the time
223of his study, there were few serious tests of the random
walk which had been performed on European data
"... probably due to the lack of systematic computerised
databases" (p. 1151).
Solnik was echoing the observations of Dryden (1969) who
had noted that the development of research data in the UK.
required
wa mammoth number of manhours, not to mention
computer hours, in order to build up a statistical
picture of UK share price behaviour" (p.49).
The task of gathering data, setting up a database, and
ensuring the internal and external validity of its
structures for the purpose of market-based research can be
a very difficult one indeed. This is more so in developing
countries where data may be unavailable or where the
persons responsible for such data may not be aware of its
importance as a source of research material. Data
collection in developing countries is almost always an
expensive exercise. This is because of the need to use
field staff to collect and code data which adds
substantially to the cost per sample.
Russell (1972) writing about the formation of the London
Stock Exchange data bank at City University observed:
224"Anyone totally unfamiliar with the development of
a computer data bank or the state of the art of
information storage on London Stock Exchange data
in the late 1960's and at the beginning of the
1970's might suppose that, given reliable price
information already punched on cards, it was a
very simple and straightforward matter to arrange
these into readily usable, machine readable form.
Anyone familiar with either of these will not be
surprised that the task has proved neither simple
nor straightforward" (p.638).
One may therefore imagine a situation of this nature with
the data for this study sought from the Nairobi Stock
Exchange. This study faced the enormous task of first
finding data which was kept in manual office files. The
next step was to check the completeness of the data. After
this the data had to be transcribed into a form that could
be used for this and other research work.
There are advantages available to researchers now which
were unavailable in the 1970's. The creation of databases
in the early 1970's faced particular problems arising from
the limitations of the computers of the day. Since then,
there have been tremendous development in computer
software, and the costs of developing usable database even
in developing countries is now manageable. Currently,
there are many stock exchanges which have readily
available	 computerised	 databases	 [Datastream
225International; IFC (1990)]. These are of recent
establishment and hence the level of research is still
behind that of the USA. These countries are, however, far
ahead when compared to the data at present available for
some stock exchanges in developing countries where no
machine-based database exist. The Nairobi Stock Exchange
is a case in point.
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is one of the
few bodies which has a database for emerging markets. The
database was the first to provide detailed statistics on
the stock markets of developing countries [IFC (1990, p.
viii). But even this database is of recent origin. It was
began in 1981, but it has only been available on-line from
1987 in America. Unfortunately, the Nairobi Stock
Exchange is not one of the exchanges for which total
activity data is available. A database for the NSE had
therefore to be created. The database for this study was
designed in such a manner that it will be possible for it
to contribute in the future to the creation of a fully
integrated research database for the Nairobi Stock
Exchange.
7.3 TYPE OF DATA COLLECTED
Research in securities markets relies heavily on
historical data. The data consist primarily of the past
series of security prices, earnings and other company or
national indices. The NSE has 55 quoted companies which
226have issued 52 equity (common or ordinary) shares and 18
preference shares up to 31 December 1988. To ensure
consistency with other studies, only companies which had
issued equity shares are considered. The following data
were collected for those companies:
(i) Share price data
The share price data collected fell into the following
categories.
(a) Buyers (Bid) prices
- These represent the prices at which buyers were offering
to buy particular shares.
(b) Sellers (Ask) Prices
- These represent the prices at which sellers were
willing to sell particular shares.
(c) Transaction prices
- These represent the prices at which the transactions
took place.
The price recording system generating the prices was
described in chapter 3.
227(ii) Dividend /Bonus issues data
Dividend/bonus issues data were collected for all
companies over the period January 1979 to December 1988.
(iii)Par value per share
- Dividend information is provided as a percentage of par
value. The par value information was necessary to
determine the amount of dividend declared and paid.
(iv) Issued ordinary shares
The issued ordinary shares information was collected from
the company reports for use where necessary. For example,
it has been used to calculate the market capitalisation in
Table 3.1.
(v) Share price index
Information on the weekly Nairobi Share Price Index was
collected. The basic information was on the closing index
at the end of each week.
2287.4	 DATA SOURCE
Data for this research was obtained from the NAIROBI
STOCK EXCHANGE. The nature and operations of the exchange
were discussed in detail in Chapter 3. The exchange does
not have any formal office. Most of its records are
maintained by Africa Registrars, a firm of professional
company secretaries, who act as the Secretaries to the
Exchange. Share price lists used in this study were
obtained from them.
Company specific information on issued share capital and
dividends was extracted from company files maintained by
the Secretaries to the Exchange.
The Secretaries to the Exchange represent the most
reliable source of data for share price trading in Kenya.
Any information issued by companies, for example,
earnings, rights issue, dividends, annual reports and
change in nature of operations or management are required
to be reported to the Secretaries of the Exchange first
before release to the public as per the Stock Exchange
rules.
The Secretaries are also responsible for public
circulation of share price data. Copies of the share price
lists are issued to the Secretaries immediately after the
229weekly call-over on Thursdays at 12.00 noon, for
circulation to other parties. The Secretaries will then
release the information to the press. Once released, the
information is available for public inspection at any
time.
7.5	 DATA PREPARATION
It was important that the raw data collected were
formulated into a complete and correct database consistent
with the objectives and resources of the research. The
steps undertaken were the creation of the database and
editing of data.
7.5.1	 Creating the database.
The source documents for creating the databases were:
(i) The weekly share price lists for the periods January
1979 to December 1988. (An example of the weekly
call-over share price list is provided in Appendix 2 )
(ii) A data collection form was designed for the purposes
of tapping dividend information for companies. An example
of the dividend data collection form is provided in
Appendix 3.
(iii) A listing of the Nairobi Stock Exchange Index on a
weekly basis.
230Three computer-based databases were created. These
databases were:
(1) The share price database:
This database was created to record information relating
to the price of shares. The database was designed to give
information on, buyer (bid) price, seller (ask) price,
transaction price, the company to which the price
information relates and the related week of trading.
The database formed was therefore in the form of a DATA
MATRIX where the rows of the matrix correspond to a
particular company, while the columns correspond to the
variables of interest.
(2) The dividend database:
The dividend database was created to record the dividend
history of the company for a particular year. It was
designed to give information on:
- The company
- The week of the year in which the dividends were
declared.
- The week of the year in which the prices went ex-div
- The amount of dividend declared as a percentage of par
value or the rate of bonus issue.
231- The par value of the share. This was necessary to
facilitate adjustment of the dividend percentage to
value.
(3) The share price index database:
The share price index database was created to record the
Nairobi Stock exchange index over the study period. The
database was designed to give information on:
- The week corresponding to the index.
- The level of the index.
7.6	 CODING
The main variables of interest in the study were:
- The various series of prices ( Buyer, Seller and
Transaction prices)
- The week of activity
- The specific identification of the listed companies
- The dividends declared
- The par value of the various companies
- The issued share capital of each listed company
- The missing variables
To create integrated databases, common variables in the
databases were assigned the same codes. The basis of some
codes is given below. Specific codes were assigned to the
232above variables as follows:
TYPE OF VARIABLE	
VARIABLE CODE	 MISSING VALUE
CODE
Company Identity	 Companid	 -
Week of Activity	 Weekcode	 -
Buyers price	 Buyerpr	 999.99
Sellers price	 Sellerpr	 999.99
Transaction price	 Tranpr	 999.99
Par value of share	 Parvalue
Dividend declared	 Dividend	 999.99
Issued Share capital	 Shares
Index value	 NSEINDEX	 9999.99
Companies Codes:
Companies were assigned specific codes from 0010; 0020;
0030; etc. ( A list of the quoted companies and their code
numbers is presented in Appendix 1).
Code for Week of Activity:
As explained earlier, the exchange was formally
inaugurated in January 1954. Weeks of activity were
assigned codes, with the first week of January 1954 being
weekcode 0001. ( For example the week of trading where the
233prices were released on 22/12/1988 is given weekcode 1825;
representing the 1825th week from January 1954). This
coding allows for the extension of the databases for
future studies covering longer periods. Other variables
were given codes convenient for identification purposes in
each of the databases created.
7.7	 DATA EDITING
The data relevant to a particular study summarise the
facts concerning the phenomena under investigation. The
data may be quantitative, qualitative, or a mixture of
both types. In carrying out any investigation it is
important to understand that there may be inherent
problems with the data. This is because data very
frequently are subject to the measurement and reporting
inaccuracies of human behaviour. These errors include
observation errors, round-off and approximation errors,
hiding of information, and errors of computation
[Intriligator (1978)].
Praetz (1976) also points to the importance of ensuring
the correctness of databases. He observes that there are
many stages at which errors can occur in recorded stock
prices. These errors, when they occur, can cause negative
first order serial correlation and "fat-tails" in return
distributions. If the errors are large they may give
misleading results. Taylor (1986) notes that one or two
large observations, generally called outliers, can be
234responsible for apparent skewness.
The tasks described below represent what was done to
prevent and detect errors in the databases. This was
performed through data editing. Data editing consisted of
checking the data before entry and detecting and
correcting possible errors that occurred during the data
entry process.
7.7.1	 Checking the data before entry.
Missing data lists
The first task was to go through all the price lists
obtained from the stock exchange and identify whether any
were missing. Where share price lists were missing
photocopies of the lists were sought from the stock
braking firms.
7.7.2	 Data entry checks
(i)	 Manual Checks
Each database was printed and the listing was manually
checked against the source documents. Errors identified
were corrected. This process involved the use of a team of
research assistants consisting of second year accounting
majors from the Department of Accounting, University of
Nairobi. To minimise errors in the manual check, the
235research assistants had to demonstrate a basic
understanding of the DB3-1- (R) operations. In addition they
were put through a two day training exercise with each
document counter-checked by another assistant. The
researcher also went through samples of work done. Any
assistant with more than four errors per one hundred
observations was not hired. The sample checking was
repeated several times over the period of the manual
check. The assistants systematically went through the
database against original records under the supervision of
the researcher. The process, although costly, also had the
advantage of identifying omitted data, punching errors,
and incorrect coding of variables during data entry.
(ii)	 Computer based checks
Manual checks of a database are not likely to eliminate
fully all data conversion errors. Computer-based checks
were applied to check further on the data. Re-keying the
data as a check for data entry errors was considered, but
not used because of cost and facilities considerations.
Other checks were preferred, and are explained below:
Overall checks
The first of the checks involved processing the database
through the SPSS-PC+ (R) soft ware. The results obtained
were able to show weeks for which data was missing, or
price variables which were not consistent with known
236values ( for example, sh. 13.77 instead of sh.13.75, since
prices in Kenya are denominated to the nearest five
cents), and which were overlooked during the manual check.
Consistency checks
The next check applied was that of assessing consistency
of the research data. Within-case checks were performed to
ensure the consistency of the data for each company
overtime. For example, a sharp change in Buyer price in
Week 1 for Company 1 from sh. 20.00 to sh. 40.00 in week
2, and back to sh.21.00 in week 3 would be an odd
occurrence for investigation.
Range checks-
There are ranges in which particular prices are expected
to fall. The stock exchange provides the high and low of
the stock for the year. The price series were compared
with these prices and any deviations investigated.
7.8	 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE DATABASE
In creating and editing the database there were other
aspects which had to be considered. These may have an
important impact on the accuracy and reliability of the
databases. These aspects were:
2377.8.1 Reliability of original data
Reliability is very much a function of the characteristics
of the organisation that produces and publishes data. All
the data are collected by organisations. The users of such
data cannot take it for granted that care has been
exercised in the collection and reporting of information.
The problem increases when one depends on other
organisations for one's data collection because the
researcher has no influence on the organisational
procedures that produce the data. The more one relies on
particular data the more one needs to know the
organisational processes that governed the collection and
archiving of information [ Jacob (1984)]. The prices
recorded on the NSE's weekly call-over are transcribed
from manual records available from each broker. With the
data originating from several manual sources, there may
arise transcription errors which pass unnoticed. A check
was made for these type of errors by investigating any
price observations that looked exceptional or peculiar.
The peculiarities observed were not material and were
confirmed with the brokers.
7.8.2 Manipulation of data
It is recognised that data may be contaminated by either
ideological or organisational values. The data that
238organisations collect can have favourable or unfavourable
consequences for them. In such cases some organisations
try to tilt the data collection process in their favour.
Palacios (1975), for example, argues that the brokers in
the Spanish stock markets failed to disclose the actual
amount of transactions to avoid paying higher taxes. He
went further to state that Spanish firms disclosed
inaccurate financial information in an effort to avoid tax
exposure. We are sure that this problem is not unique to
Spain and may be a feature of many other small stock
exchanges. We do not have factual evidence that share
price data or published corporate reports have been
contaminated in Kenya. Currently, however, a broker on the
NSE is not obliged to disclose any transaction handled
exclusively by himself. We may never know whether all
transactions are actually reported at weekly call-over
sessions. Certainly buyer and seller prices, but not
transaction prices, are readily disclosed by the brokers
even over the phone. A broker will not answer a question
on transaction prices and will refer the questioner to the
call-over list. It was taken in good faith that the data
available was not subject to organisational manipulation,
and represented the true state of the market.
7.9	 SAMPLE SELECTION
The sample for this study was selected from the database
of the equity securities created above. The sample
consisted of the 30 mostly actively traded companies as
239measured by the number of transaction price observations.
To qualify for selection, other criteria applied were:
(i) The equity shares of the company must have been
quoted by 1 January 1979 and remained continuously
quoted to 31 December 1988.
(ii) Complete dividend history was available for all
years of the study period, that is, 1979 to 1988.
(iii) The equity share must have a minimum of sixty
observations. This is because the goodness-of-fit tests
need a reasonable sample to detect subtle but real
differences in the analysis of the data [Praetz and
Wilson (1980)].
The year 1979 was selected because Parkinson (1984) had
carried out efficiency tests on the Nairobi Stock
Exchange for the period 1974 to 1978. This study can be
considered in this respect at least as an extension of the
Parkinson's work.
The time period was significant in that it gave 10 years
of weekly data. This was an attempt to minimise the data
problems inherent in other stock market studies in
emerging markets [Yacout (1981); Parkinson (1984)]. This
meant that for each company there was expected to be a
total of 520 weekly price observations.
2407.10	 THE STRUCTURE OF THE SAMPLE DATA
The data for each of the 30 companies selected is
summarised in Table 7.1. The number of returns over the
ten year period for each share shown in the Table
indicates clear evidence of infrequent trading.
The transaction prices observed for the total sample was
52.7%. The number of price observations improve
considerably as one moves to the seller prices where the
total observations are 59.43%. For the buyer prices the
situation is even better. The total observations are
96.56%.
The availability of data on buyer prices and the thinness
of transaction prices is expected given the nature of
stock markets in developing countries. In such markets one
would expect to find that the key problem is on the supply
rather than the demand side [Drake (1985)]. It is expected
that there would be many buyers willing to buy any shares
coming into the market provided the offer price reflects
the true worth of the security. The thinness of
transactions may be explained by the problem that
investors wishing to transact in the market to change
their portfolio position are hampered by the unwillingness
of others to offer their securities for sale. The supply
side restriction makes it difficult to generate many
transactions on the exchange.
241TABLE 7.1: SUMMARY OF EXPECTED AND ACTUAL OBSERVATIONS OF THE SHARE PRICE SERIES OF THE NAIROBI STOCK EXCHANGE
(1979- 1988). (MISSING OBSERVATIONS ARE ALSO GIVEN IN PERCENTAGES). 
BUYER
	
PRICES SELLER	 PRICES TRANSACTION PRICES
NAME OF THE COMPANY	 MOBS AC.OBS MISSING %AGEM AC.OBS MISSING %AGEM AC.OBS MISS %AGEM 
020 A. Baumann & Co. Ltd.	 520	 510	 10	 1.92	 323	 197 37.88	 152 368 70.77
030 B.A.T. Kenya Ltd.	 520	 517	 3	 0.58	 181	 339 65.19	 368 152 29.23
040 Bamburi Portland Cement Co.Ltd.	 520	 506	 14	 2.69	 431	 89	 17.12	 262 258 49.62
060 Brooke Bond Liebig Kenya Ltd.	 520	 505	 15	 2.88	 297	 223 42.88	 371 149 28.65
070 Car and General (Kenya) Ltd.	 520	 511	 9	 1.73	 431	 89	 17.12	 301 219	 42.12
090 City Brewery Investments Ltd.	 520	 518	 2	 0.38	 69	 451	 86.73	 161 359 69.04
100 Consolidated Holdings Ltd.	 520	 518	 2	 0.38	 467	 53	 10.19	 308 212	 40.77
110 CMC Holdings Ltd.	 520	 506	 14	 2.69	 392	 128	 24.62	 376 144	 27.69
120 Credit Finance Corp Ltd.	 520	 501	 19	 3.65	 233	 287	 55.19	 195 325	 62.50
130 Diamond Trust of Kenya Ltd.	 520	 517	 3	 0.58	 174	 346 66.54	 358 162 31.15
160 E. A. Bag & Cordage Co.Ltd.	 520	 512	 8	 1.54	 457	 63	 12.12	 277 243	 46.73
170 E. A. Breweries Ltd.	 520	 517	 3	 0.58	 423	 97	 18.65	 508	 12	 2.31
180 E. A. Cables Ltd.	 520	 501	 lg	 3.65	 128	 392	 75.38	 156 364	 70.00
200 E.A. Packaging Ind. Ltd.	 520	 515	 5	 0.96	 343	 177 34.04	 283 237 45.58
220 E. A. Road Services Ltd.	 520	 505	 15	 2.88	 404	 116 22.31	 208 312 60.00
230 Elliot's Bakery Ltd.	 520	 488	 32	 6.15	 195	 325	 62.50	 172 348 66.92
240 Express Kenya Ltd.	 520	 500	 20	 3.85	 297	 223 42.88	 161 359 69.04
250 George Williamson Kenya Ltd.	 520	 495	 25	 4.81	 299	 221	 42.50	 242 278 53.46
270 ICDC Investment Co. Ltd.	 520	 504	 16	 3.08	 314	 206	 39.62	 457 63	 12.12
290 Kakuzi Ltd.	 520	 507	 13	 2.50	 389	 131	 25.19	 321 199 38.27
310 Kenya National Mills Ltd.	 520	 517	 3	 0.58	 427	 93	 17.88	 448	 72	 13.85
320 Kenya Oil Co. Ltd.	 520	 454	 66 1 2.69	 390	 130	 25.00	 180 340 65.38
340 Kenya Power & lighting Co. Ltd.	 520	 513	 7	 1.35	 295	 225	 43.27	 398 122	 23.46
370 Motor Mart Group Ltd.	 520	 451	 69 1 3.27	 299	 221	 42.50	 166 354 68.08
380 National Printer& Publisher	 520	 509	 11	 2.12	 344	 176	 33.85	 308 212	 40.77
390 National Industrial Credit	 520	 514	 6	 1.15	 232	 288	 55.38	 270 250	 48.08
410 Pan Africa Insurance Co. Ltd.	 520	 421	 99 1 9.04	 260	 260	 50.00	 148 372	 71.54
420 Pearl Dry Cleaners Ltd.	 520	 515	 5	 0.96	 296	 224 43.08	 173 347 66.73
440 Sasini Tea& coffee Ltd.	 520	 514	 6	 1.15	 184	 336	 64.62	 201 319 61.35
490 Unga Group	520	 503	 17	 3.27	 298	 222 42.69	 295 225 43.27
Overall Sample	 15600	 15064	 536	 3.44	 9272	 6328 40.57	 8224 7376 47.30
KEY:
EX.OBS	 - Expected number of weeks of price observations.
AC.OBS	 - Actual number of weeks of price observations.
Missing - Number of weeks of prices not observed.
XAGEM	 - Percentage of total weeks prices not observed.
242This observation is evidenced by the over-subscriptions
which accompany many new issues of shares. In fact there
are those who believe that the securities markets in many
developing countries are investment-based rather than
speculative [Yacout (1981)]. This is because the
restricted nature of alternative investment opportunities
available in such countries makes it important to continue
to hold on to shares once purchased. Investors buy
securities for investment rather than speculation.
This observation with regard to the Nairobi Stock Exchange
is not unique among stock exchanges. Recently, Keim (1989,
Table 1, p.78) shows evidence that even on the American
exchanges non-trading on certain days may be observed,
although it is admittedly minimal.
Jennergren and Korsvold (1975) in their study of the
Norwegian and Swedish stock markets had difficulties in
obtaining complete series of transaction prices. They
faced the problem of thin trading. In some cases they only
had 28% of expected price observations even though their
sample consisted of the mostly actively traded securities.
The data used in their study therefore consisted of price
sequences of different lengths. They did not see this as a
major problem and concluded that it was interesting to see
the results of efficiency tests from such price sequences.
Cooper (1982) noted that the number of companies quoted on
an exchange is not an indicator of the number of
243securities that are actively traded in the various
markets. Control of companies quoted on many exchanges
continues to be in the hands of small groups who may have
no motivation to trade. In Peru, for example, he noted the
number of securities quoted, the volume of transactions,
and the number of actual securities accounting for the
total volume of transactions was generally very small.
Furthermore, those securities which had achieved a wide
acceptance from the investing community faced stiff
competition from other safer forms of investment. In the
Buenos Aires Stock Exchange, for example, there were
virtually no new issues and the Government securities
market had virtually disappeared. In India, it was noted
that, although there are eight stock exchanges, trading
occurred very infrequently.
Yacout (1981) faced severe data problems when carrying out
his market efficiency studies of the stock exchanges of
Nigeria and Egypt. He nevertheless did carry out his tests
on the transaction data available. No indication is
available from his work on the action he took to minimise
the effects of the data problem.
Parkinson (1984) also faced similar problems of data on
the NSE but he argued that the advantage to research of
using what was available far outweighed the problems.
2447.11 DEALING WITH INCOMPLETE PRICE SERIES
Given the incomplete nature of the price series from the
exchange and the problems faced by other researchers, the
issue arises as to whether it is necessary to take
"remedial" action when the observed price series are
incomplete. The action is usually aimed at increasing the
number of observation which consequently may improve the
validity of the findings. Interpolation was considered to
be a possible alternative for this purpose. The actual
transaction prices could be interpolated linearly for the
days when there was no trading. This, however, has its
problems. In the use of non-experimental data like share
prices it is impossible to replicate the conditions that
gave rise to the data, so additional data points cannot be
generated [Intriligator (1978)]. This means that even if
the data is interpolated there would be no basis for
assuming that the interpolated prices represent what would
have occurred if there had been transactions.
Secondly, linearly interpolated prices would tend to
increase the dependence between successive price returns,
that is, reduce the degree of randomness, and perhaps
produce misleading results in the tests of efficiency. We
noted earlier that Parkinson (1984), for example, did
observe significant serial correlation for the companies
whose data had been interpolated.
Thirdly, the problem of missing data points is common to
245many of the studies of the behaviour of share prices. One
may even take an extreme view, by stating as Jennergren
and Korsvold (1975) did, that weekends and holidays
actually represent missing data points, although market
studies to date have not attempted to interpolate for
them.
No changes were therefore made to the observed price
series.
7.12 PRICE SERIES USED IN THE STUDY
As discussed in Chapter 6, this is a study of the three
price series: the buyer, the seller, and the transaction
price series over a ten year period (1979 - 1988).
The period used is longer than any of the previous periods
covered by other studies of emerging markets in Africa and
elsewhere [Sharma (1977); Yacout (1981); Parkinson (1984);
Yong (1987)]. This means that we are able to obtain many
more observations than the previous studies. This,
hopefully, may provide stronger evidence for or against
efficiency. It will also add to the evidence on behaviour
of share prices in small exchanges which, as other studies
have noted, are infrequently traded. This was also the
motivation of Jennergren and Korsvold (1975) who stated
that even though the price series they used were not
complete, carrying out the study "has the advantage that
we may investigate price behaviour of stocks with
246different frequencies. However it obviously also reduces
the length of the time series available" (p.40).
We may also take comfort from Yule and Kendall (1965) who
argued that "however incomplete the data may be, the
investigator must take what he can get and be thankful"
(p.xix).
7.13	 ADJUSTMENT FOR DIVIDENDS AND BONUS ISSUES
The prices used in the study were adjusted for any
dividend and bonus issues. The prices were adjusted by
the full amount of the dividend in the week the shares
went ex-div. The adjustments assume that the share price
falls by the full dividend amount at the day when it goes
ex-div. The full adjustment is made because the actual
change is currently unknown. Brealey (1970) argued for
adjusting the prices with the after-tax dividend. Some
studies do not adjust because such information is not
available [Solnik (1973); Conrad and Juttner (1973)].
Bonus issues were adjusted based on the bonus rate
declared at the date when the shares go ex-bonus. For
example if a two-to-one bonus issue was declared and the
share went ex-bonus in week t, the actual closing price of
the share in week t was doubled, and the price change
between week t and week t-1 was taken to be the difference
between the doubled price of week t and the closing price
of week t-1. The adjustment reflects the fact that the
247process of bonus issues represents no change either in the
asset value of the company or in the wealth of the
individual shareholders.
248CHAPTER 8
RESULTS: WEAK-FORM EFFICIENCY TESTS
	8.1	 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 4 the various methodologies for testing for
weak-form efficiency were discussed. It was shown that
tests of this level of efficiency are mainly concerned
with showing that successive price returns are independent
and random and that these returns are therefore
unpredictable. In chapter 6 the hypotheses to be tested
were developed. In chapter 7 the data for testing the
hypotheses was presented. This chapter provides evidence
from tests of weak-form efficiency on the Nairobi Stock
Exchange.
	
8.2	 RESULTS OF SERIAL CORRELATION TESTS
It has been explained that the serial correlation
coefficient is a useful measure for testing for serial
independence of share price returns. In Section 6.2.3 it
was shown that it is useful to test for the independence
of the three price series: Transaction, Bid, and Ask
prices. Using weekly data, the sample serial correlation
coefficients have been computed for each of the 30
companies for lags of 1 to 30 weeks. The results of the
Transaction, Bid, and Ask price returns are presented in
that order. The calculated serial correlation coefficients
249are to be used to test the following hypotheses:
N01: pk = 0, i.e. the correlation coefficient of
successive price returns on the NSE at lag k
is zero.
Hal: pk  4 0, i.e. the correlation coefficient of
successive price returns on the NSE at lag k
is not zero.
The hypotheses are designed to test independence of
successive price returns at individual lags.
H02: pl = p2 = 	 = pk = 0, i.e. the correlation
coefficients of successive price returns on
the NSE at all lags are zero.
Ha2:	 coefficients 2 The correlation cfficients of successive
price returns on the NSE at all lags are not
all zero.
The hypotheses are designed to test independence of
successive price returns across all lags for each company.
From Section 6.4, an individual coefficient is significant
if it exceeds +1.96 of its standard error ,./[1/(N - k)],
where N is the number of return observations and k is the
number of lags. (Results at the 1% level of significance,
250+ 2.57 of the standard error, are given for comparison _
purposes.)
For each company results over all 30 lags are significant
if:
(a) the number of significant coefficients (Nr) across
all lags 1 to 30 is either equal to or greater than 4,
i.e. Nr a 4, and/or
(b) the computed Q-statistic, Q k, is greater than 43.77,
i.e. Q30 > 43.77.
Results of serial correlation coefficients using monthly
returns from each of the price series are also presented
for comparison purposes.
8.2.1 Serial correlation coefficients for transaction
returns
The summarised results of the serial correlation
coefficients for transaction returns are presented in
Table 8.1. The Table shows the serial correlation
coefficients at lags 1, 10, 20 and 30. The Table also
presents the average serial correlation coefficient, the
number of coefficients which are significant at 1 and 5%,
and the Q-statistic for each company.
251TABLE 8.1: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR TRANSACTION RETURNS OF THE NAIROBI STOCK  EXCHANGE
(1979 - 1988) LAGS 1. 10. 20. AND 30 
NO. COEFFICIENT
	
LAG 1	 10	 20	 30	 AVERAGE	 SIGN AT SIGN AT
	
SCC TR	 1%	 5% Q-STATISTIC
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)
0020	 .0944	 .0541	 .0408	 .1209	 -0.0128	 0	 0	 4.8193
0030	 -.0212	 -.0291	 -.0414	 .0430	 -0.0065	 0	 1	 1.6678
0040	 -.0130	 -.0807	 .0064	 .0283	 -0.0095	 1	 1	 3.6826
0060	 -.0188	 -.0930	 .0851	 .0700	 0.0040	 0	 0	 2.7786
0070	 .0123	 .0436	 -.0234	 .0740	 0.0209	 0	 0	 2.4849
0090	 .0408	 -.0559	 .0407	 -.0316	 -0.0135	 0	 0	 3.7849
0100	 -.0328	 .0092	 -.0642	 .0673	 0.0073	 1	 1	 3.2101
0110	 .0211	 .0337	 -.0031	 -.0073	 0.0042	 0	 2	 2.5531
0120	 .0683	 .0157	 -.0295	 .0173	 0.0107	 0	 0	 4.3372
0130	 -.0321	 .0416	 .0116	 .0487	 -0.0002	 0	 0	 1.2015
0160	 -.0993	 -.1153	 -.0712	 -.0848	 -0.0077	 0	 0	 3.5852
0170	 -.0040	 .0124	 .0128	 -.0284	 0.0060	 1	 1	 2.1715
0180	 -.0168	 .0218	 .0439	 -.0108	 -0.0066	 0	 0	 3.1550
0200	 -.0293	 .0188	 -.1402*	 -.0120	 -0.0058	 0	 1	 3.5236
0220	 .0748	 -.0105	 -.0984	 -.0250	 0.0019	 0	 1	 3.2983
0230	 -.0365	 -.0241	 .0896	 -.0520	 -0.0114	 0	 0	 4.3986
0240	 -.0568	 -.0455	 .0030	 -.0232	 -0.0130	 0	 1	 5.1545
0250	 -.0131	 .0455	 -.0691	 -.0637	 0.0183	 0	 2	 4.0176
0270	 .0080	 .0245	 .0004	 -.0051	 0.0036	 0	 1	 1.4540
0290	 .0073	 -.0044	 .0619	 .0181	 -0.0025	 0	 0	 2.3669
0310	 .0867	 .0258	 -.0120	 -.0617	 0.0049	 0	 1	 1.8395
0320	 -.0483	 -.0821	 -.0199	 -.0079	 -0.0062	 0	 2	 5.7031
0340	 .0710	 .0223	 .0130	 -.0389	 0.0122	 0	 1	 1.8651
0370	 .0986	 -.0294	 .1020	 -.1401	 -0.0016	 0	 0	 6.2152
0380	 -.0685	 -.0306	 -.0795	 -.0837	 -0.0058	 0	 2	 3.3955
0390	 .0467	 .0209	 .0006	 -.0767	 0.0025	 0	 1	 2.5736
0410	 .0540	 .1124	 -.0482	 -.0979	 -0.0125	 0	 0	 4.4056
0420	 -.0278	 .1062	 -.0750	 -.1359	 0.0076	 0	 3	 5.5886
0440	 -.0888	 -.0046	 -.0042	 -.0443	 -0.0011	 0	 1	 3.8216
0490	 .1273*	 .0047	 -.0304	 -.0402	 0.0080	 0	 1	 2.6624
coefficient is significant at 5% level
**	 coefficient is significant at 1% level
number of significant coefficients are either equal to or greater than 4.
252Detailed results of the serial correlation coefficients
for all lags are reported in Appendix 4.
Serial correlation coefficients at individual lags
Detailed results for individual lags are reported in
Appendix 4. The majority of the serial correlation
coefficients [876 out of 900 ( 97.33%)] are not
statistically different from zero at the 5% level of
significance. At lag 1, for example, the results indicate
that only one coefficient is significant at the 5% level
(Company 490). This coefficient of .1273 has very little
explanatory power. It can only explain 1.6% of variation
of returns at this lag. The results of other lags are
similar. No significant coefficients are observed for 12
lags	 (lags 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 26, 27, 28, 30).
One significant coefficient is observed for 13 lags (lags
1, 5, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25). Two
significant coefficients are observed for 4 lags (lags 2,
3, 6, 9). Three significant coefficients are observed for
1 lag (lag 29). These significant coefficients are very
small in magnitude.
We can reject the independence hypothesis for individual
coefficients for only 24 out of the 900 coefficients at
the 5% level (2 out of 900 at the 1% level).
253Overall results for individual companies
The serial correlation coefficients results for individual
companies over 30 lags are evaluated using two statistics:
the number of significant coefficients across the 30 lags
and the Q-statistic. The results are discussed in that
order.
Results using number of significant coefficients
The number of significant coefficients across the 30 lags
for each company are shown in Columns (7) and (8) of Table
8.1.	 No statistically significant	 coefficients	 are
indicated for 12 out of the 30 companies at any lag. 13
companies have only one significant coefficient at the 5%
level. 4 companies have two significant coefficients. One
company has three significant coefficients. These
coefficients are widely distributed and do not show any
consistent pattern.
The results in Table 8.1 show that no company has either 4
or more significant coefficients. Using the decision rule
of Nr > 4, the hypothesis of independence cannot be
rejected for any company for weekly transaction returns.
Results using the Q-Statistic
The Q-statistic computed across 30 lags for each company
is shown in Column (9) of Table 8.1. The decision rule is
254that the coefficient is significant if Q30 > 43.77. None
of the computed statistic exceeds this critical value. In
this case the hypothesis of independence of share price
returns across all lags cannot be rejected for any
company. These results are consistent with those of the N.
> 4 rule. _
These results also confirm the observation that the
individual serial correlation coefficients are small in
magnitude. This may also be observed from the average
coefficients. The average serial correlation coefficients
of the companies across the 30 lags are very small. The
highest average coefficient is 0.0209 (Company 70) which
is not very different from zero.
8.2.2 Serial correlation coefficients for Bid returns
series
The summarised results of the serial correlation
coefficients for bid returns are presented in Table 8.2.
The Table shows the serial correlation coefficients at
lags 1, 10, 20 and 30. The Table also presents the average
serial correlation coefficient, the number of
coefficients which are significant at 1 and 5%, and the
Q-statistic for each company. Detailed results of the
serial correlation coefficients for all lags are reported
in Appendix 5.
255TABLE 8.2:	 SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR BID RETURNS OF THE
NAIROBI STOCK	 EXCHANGE (1979-1988) LAGS 1, 10, 20, and 30
LAG
(1)
1	 10	 20	 30	 AVERAGE	 SIGN AT SIGN AT
SCC	 BP	 1%	 5%	 Q-STATISTIC
(2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)
0020 -.0026	 -.0171	 .0327	 -.0344	 -0.0147	 1	 1 1.2399
0030 -.0577	 .0047	 .0148	 .0160	 0.0045	 0	 1 0.8995
0040 -.0525	 -.0036	 -.0114	 .0229	 -0.0010	 1	 3 2.3319
0060 .0204	 -.0101	 .0579	 -.0344	 -0.0142	 1	 1 1.2809
0070 -.0665	 .0513	 .0024	 -.0001	 -0.0086	 0	 0 0.7780
0090 -.0397	 .0038	 .0050	 -.0010	 -0.0028	 0	 2 0.9238
0100 -.0983*	 -.0003	 .0710	 -.0061	 0.0033	 1	 2 1.7137
0110 -.0282	 .0169	 .0299	 .0245	 0.0092	 0	 0 0.3111
0120 -.0323	 -.0287	 -.0093	 .0340	 -0.0047	 0	 0 0.7091
0130 -.0208	 .0103	 .0037	 .0038	 -0.0052	 0	 0 0.2173
0160 -.0406	 -.0471	 .0047	 .0738	 -0.0024	 0	 1 1.6001
0170 -.0282	 -.0061	 -.0905*	 .0058	 -0.0032	 0	 1 0.9186
0180 -.0461	 .0216	 -.0932*	 .0184	 -0.0148	 1	 3 2.1582
0200 -.0050	 .0226	 -.0378	 .0607	 -0.0057	 0	 0 1.0749
0220 -.0679	 .0106	 -.0643	 .0101	 0.0054	 0	 1 0.8567
0230 .0034	 .0005	 .0203	 .0028	 -0.0012	 0	 0 0.6201
0240 -.0230	 .0115	 -.0064	 -.0167	 -0.0241	 3	 4 c 3.1894
0250 .0394	 -.1661**	 -.1020*	 .0049	 -0.0249	 2	 3 2.9667
0270 -.0306	 -.0419	 .0512	 -.0446	 -0.0235	 0	 2 1.4995
0290 .0586	 .0028	 -.0958*	 -.0267	 -0.0239	 0	 1 2.0501
0310 -.0415	 -.0129	 .0108	 -.0265	 -0.0190	 0	 0 1.0209
0320 -.0033	 -.0237	 -.0774	 .0355	 -0.0223	 0	 0 2.0464
0340 -.0035	 -.0426	 -.0061	 -.0036	 -0.0039	 1	 1 1.0609
0370 -.0712	 -.0208	 -.0096	 -.0284	 -0.0188	 0	 4 c 2.5276
0380 -.0877*	 .0480	 -.0053	 .0455	 0.0048	 0	 2 1.5580
0390 -.0084	 -.1542**	 .0412	 -.0002	 -0.0163	 4	 8 c 4.9011
0410 -.0118	 .0086	 -.0476	 -.0482	 -0.0274	 0	 o 1.6062
0420 -.0156	 -.0065	 -.0265	 -.1641**	 -0.0051	 2	 2 1.7875
0440 -.0117	 -.0041	 -.0382	 .0022	 0.0021	 0	 2 1.3477
0490 .0099	 .0235	 .0199	 -.0065	 0.0081	 0	 0 0.9014
* coefficient is significant at 5% level
** coefficient is significant at 1% level
c number of significant coefficients are either equal to or greater than 4.
256Serial correlation coefficients at individual lags
Detailed results for individual lags are reported in
Appendix 5.	 The majority of the serial correlation
coefficients [854 out of 900 (94.89%)] are not
statistically different from zero at the 5% level of
significance. At lag 1, for example, the results indicate
that only two coefficients are significant at the 5%
level, but are small in absolute value. The largest,
-0.0983 (Company 100), can only explain less than 1% of
the variation of the return as resulting from past price
changes. The results of other lags are similar. No
significant coefficients are observed for 5 lags (lags 3,
11, 12, 13, 23). One significant coefficient is observed
for 10 lags ( lags 6, 7, 8, 16, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30).
Two significant coefficients are observed for 12 lags
(lags 1, 4, 5, 9, 10, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 25, 29). Three
significant coefficients are observed for 1 lag (lag 17 ).
Four significant coefficients are observed for 1 lag
(lag 20 ). Five significant coefficients are observed for
1 lag (lag 2 ). These significant coefficients are very
small in magnitude. We can reject the independence
hypothesis for individual coefficients for only 46 out of
the 900 coefficients at the 5% level (15 out of 900 at the
1% level).
257Overall results for individual companies
The serial correlation coefficients results for individual
companies over 30 lags are evaluated using two statistics:
the number of significant coefficients across 30 lags and
the Q-statistic. The results are discussed in that order.
Results using number of significant coefficients
The number of significant coefficients across the 30 lags
for each company are shown in Columns (7) and (8) of Table
8.2. There are no consistent patterns of significant
serial correlation coefficients that can be noted for any
company. 10 out of the 30 companies do not have any
significant coefficient at any lag. 7 companies have only
one significant coefficient. 7 companies have two
significant coefficients. 3 companies, companies 40, 180,
and 250, have three significant coefficients each.
Companies 240, 370, and 390 have either four or more
significant coefficients. Using the decision rule of Nr >
4 for lack of independence, the hypothesis of independence
is rejected for each of the three companies. Rejection of
independence should, nevertheless, be interpreted
cautiously. It was suspected that the extreme values of
the returns of these companies could be the cause of the
problem. To check if the extreme positive and negative
values did contribute to the significant results of
companies, the values were eliminated and the serial
258correlation coefficients recomputed. In all the cases,
significant coefficients did not recur. The suggestion of
dependence may, therefore, arise from these extreme
values.
Results using the Q-Statistic
The Q-statistic computed across 30 lags for each company
is shown in Column (9) of Table 8.2. The decision rule is
that the coefficient is significant if Q 30 > 43.77. None
of the computed statistics exceeds this critical value. In
this case the hypothesis of independence of share price
returns across all lags cannot be rejected for any
company. These results using an overall statistic confirm
that the findings under the Nr > 4 rule above are not
clear cut and one should hesitate to reject independence
based on the rule alone.
These results also confirm the observation that, overall,
very few coefficients are significant at the 1% and 5%
levels.
8.2.3 Serial correlation coefficients for Ask returns
series
The summarised results of the serial correlation
coefficients for the Ask returns series are presented in
Table	 8.3. The Table shows the serial	 correlation
259coefficients at lags 1, 10, 20 and 30. The Table also
presents the average serial correlation coefficient,	 the
number of coefficients which are significant at the 1 and
5% levels, and the Q-statistic for each company. Detailed
results of the serial correlation coefficients for all
lags are reported in Appendix 6.
Serial correlation coefficients at individual lags
Detailed results for individual lags are reported in
Appendix 6.	 The majority of the serial correlation
coefficients [872 out of 900 (96.89%)] are not
statistically different from zero at the 5% level of
significance. At lag 1, for example, the results indicate
that only one coefficient is significant at the 5% level,
and small in absolute value. The	 coefficient, 0.1256
(Company 340), can only explain about 1.6% of the
variation in returns. The results of other lags are quite
similar. No significant coefficients are observed for 10
lags ( lags 4, 7, 9, 13, 14, 16, 19, 25, 27, 28). One
significant coefficient is observed for 14 lags (lags 1,
2, 3, 8, 10, 12, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24). Two
significant coefficients are observed for 4 lags (lags 11,
26, 29, 30). Three significant coefficients are observed
for 2 lags (lags 5 and 6 ). These significant coefficients
are very small in magnitude.
260TABLE 8.3: SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR ASK RETURNS OF THE
NAIROBI STOCK	 EXCHANGE (1979-1988) LAGS 1, 10, 20, and 30
LAG
(1)
1	 10	 20	 30	 AVERAGE	 SIGN AT SIGN AT
SP	 1%	 5%	 Q-STATISTIC
(2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)
0020 .0789	 .0323	 -.0309	 -.0430	 0.0004	 o	 1 1.5210
0030 .0277	 .0996	 -.0237	 -.0587	 0.0430	 o	 3 5.9428
0040 .0140	 -.0161	 -.0067	 -.0105	 -0.0030	 o	 o 0.8224
0060 .0693	 -.0459	 .0172	 -.0396	 0.0251	 o	 1 2.4708
0070 .0555	 -.0183	 .0820	 .0478	 0.0218	 0	 o 2.4337
0090 .0803	 -.2504	 .0677	 .1549	 0.0450	 0	 o 14.5376
0100 .0225	 -.0553	 .0148	 .0593	 0.0085	 o	 o 1.4263
0110 .0486	 .0031	 -.0206	 -.0309	 0.0051	 o	 1 1.5609
0120 -.0087	 .0301	 -.1179	 .0086	 0.0151	 o	 0 1.9962
0130 -.0524	 -.1104	 .0337	 .0642	 0.0231	 o	 1 2.6771
0160 .0285	 .0579	 -.0955*	 .0124	 0.0088	 1	 2 2.2891
0170 .0305	 .1050*	 -.0117	 .0255	 0.0385	 1	 3 2.5903
0180 .0284	 -.0815	 .0076	 .0112	 0.0079	 o	 0 3.5309
0200 -.0200	 -.0390	 .0163	 .0620	 0.0020	 o	 1 1.7688
0220 -.0114	 -.0057	 .0909	 .0604	 -0.0096	 0	 0 2.1151
0230 .0232	 .0538	 -.0377	 .0031	 0.0246	 o	 2 4.3166
0240 -.0175	 -.0017	 -.0196	 .0298	 -0.0034	 o	 o 0.7979
0250 -.0789	 .0046	 .0147	 .0086	 0.0019	 o	 1 17743
0270 .0938	 .0966	 -.0231	 .0836	 0.0594	 0	 2 5.0392
0290 .0567	 .0360	 -.0235	 -.0915	 -0.0053	 1	 1 2.5414
0310 .0054	 .0251	 -.0275	 .0272	 0.0164	 o	 2 1.6111
0320 -.0884	 -.0442	 .0036	 -.0748	 -0.0267	 o	 0 1.5661
0340 .1256*	 .0560	 .0275	 .0536	 0.0413	 o	 3 3.5164
0370 .0818	 .0055	 -.0230	 .1221*	 0.0231	 o	 2 2.7701
0380 -.0494	 .0751	 .0371	 .0444	 0.0378	 o	 o 2.2895
0390 .0225	 .0140	 -.0001	 .0064	 0.0086	 0	 o 2.3247
0410 -.0750	 .0205	 .0234	 .0569	 0.0336	 o	 o 2.1266
0420 .0062	 -.0117	 .0079	 .1299*	 0.0278	 o	 1 2.7151
0440 -.0051	 .0242	 -.0035	 -.0031	 0.0205	 o	 1 2.9742
0490 -.0166	 .0795	 .0524	 .0835	 0.0273	 o	 o 2.1489
coefficient	 is significant at 5% level
** coefficient	 is significant at 1% Level
number of significant coefficients are either equal to or greater than 4.
261We can reject the independence hypothesis for individual
coefficients for only 28 out of the 900 coefficients at
the 5% level (3 out of 900 at the 1% level).
Overall results for individual companies
The serial correlation coefficients results for individual
companies over 30 lags are evaluated using two statistics:
the number of significant coefficients across 30 lags and
the Q-statistic. The results are discussed in that order.
Results using number of significant coefficients
The number of significant coefficients across the 30 lags
for each company are shown in Columns (7) and (8) of Table
8.3. At individual company level, 13 companies out of 30
do not have a significant serial correlation coefficient
at any lag. 9 companies have only one significant
coefficient across the 30 lags. 5 companies have two
significant	 coefficients. 3 companies have three
significant coefficients.	 The significant	 serial
correlation coefficients are widely distributed and do not
show any pattern or consistency across lags. The
significant serial correlation coefficients are also small
and very few are significant at the 1% level.
No company has either four or more significant
262coefficients. Using the decision rule of N r > 4 for lack of
independence, the hypothesis of independence is not
rejected for any company for weekly Ask returns.
Results using the Q-Statistic
The Q-statistic computed across 30 lags for each company
is shown in Column (9) of Table 8.3. The decision rule is
that the coefficient is significant if Q 30 > 43.77. All
computed statistics do not exceed this critical value.
This means that the hypothesis of independence of share
price returns across all lags cannot be rejected for all
the 30 companies. The results on the whole are consistent
with the findings under the Nr > 4 rule.
8.2.4 Serial correlation coefficients for monthly returns
We noted that the coefficients of weekly returns of the
three price series studied were generally small and
insignificant. Several studies have examined longer
differencing intervals, usually using monthly returns, for
evidence of dependence. In this section emphasis is
shifted from weekly to monthly returns. The use of monthly
returns reduces the number of observation and may weaken
the results. It should, nevertheless, provide more
evidence for or against randomness for the stock exchange
under study. We shall also have evidence to compare with
the findings of Parkinson (1987) who used monthly returns
to study the same market.
263The results of the serial correlation coefficients for
monthly returns for the three price series are presented
in Table 8.4. The Table shows the coefficients at lag 1,
the Q-statistic and the number of significant coefficients
at the 5% level. The results of Parkinson (1987) are also
presented in Column (11). Detailed results of individual
coefficients are reported in Appendix 7.
Results of individual coefficients
The absolute sizes of the individual coefficients seem to
be higher than those observed for the weekly data. These
results are consistent with Fama (1965). The increase in
the size of the coefficients does not necessarily mean
that the price returns over longer intervals show more
dependence, since it is known that the variability of the
coefficients are inversely related to the sample size.
The majority of the coefficients are not statistically
significantly different from zero at the 5% level and the
hypothesis of independence cannot be rejected for 858 out
of 900 coefficients (95.33%) of transaction returns, 866
out of 900 ( 96.22%) of bid returns, and 866 out of 900
(96.22%) of ask returns. The hypothesis of independence
can be rejected for only 42 out of 900 coefficients of
transaction returns, 34 out of 900 of bid returns, and 34
out of 900 for ask returns. The significant coefficients
are themselves small in absolute value.
264TABLE 8.4: SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR	 MONTHLY TRANSACTION, BID, AND ASK RETURNS
OF THE NAIROBI STOCK	 EXCHANGE (1979-1988)
TRANSACTION RETURNS BID	 RETURNS ASK RETURNS PARKINSON
1974-1978
COMPANY SCC	 AT	 SIGN AT SCC AT	 SIGN AT SCC AT SIGN AT SCC AT
NUMBER LAG	 1 5% Q-STAT LAG1 5% Q-STAT LAG	 1 5% Q-STAT	 LAG	 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)	 (11)
20 .0270 3 19.3234 -.1684 2 11.0611 .1407 2 12.1501	 -.0030
30 -.0556 1 4.5188 -.0041 1 10.5760 .2267 1 16.2885	 -.0553
40 -.2128* 1 5.8666 -.1623 2 9.8883 .0276 0 3.5466	 -.0815
60 -.0339 2 11.8728 -.2487** 1 5.8518 .0609 3 18.4976	 -.2804
70 .0016 0 3.7041 -.1410 1 12.7799 -.0085 0 6.9663	 -.2908
90 -.0086 1 10.2736 -.1645 o 7.1795 .1563 0 19.3502	 -.0916
100 -.0768 2 10.6012 -.1699 o 5.7892 .1715 2 10.5958	 -.4968
110 .1012 0 2.3966 .1034 1 8.0993 .0848 1 8.9104	 .1095
120 .1911 3 14.1934 -.1652 1 7.5436 .2753* 3 11.1214	 -.0988
130 -.0775 0 1.8161 -.2212* 1 7.0057 .0632 0 11.6555	 -.2534
160 -.1442 2 9.1486 -.1312 1 8.5952 .0151 0 5.6109	 .0925
170 -.1612 2 10.1320 -.0035 3 12.1987 .0123 2 8.6223	 .0182
180 -.1342 0 11.9516 -.0993 1 8.3066 -.0465 0 9.6062	 -.0235
200 .0061 3 7.5637 -.1139 0 10.3376 -.0278 2 8.6817	 .0932
220 -.0418 2 12.5571 -.1580 0 5.7196 .0303 0 5.8478	 .0042
230 -.2375* 1 7.1288 -.0555 3 10.5669 .0458 0 8.7520	 -.0565
240 -.0545 0 6.5769 -.0276 3 9.8336 -.0276 0 14.2644	 N/A
250 -.0608 0 8.2143 -.1226 0 3.1752 .0398 0 6.7313	 .1334
270 -.0460 0 1.2159 -.0454 o 4.7540 .1615 2 16.4945	 -.3533
290 -.0398 1 4.5753 -.1122 1 4.6402 .0123 1 11.6222	 .0126
310 -.1273 1 6.9687 -.0604 3 10.0137 .0710 2 8.3530	 -.1970
320 .2127* 2 1 2.3795 -.0347 0 13.4251 -.0300 1 9.9236	 -.2284
340 .1857* 2 9.9733 -.1490 2 8.6624 -.0051 2 13.4567	 .1940
370 .1832 3 15.5889 -.1336 1 7.3034 -.0180 1 14.6422	 -.1485
380 -.0961 2 11.3386 -.1149 0 5.9074 .0080 1 8.5942	 -.2245
390 -.0832 3 13.4570 -.1129 1 7.1150 -.0235 0 4.1923	 .0412
410 -.0508 1 9.5397 -.0544 0 5.1167 -.1567 1 10.6973	 -.2452
420 .1042 2 15.1815 -.1015 0 4.3516 -.1003 3 12.9156	 -.2279
440 .1375 0 10.6489 -.1038 0 3.7913 -.1017 0 9.0892	 -.1645
490 .0236 2 10.4193 -.2794** 3 12.7589 -.0951 1 6.7823	 -.0581
*	 coefficient is significant at 5% level
**	 coefficient is significant at 1% level
c	 number of significant coefficients are either equal to or greater than 4.
N/A	 Not Available
265There are differences between these results at lag 1 and
those of Parkinson (1984, 1987) for the same market.
Although he did not report how many of his companies had
significant coefficients, by using the standard error for
a sample of 60 observations at lag 1, 17% of the
coefficients were significant at 5%. This compares to only
13% for transaction returns (4 out of 30 coefficients),
10% for bid returns, and 3% for ask returns. It should be
noted that the standard error in the current study is
theoretically + (0.1789) compared with + (0.2530) for
Parkinson (1984). This subjects the current research
results to a stricter decision rule, but they still give
much more convincing results.
There is also a major difference between the size of the
coefficients observed in the two studies. The results
presented here indicate very few coefficients over 0.2000
for any of the price series ( 3, 3, and 2 coefficients for
Transaction, Bid, and Ask prices respectively) compared
with 9 coefficients for Parkinson (1984). His highest
coefficient was -0.4968 compared with -0.2794 for the
current study.
Parkinson (1984) did not perform any analysis beyond lag
1. Comparison at other lags is therefore not possible. In
section 8.4.3 we examine why Parkinson's results may
differ from those of this study.
266Overall results for individual companies
As for weekly returns the overall serial correlation
results for individual companies are evaluated using two
statistics: the number of significant coefficients across
30 lags and the Q-statistic. The results are discussed in
that order.
Results using the number of significant coefficients
The number of significant coefficients at the 5% level
across the 30 lags for Transaction, Bid, and Ask returns
are shown in Columns (3), (6), and (9) of Table 8.4
respectively. No company has either four or more
significant coefficients. Using the decision rule of
Nr	4 for lack of independence, the hypothesis of
independence is not rejected for any company for monthly
returns.
Results using the Q-Statistic
The Q-statistic computed across 30 lags for each company
is shown in Columns (4), (7), and (10) of Table 8.4
respectively. The decision rule is that the coefficient is
significant if Q30 > 43.77. None of the computed
statistics for all the three price series exceed this
critical value. This means that the hypothesis of
independence cannot be rejected for any company when
267monthly return series are used. The results on the whole
are consistent with the findings under the N r > 4 rule.
8.2.5 Discussion
The results for the three price series showed some
significant coefficients at some lags although they were
not significant when examined overall. There may be
several sources of these significant individual
coefficients. These possible sources are discussed in this
section.
The first may be due to the variations in the times at
which the prices are recorded. As discussed in Chapter 3
the prices are reported once a week. The reported price
may have occurred at any time in that week. These
non-synchronised prices may induce autocorrelation in the
price series. The returns are supposed to be measured over
specific time intervals. When the prices do not occur
simultaneously, it follows that we are measuring returns
over different time intervals. We might therefore expect
returns calculated over these different intervals to have
a distribution differing from that of the fixed period
returns. This will mean that the variances of the returns
will differ as they are calculated over different time
lengths [French and Roll (1986), Gibbon and Hess (1981)].
This will in turn affect the serial coefficients since
variances are used in their computations.
268Secondly, it is possible that, even though rigorous
attempts were made to control for all the errors in the
database, the prices used had error of original entry from
the broker's side. Praetz (1976) shows that this will tend
to induce significant serial correlation coefficients in a
series. Praetz argues that if a price series has k errors,
these affects at most 2k returns. We found in section
8.2.3 that, if the extreme positive and negative values
were removed, the significant serial correlation
coefficients were eliminated. Eliminating the extreme
values, nevertheless, reduces the amount of data and may
affects the reliability of the coefficients.
Thirdly, it is possible that the significant serial
correlation coefficients are due to chance. When all the
coefficients are considered, some will probably suggest
significance even when the random walk hypothesis holds.
For example, on average 1 out of 20 would then suggest
significance at the 5% level. We can therefore expect at
least one coefficient to be significant by chance for any
of the 30 lags and 30 companies studied. Since all other
correlations are close to zero, it suggests that the
significant correlations observed at some lags are
spurious and due to chance.
Fourthly, even though some serial correlation coefficients
are significant when compared with their standard errors,
it should be noted that they have very little explanatory
269power. This low explanatory power is unlikely to be
significant from an investor's point of view. In any case
as Fama (1965) puts it:
" What constitutes a 'minimum acceptable' level of
dependence depends on the particular problem that
one is trying to solve. For example, one doing
statistical work in the stock markets may wish to
decide whether dependence in the series of
successive price changes is sufficient to account
for some property of the distribution of price
changes	 By contrast the stock market trader
has more practical criteria for judging what
constitutes important dependence in successive
price changes. For his purposes the random walk
model is valid so long as the knowledge of past
behaviour of the series of price changes cannot be
used	 to increase expected	 gains	
Dependence that is important from the trader's
point of view need not be important from a
statistical point of view" (p.35).
8.2.6 Serial correlation coefficients for Nairobi Stock
Exchange Index.
A share price index is probably one of the most widely
used statistical series in market studies. Understanding
the series is of importance in market-based studies
because of the reliance on the index as a surrogate of the
270market [Bowman (1983), Roll (1977)]. It was felt necessary
to extend the test of randomness to the Nairobi Stock
Exchange Index. The structure of the index was explained
in Chapter 3.
Results of individual coefficients
The serial correlation coefficients for the NSE Index
returns are given at the bottom of Appendix 4. The
majority of the coefficients (20 out of 30) are not
statistically significant and are very small in
magnitude.
Overall results
As for the weekly and monthly returns the overall serial
correlation results for individual companies are evaluated
using two statistics: the number of significant
coefficients across 30 lags and the Q-statistic. The
results are discussed in that order.
Number of significant coefficients
The coefficients are significant in 10 out of the 30 lags
(Lags 2,3,4,5,9,15,17,18,20, and 30). The largest
coefficient of 0.2158 is at lag 3. This coefficient
explains 4.66%	 of the index return variation with
respect to past returns. In some instances, a significant
271coefficient	 is followed by another	 significant
coefficient. Using the decision rule of Nr > 4 for lack
of independence, the hypothesis of independence of
successive index return may be rejected at the 5% level.
Q-statistic
The Q-statistic for the NSE index correlation coefficients
is 7.8307 which is less than its critical value of 43.77
at the 5% level of significance. The hypothesis of
independence is not rejected. These results also confirm
the observation that, overall, the coefficients are small
in size.
Significant coefficients at individual lags have been
observed when indices have been used in similar studies.
Cooper (1982), for example, presents results of the
correlation coefficients for 31 stock exchanges including
the NSE. For the NSE, the highest coefficient was 0.25 at
lag 1. He also found that 8 coefficients were significant
at the 5% level. The results obtained here are not
therefore materially different.
Stock indices can display more first-lag correlation than
individual stocks because of the market factor and thin
trading of small companies [Gibbon and Hess (1981)]. This
market factor was also noted by King (1966). According to
Working (1960) the correlation of first differences of
272averages in a random chain can induce correlations not
present in the original data especially when working with
an index. The first order co-efficient will also be
biased upwards if the prices used do not occur
simultaneously. Brealey (1970), for example, found that
the first order serial correlation fell from 0.32 to 0.19
when he used a share price index based on simultaneous
price observations. We noted in Section 5.4.8 that the
prices reported at the weekly call-over, and which are used
to calculate the index, did not occur simultaneously but
could have occurred any time during that week. This could
cause a timing problem which could be reflected by the
non-independence of the index.
Another factor may be that some of the companies included
in computing the index are very thinly traded. This would
cause a bias in the index resulting in non-randomness.
Fisher (1966) showed that infrequent trading causes an
index constructed from such share price data to induce
positive serial correlation into returns which are
calculated from the index and the estimated variance of
the returns on the index to be biased downwards.
It should be noted that the significant coefficients may
not be material enough to attract profitable trading
opportunities from an investment point of view, given the
level of transaction costs.
2738.2.7 The sign of the serial correlation coefficients
The issue of the sign of the serial correlation
coefficients observed in weak-form efficiency tests has
gained renewed interest in recent finance literature [Ball
and Kothari (1989)]. Current efforts are designed to
explaining why certain signs predominate.
For example, in the studies on the New York stock
exchange, evidence has revealed the predominance of
negative serial coefficients in stock returns. This study
does not attempt to seek the reasons for the existence of
certain signs of the coefficients of the Nairobi stock
exchange returns, but to present evidence of their nature
in line with the majority of other previous randomness
studies. A positive serial correlation would indicate a
tendency for a rise in price at time t-1 to be followed by
a further rise at time t. A negative serial correlation
would show a tendency for a rise in price to be followed
by a price fall at time t and vice versa [Niarchos
(1971)].
The results of the signs of the serial correlation
coefficients for three price series are presented in Table
8.5. The Table shows numbers of negative and positive
coefficients at each lag. The signs of the coefficients
of transaction returns are evenly distributed across all
lags. 13 lags have predominantly negative and 14 have
predominantly positive coefficients.
274TABLE 8.5: SUMMARY OF SIGNS OF SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
FOR LAGS 1 TO 30 (1979 - 1988)
TRANSACTION
RETURNS	 BID RETURNS	 ASK RETURNS
LAG	 NEGATIVE POSITIVE	 NEGATIVE POSITIVE	 NEGATIVE POSITIVE
SIGN SCC SIGN SCC	 SIGN SCC SIGN SCC	 SIGN SCC SIGN SCC
	
1	 16	 14	 25	 5	 11	 19
	
2	 16	 14	 25	 5	 9	 21
	
3	 19	 11	 20	 10	 7	 23
	
4	 13	 17	 16	 14	 9	 21
	
5	 12	 18	 20	 10	 9	 21
	
6	 16	 14	 18	 12	 7	 23
	
7	 12	 18	 17	 13	 7	 23
	
8	 18	 12	 14	 16	 10	 20
	
9	 11	 19	 17	 13	 14	 16
	
10	 13	 17	 16	 14	 12	 18
	
11	 17	 13	 18	 12	 8	 22
	
12	 12	 18	 17	 13	 13	 17
	
13	 17	 13	 15	 15	 10	 20
	
14	 11	 19	 15	 15	 9	 21
	
15	 15	 15	 17	 13	 13	 17
	
16	 11	 19	 15	 15	 11	 19
	
17	 15	 15	 18	 12	 17	 13
	
18	 16	 14	 19	 11	 12	 18
	
19	 17	 13	 20	 10	 15	 15
	
20	 16	 14	 16	 14	 15	 15
	
21	 14	 16	 16	 14	 10	 20
	
22	 13	 17	 16	 14	 14	 16
	
23	 14	 16	 15	 15	 13	 17
	
24	 13	 17	 19	 11	 14	 16
	
25	 17	 13	 15	 15	 15	 15
	
26	 15	 15	 15	 15	 10	 20
	
27	 13	 17	 11	 19	 9	 21
	
28	 14	 16	 14	 16	 9	 21
	
29	 16	 14	 17	 13	 13	 17
	
30	 21	 9	 15	 15	 8	 22
Key
SCC = Serial Correlation Coefficients
275The signs of the coefficients for bid returns are
predominantly negative (20 out of the 30 lags). The
results are the reverse for ask returns where 26 out of
the 30 lags are predominantly positive.
Solnik (1973) argues that the predominance of positive
serial correlation coefficients, for example those
observed here for ask returns, could be created by slow
adjustment to new information. Characteristics such as
thin markets and discontinuity of trading across weeks
could also explain the existence of the predominating
positive signs.
Another factor that may explain the dominance of the
positive signs is the market factor identified by King
(1966). The serial correlation coefficient for a share
will be partly determined by the serial behaviour of the
market component and partly by the serial behaviour of the
factors peculiar to that share. As the market component is
common to all shares, its behaviour, during the sampling
period, may tend to produce a common sign for the serial
correlation coefficient of all the shares.
Two competing hypotheses have been offered for explaining
the existence of negative serial coefficients in returns,
for example those observed in this study for bid returns.
Summers (1986), De Bondt and Thaler (1987) argue that they
result from stock market mispricing, with prices taking
long,	 but subsequently corrected,	 departures from
276fundamental values or routinely overreacting to
information. Fama (1976) and Chan (1988) argue that they
are caused by changing expected returns in an efficient
market.
Ball and Kothari (1989) show empirically that negative
coefficients in relative returns are due almost entirely
to variations in relative risks and therefore expected
relative returns, through time. They are able to reject
the mispricing hypothesis.
8.3 COMPARISON WITH OTHER STUDIES
The discussion of results would not be complete without
comparing them with those of other studies from the
developed and developing exchanges.
8.3.1 Studies of developed exchanges
The nature and results of major studies of developed
exchanges are discussed in Chapter 5. The results of the
majority of those studies were in support of the random
walk hypothesis. The results obtained for the serial
correlation tests for the NSE compare very well with the
findings of studies of these markets. The results of the
average serial correlation coefficient for this study does
not show any marked difference when compared, for example,
with the results of study of the Solnik (1973) of European
277Stock Exchanges. These results, all for weekly returns,
are given for comparative purposes in Table 8.6:
TABLE 8.6 SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DEVELOPED
EXCHANGES
Country
Sample
Size
Average
Serial corr.
France 65 -0.049
Italy 30 0.001
UK. 40 -0.055
Germany 35 0.056
Netherlands 24 0.002
Belgium 17 -0.088
Switzerland 17 -0.022
Sweden 6 0.024
USA. - -0.038
Kenya 30 0.006
[Partly adopted from Solnik (1973, p.1156, Table 2)]
It may be argued that the results are not comparable as
they are for periods earlier than this study, for
different sample sizes, and even different time lengths.
278The efficient market hypothesis has nevertheless been
shown to apply not only when different time periods are
considered, but also for different samples and markets
[Ang and Pohlman (1978)]. Other comparable statistics may
be found in Granger (1972, p.477). The coefficients
obtained in the current study were relatively small and
insignificant as in the above studies.
8.3.2 Studies of developing exchanges
The nature and results of major studies of developing
exchanges are discussed in Chapter 5. The results of the
majority of those studies were in support of the random
walk hypothesis. Several studies, not supporting the
hypothesis, were identified to have inherent problems of
methodology and data and therefore to be very unreliable.
This study's results for the serial correlation tests
support the hypothesis of independence, and add to the
growing number of such studies from emerging markets. The
correlation coefficient of 0.0068 for lag 1 is similar to
that of Niarchos (1972) of 0.036 for Greece, Jennergren
and Korsvold (1975) of 0.083 and 0.109 for Norway and
Sweden respectively, and Al-Mudhaf (1983) of 0.055 for
Kuwait. The evidence supports Cooper (1982), whose
evidence, although he used index data, represents one of
the most robust supports of the random walk hypothesis in
developing exchanges.
2798.4	 RESULTS OF THE RUNS TEST
The serial correlation tests have produced evidence which
is consistent with independence of the price series. An
alternative test was considered to check the strength of
the results and provide evidence on the randomness of the
price series. It was stated in Section 4.4.3 that the runs
test is suitable as a test for randomness of share price
returns series. Its application is appealing in that,
unlike the serial correlation test discussed earlier, it
is not affected by the extreme values in the return
series. The runs test was conducted for the sample of 30
companies of the Nairobi Stock Exchange. The results will
be presented for the three price series being studied. The
results of the runs test are used to test the following
hypothesis:
H0 3: The successive price returns of a company's
shares on the NSE are random.
11a3: The successive price returns of a company's
shares on the NSE are not random.
The hypotheses are designed to test randomness of
successive price returns. The decision rule used in the
runs test was stated in Section 6.3. The computed test
280statistic (V) is assumed to be normally distributed with
mean 0 and variance 1. A 5% level of significance is used.
The computed value (labelled Z-value in Tables 8.8 and
8.9) is significant if it beyond the critical values of +
1.96.
Results obtained from the Z values also indicate the
nature of the dependency. The negative Z value is a sign
of positive dependence while a positive Z value is a sign
of negative dependence.
8.4.1 Results for runs test for transaction returns
The results of the runs test for transaction returns are
presented in Table 8.7, columns (2), (3) and (4). The
results show that the actual number of runs is less than
the expected number of runs in 14 out of the 30 companies
studied. The actual number of runs exceeds the expected
number of runs in 14 out of the 30 companies. From the
Table it is also to be noted that of the 30 companies in
the sample, 14 produced a negative Z value and 14 produced
a positive Z value. The results are evenly distributed
and are not predominantly in favour of either positive or
negative dependency. Two companies (200 and 250) produce
the dramatic result of the actual and expected number of
runs being equal.
281TABLE 8.7: RUNS RESULTS FOR TRANSACTION. BID AND ASK RETURNS
TRANSACTION RETURNS BID RETURNS	 ASK RETURNS
COLUMN	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 (10)
COMPANY EXPECTED ACTUAL 2-VALUE EXPECTED ACTUAL Z-VALUE	 EXPECTED ACTUAL Z-VALUE
CODE	 NO. OF NO. OF	 NO. OF NO. OF	 NO. OF NO. OF
RUNS RUNS RUNS RUNS RUNS RUNS
20 102 101 -0.1733 193 209 1.7911 153 151 -0.2794
30 242 243 0.1117 238 253 1.4449 106 104 -0.3506
40 164 158 -0.8273 188 203 1.7309 210 197 -1.5702
60 246 243 -0.3334 257 239 -1.7681 185 178 -0.9004
70 190 181 -1.1489 180 195 1.8366 205 205 0.0000
90 104 95 -1.5550 144 162 2.6859 * 42 42 0.0000
100 188 196 1.0383 180 191 1.3893 207 201 -0.7614
110 238 229 -1.0246 223 209 -1.6223 195 185 -1.2478
120 130 138 1.2243 253 259 0.6130 101 105 0.6829
130 238 247 1.0161 262 260 -0.2010 84 89 0.8843
160 178 176 -0.2628 185 199 1.6506 191 196 0.6658
170 336 332 -0.3790 231 249 1.7508 211 210 -0.1131
180 105 111 1.0264 171 177 0.8573 81 74 -1.3758
200 187 187 0.0000 194 203 1.0396 166 166 0.0000
220 136 132 -0.6026 207 211 0.5044 154 145 -1.3671
230 114 122 1.3132 161 151 -1.4780 81 78 -0.5616
240 101 99 -0.3524 175 162 -1.7989 95 98 0.5989
250 161 161 0.0000 209 220 1.1891 153 143 -1.5343
270 296 306 1.0141 252 239 -1.3306 197 191 -0.7477
290 212 209 -0.3584 219 230 1.1999 198 193 -0.6139
310 296 304 0.8091 225 235 1.1122 193 191 -0.2617
320 119 125 0.9621 183 175 -0.9997 180 167 -1.7197
340 262 250 -1.2918 215 229 1.4673 165 160 -0.7107
370 103 101 -0.3507 156 165 1.1218 75 84 1.7834
380 203 222 2.3277 * 261 271 1.0074 192 187 -0.6578
390 180 203 2.9870 * 233 224 -0.9448 132 122 -1.5922
410 99 104 0.8791 131 135 0.6668 85 86 0.2004
420 116 112 -0.6502 157 165 1.1494 139 136 -0.5011
440 132 146 2.1293 * 192 216 2.5539 * 107 105 -0.3524
490 192 199 0.8843 180 179 -0.1433 108 102 -1.0879
*	 Significant at 5% level
282These results are very close to those obtained for signs
of the serial correlation coefficients. From Table 8.5 it
was observed that 14 out of 30 lags had predominantly
positive coefficients while 13 had negative coefficients.
There are three significant coefficients for companies,
380, 390, and 440. The coefficients are positive
indicating that the actual number of runs exceeds the
expected number of runs. This means that the hypothesis of
randomness may be rejected for 3 out of the 30 companies.
8.4.2 Results for runs test for bid returns
The results of the runs test for bid returns are presented
in Table 8.7 columns (5), (6) and (7). The results show
that the actual number of runs exceed the expected number
of runs in 21 out of the 30 companies examined. The actual
number of runs are less than the expected number of runs
in 9 out of the 30 companies.
From the Table it is also to be noted that of the 30
companies in the sample, 21 produced a positive Z value
and 9 produced a negative Z value. The results are
predominantly inclined to negative dependency of bid
returns.
These results are very close to those obtained for signs
of the serial correlation coefficients. From Table 8.5, it
was observed that 20 out of 30 lags had predominantly
283negative coefficients while 7 had positive coefficients.
There are two significant coefficients for companies 90
and 440. The coefficients are positive, indicating that
the actual number of runs exceeds the expected number of
runs. This means that the hypothesis of randomness may be
rejected for 2 out of the 30 companies.
8.4.3	 Results for runs test for ask returns
The results of the runs test for ask returns are presented
in Table 8.7 columns (8), (9) and (10). The results show
that the actual number of runs is less than the expected
number of runs in 21 out of the 30 companies examined. The
actual number of runs exceeds the expected number of runs
in 6 out of the 30 companies.
From the Table it is also to be noted that of the 30
companies in the sample, 21 produced a negative Z value
and 6 produced a positive Z value. The majority of cases
therefore show evidence of positive dependency. Three
companies (70, 90, and 200) produce the dramatic result of
the actual and expected number of runs being equal.
These results are very close to those obtained for signs
of the serial correlation coefficients. From Table 8.5 it
was observed that 26 out of 30 lags had predominantly
positive coefficients while only 1 had a negative
coefficient.
2848.4.4	 Discussion
The computed Z values of the three price series are not
significant for the majority of companies at the 5% level.
There are nevertheless some significant results. 3
companies have significant Z values for transaction
returns and 2 companies for bid returns. This means that
we can reject the hypothesis of randomness for 3 and 2
companies for transaction and bid ask price series
respectively at the 5% level.
These results are interesting in that, even though the
signs of the Z value agree with the trend shown by the
serial correlation coefficient, the overall conclusion in
support of the random walk hypothesis seem stronger for
the serial correlation coefficients than for the runs,
especially for transaction returns.
As explained in Section 8.2 we cannot reject the
hypothesis of independence for both transaction and ask
returns when using the serial correlation coefficient
test. The companies which had significant results for the
bid returns did not show similar results under the runs
test.
The differences between the two results may arise because
the runs test is affected more readily by trends than the
serial correlation test [Fama (1965)]. Caution is also
285required when interpreting the results of runs tests. This
is because the expected number of runs increases
proportionately with the sample size while the standard
error increases proportionately with the square root of
the sample size (Fama 1965, p.76). This means that a
constant but small percentage difference between the
expected and actual number of runs will produce higher Z
values as the sample size is increased. The significant
results of the runs test for some companies are
nevertheless not at a level where they may be used to
formulate profitable trading strategies when transaction
costs are taken into account.
8.4.5	 Results for runs test for monthly returns
The results for the monthly returns are presented in Table
8.8 for the three price series. The results are very
similar to those of weekly returns. For transaction
returns the results indicate that the actual number of
runs exceeds the expected number of runs in 18 out of the
30 companies examined. The results are predominantly
inclined to negative dependency of transaction returns.
Significant results are noted for companies 30 and 380.
286TRANSACTION RETURNS	 BID RETURNS ASK	 RETURNS
COLUMN	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 (10)
COMPANY EXPECTED ACTUAL	 2-VALUE	 EXPECTED ACTUAL	 2-VALUE	 EXPECTED ACTUAL	 2-VALUE
CODE	 NO. OF NO. OF	 NO. OF NO. OF	 NO. OF NO. OF
	
RUNS RUNS	 RUNS RUNS	 RUNS RUNS
TABLE 8.8	 MONTHLY RETURNS RUNS TEST Z-VALUES
	20	 56	 54	 -0.4704	 77	 79	 0.3913	 62	 60	 -0.4492
	
30	 76	 88	 2.4378 *	 74	 72	 -0.4380	 49	 59	 2.5231 *
	
40	 77	 75	 -0.4021	 65	 72	 1.3800	 74	 67	 -1.4242
	
60	 76	 72	 -0.7955	 56	 65	 1.8820	 56	 53	 -0.6977
	
70	 74	 72	 -0.4096	 63	 70	 1.3857	 78	 75	 -0.5972
	
90	 60	 57	 -0.6816	 63	 69	 1.1939	 24	 28	 1.5012
	
100	 76	 76	 0.0000	 77	 77	 0.0000	 79	 76	 -0.5945
	
110	 79	 82	 0.5936	 64	 71	 1.3948	 72	 66	 -1.2480
	
120	 67	 73	 1.2887	 75	 73	 -0.4298	 49	 47	 -0.5045
	
130	 76	 79	 0.6061	 60	 68	 1.6310	 43	 42	 -0.2716
	
160	 76	 77	 0.2018	 60	 70	 1.9630 *	 75	 76	 0.2015
	
170	 69	 63	 -1.3017	 70	 72	 0.4182	 73	 81	 1.6591
	
180	 61	 62	 0.2269	 64	 70	 1.2040	 36	 40	 1.1889
	
200	 74	 71	 -0.6121	 55	 66	 2.2028 *	 71	 62	 -1.8869
	
220	 67	 70	 0.6466	 83	 81	 -0.3943	 71	 70	 -0.2078
	
230	 59	 62	 0.6874	 61	 66	 1.0616	 41	 36	 -1.3986
	
240	 52	 49	 -0.7354	 66	 70	 0.8121	 54	 53	 -0.2455
	
250	 72	 75	 0.6243	 65	 70	 1.0223	 57	 59	 0.4683
	
270	 78	 78	 0.0000	 84	 81	 -0.6012	 60	 66	 1.3621
	
290	 74	 74	 0.0000	 80	 79	 -0.1992	 74	 65	 -1.8383
	
310	 79	 85	 1.1821	 64	 70	 1.2259	 73	 66	 -1.4501
	
320	 54	 55	 0.2351	 43	 57	 2.8951 *	 69	 58	 -2.3371 *
	
340	 76	 76	 0.0000	 55	 64	 1.9100	 61	 61	 0.0000
	
370	 57	 59	 0.4671	 58	 65	 1.4271	 49	 48	 -0.2587
	
380	 76	 87	 2.2092 *	 71	 75	 0.7971	 65	 72	 1.5327
	
390	 67	 73	 1.3068	 89	 81	 -1.6677	 54	 53	 -0.2422
	
410	 54	 59	 1.1976	 55	 59	 0.8850	 46	 42	 -1.0412
	
420	 58	 61	 0.6951	 71	 74	 0.5952	 60	 69	 2.0570 *
440	 65	 66	 0.2196	 74	 75	 0.2015	 43	 48	 1.3624
490	 75	 78	 0.6103	 58	 67	 1.7933	 58	 56	 -0.4723
*	 Significant at 5% levelFor bid returns the results show that the actual number of
runs exceeds the expected number of runs in 23 out of the
30 companies examined. The results are predominantly
inclined to negative dependency of bid returns.
Significant results are noted for companies 160, 200, and
320. For ask returns the results indicate that the
expected number of runs exceed the actual number of runs
in 19 out of the 30 companies examined. The results are
predominantly inclined to positive dependency of ask
returns. Significant results are noted for companies 30,
320 and 420. These results show that the hypothesis of
randomness may be rejected for 2, 3, and 3 companies for
transaction, bid, and ask price returns respectively. The
significant results may arise as explained in Section
8.3.4.
Parkinson's (1984) runs test results for monthly returns
are not easily comparable because he did not consider
three runs but only two (positive and negative) and
ignored the "non-change" runs in his analysis.
Nevertheless he rejected the hypothesis of randomness for
28 of the 29 companies included as part of the sample.
This compares to 3, 2, and 3 rejected for transaction,
bid, and ask price returns respectively in the current
study. These different results probably arise from price
averaging and the omission of no-change runs from the
analysis.
2888.5 COMPARISON WITH THE PARKINSON'S STUDY OF THE NAIROBI
STOCK EXCHANGE
The nature of Parkinson's (1984, 1987) study of the NSE
was discussed in Chapter 5. In section 8.2.4 and 8.4.5.
the results of this study and those of Parkinson were
compared. The results obtained for both the serial
correlation coefficient and the runs analysis differ
significantly from those reported by Parkinson for the
same market. Parkinson found significant results for the
serial correlation coefficient and the runs test which he
argued were not consistent with the randomness of the
price series. There are particular reasons why the results
obtained in this study may differ from those of Parkinson.
We attribute these reasons to two main sources: the
quality and quantity of data used and the method of
analysis.
The quality and quantity of data affects the results in
several ways. The first is the issue of the data source.
Parkinson used data from only one stockbroker. The
structure of the NSE is such that a complete set of market
price information is available when all brokers exchange
it at the weekly call-over. The price lists of individual
brokers are incomplete to that extent. This therefore
restricted the amount and quality of the data used in his
analysis. This study avoided that problem by obtaining the
official price lists of the exchange itself.
289The other issue is on the length of period covered.
Parkinson carried out his tests over a five years period
(1974-1978). Given that the exchange faced high a
incidence of infrequent trading, this would have
introduced data limitation problems in his study. The
problem was probably compounded by the use of monthly
return intervals. This means that he could only expect to
obtain a maximum of sixty observations which, with thin
trading, was not achieved for some of the companies
sampled. This study used weekly intervals over a period of
10 years (1979-1988). As a result it had more observations
which hopefully tended to improve the results.
Data errors have been identified as possible sources of
spuriously significant results for emerging markets. The
effort and cost required to achieve high level data
accuracy through editing is enormous. Parkinson admits the
problems he had in dealing with his data.	 Cost
considerations did not enable him to pursue thoroughly for
completeness and accuracy of his data. He does not explain
his editing procedures, or how he dealt with suspect data.
As discussed in section 8.2.3, extreme values, some
probably caused by suspect data, will produce evidence not
consistent with randomness. The present study recognised
this fundamental problem faced by many previous studies of
emerging markets. A detailed plan was set up to create an
elaborate database and to ensure a high level of accuracy
of the data. This was hopefully rewarded by the increased
reliability of the results obtained.
290The differing length of periods selected in this study in
contrast to Parkinson's may not themselves be sufficient
to explain the diversity of results, since the use of
monthly returns still gives results which are different
from his. The reason may be that Parkinson's study used
interpolated data to achieve a uniform number of test
observations. This, as shown in Section 7.7, increases
dependence between successive terms of price series. His
results were in this case biased, and he could have
erroneously rejected the random walk hypothesis. This
study did not interpolate missing data points and
therefore avoided the problems of biased coefficients.
Parkinson also failed to include the "non-price change"
position in his runs test. The results of Conrad and
Juttner (1973, Table 1) show that significant differences
may arise between either including or excluding the
non-change position. This study made use of all three
types of runs expected in a price series. This approach is
consistent with Fama (1965).
2918.6 FREQUENCY OF TRADING AND THE SIZE OF WEAK-FORM
EFFICIENCY TEST STATISTICS.
In Section 6.3 we entered the debate on the relationship
between the frequency of trading the size of weak-form
test statistics. We stated that the following hypotheses
are to be tested with respect to the NSE:
Ho 4: The size of the sample serial correlation
coefficients of the price series on the NSE
are independent of the continuity in trading.
Ha 4: The size of the sample serial correlation
coefficients of the price series on the NSE
are dependent of the continuity in trading.
Ho 5: The size of the absolute sample standardised
variables for the runs tests of the price
series on the NSE are independent of the
continuity in trading.
Ha 5: The size of the absolute sample standardised
variables for the runs tests of the price
series on the NSE are dependent of the
continuity in trading.
292The hypotheses are tested by computing the rank
correlation coefficients (re), between the level of
trading and the Q-statistic and between the level of
trading and the standardised value of the runs statistic
(Z-value). The decision rule is that if the computed value
of rs exceeds +0.3620 then it can be concluded that there
is a relationship between either the level of trading as
measured by the number of share price return observations
and the correlation coefficients or the level of trading
and the standardised variables for the runs test.
The results are presented in Table 8.9. The Table shows
the computed Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (rs).
TABLE 8.9: SPEARMAN'S RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENT FOR THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEVEL OF TRADING AND
SERIAL CORRELATION AND RUNS COEFFICIENTS
	TRANSACTION	 BID	 ASK
	
RETURNS	 RETURNS	 RETURNS
	
rs	rs	rs
Q-STATISTIC	 -0.3418	 -0.2650	 -0.2013
RUNS	 -0.0081	 0.2645	 -0.0590
293The results show that there is no significant relationship
between the frequency of trading and either the serial
correlation or the runs coefficients. It is not possible
to support the propositions expounded by Granger (1972)
and Samuels (1981) that small stock markets with
infrequently traded shares will demonstrate a relationship
between weak-form efficiency test statistics and trading
frequency.
2948.7	 DISTRIBUTION OF SHARE PRICE RETURNS
It was suggested in Section 4.7.2 that considerable
interest has been generated in the nature of the
distribution of the returns of equity shares, especially
because of the effect it may have on tests of efficiency.
The aim here is to determine whether successive rates of
return for the Nairobi Stock Exchange are characterised by
a Normal distribution. An important attribute of the
normal distribution is that a known proportion of
observations fall within a given number of standard
deviations from the mean. This study investigates the
following question:
Are the returns on shares on the NSE characterised
by the normal distribution?
To answer this question the following hypotheses are
tested:
H06"- The returns on shares on the Nairobi Stock
Exchange are characterised by the normal
distribution.
Ha6 - The returns on shares on the Nairobi Stock *
Exchange are not characterised by the normal
distribution.
These hypotheses are examined through basic tests of
295(42)
(43)
normality. These tests of normality are based on the
sample skewness MD .,' 1 ), sample kurtosis (62 ), and the
chi-square test of the goodness-of-fit [D'Agostino and
Stephens (1986, p.375 ). The sample skewness (.61 ) and
sample kurtosis (62 ) are the calculated as:
*Sr
4b 1	 = M3 / (M2
3/2)
52	 = M4 / 222
Where
Mk	 =	 ( xi - R) k/ n, k > 1	 (44)
and
R =	 Xi / T	 (45)
and
X1/ 	 XT = a random sample of size T.
If the distribution is symmetric about its mean  R, as in
the normal distribution, E(Z1 ) = ../b / = 0. Values of Z 1 t
0 indicate skewness and so non-normality. For a normal
distribution the kurtosis coefficient E(62) = b2 = 3.
Values of 62 *. 3 indicate non-normality. Furthermore
values of 62 > 3 indicate a distribution with tails
296thicker than normal, and values of B2 < 3 indicate a
distribution with thinner than normal tails.
The chi-square goodness-of-fit test enables the
determination of whether the sample data are compatible
with the hypothesis that they were drawn from a population
that follows the normal distribution. The procedure for
carrying out this test is well documented in standard
statistical textbooks [Daniel and Terrell (1989, p.604-
615)].
The results of these tests are shown in Table 8.10. The
results are summarised for each price series as indicated
in the Table. Skewness coefficients are shown in columns
(2), (6), and (10). Kurtosis coefficients are shown in
columns (3), (7), and (11). The chi-square goodness-of-fit
test was carried out for the three price series and the (A.)
for transaction, bid, and ask returns are given in columns
X. (4), (8), and (12) respectively. The critical value of A.
for OC = 0.05 with 7 degrees of freedom is 14.07. (To
compute the chi-square value, the returns of each company
were separated into 10 class intervals. 10 groups were
chosen because most empirical studies have been using
deciles for analysing returns [Dimson (1988)3).
297TABLE 8.10: DISTRIBUTION STATISTICS OF NAIROBI STOCK EXCHANGE PRICES 1979-1988
TRANSACTION PRICES BUYER PRICES	 SELLER PRICES
Mean Skewness Kurtosis	 ,e.	 Mean Skewness Kurtosis	 "A!	 Mean Skewness Kurtosis	 'A!
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
0020 -.491 -.213 .941 31.05371 -.209 -.151 150.704 537.9707 -.109 .090 101.873 293.6559
0030 -.019 -3.112* 77.555 391.6422 .438 6.493* 76.022 522.9661 -.058 -.623* 17.618 110.2032
0040 -.419 -.906* 14.004 145.7593 .360 -1.388* 19.368 451.1390 -.308 -.633* 74.032 331.7690
0060 .051 -.002 153.896 435.3262 .107 -2.478* 67.143 480.5636 .085 2.403* 15.354 143.0097
0070 -.115 -2.357* 24.108 138.8179 -.077 -3.380* 47.325 453.6796 -.041 -3.905* 58.111 247.3615
0090 .569 1.264* 25.153 124.1605 .104 -.317* 58.083 476.9835 1.521 .839* 3.966 28.13032
0100 -.097 -1.372* 27.994 86.31165 -.099 -5.475* 59.720 396.0982 -.074 .638* 17.198 293.6208
0110 .028 .174 54.013 362.8968 .018 -2.022* 146.298 539.2288 .063 -.142 95.631 358.5717
0120 .075 -.248 13.920 132.5263 .031 -3.625* 32.332 417.9308 -.143 -.895* 30.876 157.0278
0130 .243 -.219 55.110 291.7203 .192 -.812* 111.903 583.6980 .527 -.205 43.572 153.0971
0160 -.271 .047 34.528 133.1803 -.183 -3.936* 35.595 351.9198 -.115 .805* 18.251 314.0041
0170 .231 -2.506* 28.623 184.0498 .117 -3.687* 34.938 279.2813 .148 .270* 14.407 339.3863
0180 .052 -.806* 7.080 58.68462 -.237 -4.495* 49.061 497.5624 -.651 -1.627* 22.570 38.35966
0200 .166 -.019 69.670 315.2791 .450 -1.234* 28.497 440.5522 .178 .686* 11.693 208.0496
0220 .871 -1.969* 32.584 125.5128 -.101 -.793* 68.991 456.5559 -.133 1.245* 12.888 292.5341
0230 .121 -.668* 4.230 113.0638 -.077 -1.592* 55.831 521.9842 .000 .982* 12.887 147.9702
0240 .400 -.305 17.002 94.03579 .157 -1.716* 33.323 432.1331 .093 1.075* 10.904 252.4513
0250 .261 -.645* 5.061 103.4488 .115 -1.287* 30.596 375.3542 .274 6.469* 75.926 270.6760
0270 .135 -.215 100.007 357.7676 .219 .482* 38.895 302.9240 .129 1.067* 12.501 128.9835
0290 .008 -5.613* 72.717 105.9699 .578 1.066* 10.174 371.2654 .026 -.373* 23.605 317.3893
0310 .142 .352 19.643 102.0136 .610 2.937* 31.686 334.3216 .173 1.132* 23.204 300.7278
0320 -.284 .040 11.027 46.19866 1.500 2.691* 19.977 435.2190 -.488 •937* 26.341 239.3845
0340 .085 -2.510* 56.698 281.9066 .463 4.042* 62.363 539.2060 .107 .996* 123.748 364.1546
0370 .574 .695* 19.926 116.5711 .510 -1.119* 29.084 457.8319 .328 4.249* 34.568 237.2572
0380 .112 -.481* 41.494 206.2796 .361 1.657* 32.239 282.4090 .183 2.044* 15.536 203.3677
0390 .174 -4.153* 43.361 125.0722 -.000 -3.571* 34.350 446.3519 .090 -1.439* 62.144 225.1691
0410 -.318 .086 6.352 62.82919 .494 10.753* 191.483 537.2322 -.318 2.542* 72.682 234.9616
0420 .166 .339* 15.660 104.2022 .221 -1.221* 37.362 472.4518 .204 .381* 21.216 162.7964
0440 .341 .752* 8.058 78.57576 .202 -6.006* 96.394 377.4753 .304 -.162 44.892 150.3698
0490 .181 -.188 7.226 94.58007 .121 -1.840* 11.757 399.1820 .129 1.189* 13.564 205.8417
* SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL
2988.7.1 Skewness coefficients
It was stated above that the expected value of 41i is
equal to zero for a normal distribution. The analysis of
results shows significant departures from normality as
shown by the computed sample values. From Table 8.12, 17,
29, and 26 companies show significant skewness for
transaction, bid, and ask returns respectively. Returns
are negatively skewed for 21, 22, and 10 companies
respectively. Returns for all other companies are
positively skewed. We may reject the normal distribution
as a description of the distribution of returns.
The results shown by the skewness statistic suggest that
the tails of the return distributions taper off in a
positive direction from the mean. These results therefore
suggest that the returns cluster around very small
values, although there are some very large observed
values.
8.7.2 Kurtosis coefficients
The analysis of results shows significant departures from
normality as indicated by the computed kurtosis
coefficient. Returns of all companies show significant
positive kurtosis and in all these are quite high. We may
reject the normal distribution as a description of the
distribution of returns.
299The results shown by the kurtosis coefficients indicate
that the returns of the Nairobi Stock Exchange are
leptokurtic and their distributions have thicker tails
than would be expected from a normal distribution.
8.7.3 Chi-square coefficients
q/ 2
The computed	 coefficients of are all greater than their
critical values. The hypothesis of normality is rejected
for all companies in the sample and for the three price
series. These results are consistent with those of the
skewness and kurtosis coefficients.
These types of results were observed by Jennergren and
Korsvold (1975), who noted that thinness was a
contributing factor. Where there are often several weeks
between price changes in a thin market, the data may
become contaminated through the mixing of different
distributions. This means that the populations of price
returns being used are not the same because of the
interval of trading weeks between transactions. We noted
in Section 6.7.3 that it is not only the difference in
transaction periods that might cause thick tails in the
distribution, but also the variations in times at which
the prices are recorded. Prices recorded at different
times should show a greater degree of dispersion than
those recorded at the same time because of the diversity
of the information that is likely to induce price changes.
300As explained earlier, the prices used in this study may
have occurred at any time during the week other than the
call-over date. The returns would therefore not be drawn
from a single homogeneous universe and if changes in
certain days in that week display higher dispersion than
on other days, it would be quite possible for the combined
distribution to be characterised by fat tails.
Another reason for the results not conforming with the
normal may be that the distribution of the returns is
non-stationary, so that the dispersion and even the
central tendency shifts periodically. The non-stationary
nature of returns is acknowledged because they are
economic time series [Granger and Morgenstern (1964)].
The results are consistent with those of Praetz and Wilson
(1980) on weekly series of share price and indices returns
in Australia. The rejection of the normality of the
distribution of share price returns is also consistent
with Fama (1965). The observed results indicate that the
empirical distribution of the returns are not consistent
with the normal distribution. Fama (1965) concluded that
the distribution of price returns conform to the Stable
Paretian distribution with characteristic exponent less
than 2. Praetz (1980) argues that returns conform better
to the Student t-distribution than to either the Normal or
Stable Paretian. Kon (1984) argues that the discrete
mixture of normal distributions model has more descriptive
validity than the Student model in explaining the
301observed significant kurtosis and skewness in the
distributions of returns.
302CHAPTER 9
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This is a study of the Nairobi Stock Exchange. The main
issue investigated was whether the behaviour of the price
series in the market is consistent with the weak-form of
the EMH. Performing the tests and understanding the
results required the carrying out of several integrated
tasks. These tasks were presented in chapters 2 to 8 of
this study.
It has been suggested that the issue of whether a market
is information-efficient or not is purely an empirical
one. Of particular interest at the weak-form efficiency
level is the need to provide more evidence that sheds
light on the nature of stock markets in developing
countries. Two reasons made this issue important. The
first was the need to challenge empirically the notion
held that the pricing systems in emerging stock markets
are, a priori, inefficient. Secondly, the literature
review had indicated that existing empirical evidence was
not overwhelming in its support of efficiency at weak-form
level. This was particularly relevant for the Nairobi
Stock Exchange because evidence provided by Parkinson
(1984) was not conclusive on the validity of the random
walk hypothesis on the NSE.
3039.1 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
This research attempted to answer the following question
with respect to the Nairobi Stock Exchange:
Are successive share price returns on the Nairobi
Stock Exchange independent random variables so
that price returns cannot be predicted from
historical price returns?
This study answered the question by testing the following
null hypotheses:
Hal: pk = 0, i.e. the correlation coefficient of
successive price returns on the NSE at lag k
is zero.
The hypothesis was tested by using serial correlation
coefficients. Results from the individual serial
correlation coefficients indicated that majority of them
were not statistically different from zero at the 5% level
of significance. These results were robust for both weekly
and monthly returns, and for all the three price series
studied. The few significant coefficients were seen to be
small in absolute value with very little explanatory
power.
304Ho2: P1 = P2 = 	 = pk = 0, i.e. the correlation
coefficients of successive price returns on
the NSE at all lags are zero.
The hypothesis was tested using two tests of significance
of serial correlation coefficients across all lags: a
binomial test and the Q-statistic test. Results based upon
correlation coefficients across all lags for each company
showed that in the majority of cases they were consistent
with the independence hypothesis. When the binomial test
was used, three companies showed significant results for
weekly bid returns. Further checks on these few companies
showed that the inconsistency with the independence
hypothesis might have resulted from the effects of extreme
values in returns. The Q-statistics gave results which
were consistent with the hypothesis of independence.
H03: The successive price returns of a company's
shares on the NSE are random.
The hypothesis was tested using the runs test. The results
of the runs test indicated that the price series of the
majority of companies are random. Some results
inconsistent with the randomness hypothesis were observed
for three and two companies for transaction and bid
returns respectively. This might be expected, given that
the runs tests may be affected by thin trading. The
305overall results were consistent with those of the
independence tests. The "acceptance" of these three null
hypotheses provides evidence of consistency with the weak
form of the EMH.
The relationship between the frequency of trading and the
size of weak-form efficiency tests statistics was examined
by testing the following null hypotheses:
Ho 4: The size of the sample serial correlation
coefficients of the price series on the NSE
are independent of the continuity in trading.
Ho - 5- The size of the absolute sample standardised
variables for the runs tests of the price
series on the NSE are independent of the
continuity in trading.
Spearman's rank correlation tests were performed between
the rankings of frequency of trading and the computed
values of the Q-statistic of the serial correlation
coefficients, and between the rankings of frequency of
trading and the Z-value of the runs test respectively.
Acceptance of the null hypothesis would suggest that no
relationship between frequency of trading and the size of
the sample statistics exists. The null hypothesis could
306not be rejected. The results are not supportive of the
held notion that small stock markets with infrequently
traded shares will demonstrate a relationship between the
size of weak-form test statistics and trading frequency.
Finally, the nature of the distribution of the successive
price returns of the NSE was examined by testing the
following null hypothesis:
Ho6- The returns on shares on the Nairobi Stock -
Exchange are characterised by the normal
distribution.
This hypothesis was examined by tests of normality based
on the sample skewness (4B 1 ), sample kurtosis (B2 ), and
the chi-square test of the goodness-of-fit. Acceptance of
the null hypothesis would imply that the normal
distribution is a good descriptor of the distribution of
returns on the NSE. The distributional evidence obtained
was against acceptance of the null hypothesis that the
returns of the price series of the NSE are normally
distributed. The evidence showed high levels of skewness
and leptokurtosis of the returns, and the chi-square test
indicated significant departure from normality for all
companies.
The independence of the NSE-Index was tested. It was
concluded that the index exhibited results not consistent
with the independence hypothesis. This was observed to be
307an expected result in an index which is constructed from
prices which do not occur simultaneously and which
includes securities which are thinly traded.
Overall, this study provides evidence that small markets,
such as the NSE, may provide empirical results consistent
with weak-form efficiency. The evidence holds for the NSE
irrespective of the nature of the price series used in
conducting the market study. These results do not
categorically say that the market is weak-form efficient,
but rather that the results do not contradict the
weak-form of the EMH. As has been the case with developed
markets, many more studies would have to be carried out
for this market covering longer time intervals, and using
a variety of methodologies, for a strong conclusion to be
made on the weak-form efficiency.
9.2 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
The current study will have implication for the following
interested parties:
9.2.1 Investors
The conclusions of this study imply that an investor is
not capable of consistently outperforming the market if he
uses the information contained in past prices of stocks.
The small amount of dependence noted in some stocks is of
no value when it is recognised that there are inherent
308costs of transacting in the market. This means that the
investor can accept the prices as given and direct his
attention to selecting a well diversified portfolio
instead of spending resources vainly to seek out mispriced
securities.
9.2.2 Regulator and stock market administrators
The results obtained from the analysis would signal that
for the majority of stocks the market should be taken to
be a reliable price setter at least to the extent of using
past price information. The key notion held by the
majority of stock market administrators and regulators is
that the market is not a reliable price setter and that it
is easy, unless they hold a tight reign of control, to
fool the market. The evidence provided here does not lend
any support to these beliefs. This means that they can
re-direct their efforts to the second major issue in this
market: the structural review necessary to increase the
level of trading and activity of the exchange. This will
improve the structural efficiency of the exchange and make
it more attractive to investors. Our reviews in Chapter 2
and 3 provided the basis on which this could be achieved.
9.2.3 Researchers
It has become apparent that carrying out research in
309developing countries may be a problematic exercise. There
are nevertheless rewards for this effort. One is the
knowledge that research methodology adopted from developed
markets may be adapted to emerging markets. The other is
the challenges raised to existing methodology by the
inherent problems of the research environment in
developing countries.
9.3 LIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH
Methodological limitations of weak-form efficiency studies
were addressed in Chapter 4. In addition to those
limitations the following require attention. The results
discussed and the conclusion drawn are based upon the
specific securities in the sample. Thus they can only be
generalised to and representative of, the firms sampled.
The interpretation of results of this research is
restricted by the nature of the data. We noticed that for
some companies the data used was thin. The results
obtained will have to be viewed in the light that, even
though they do not contradict the EMH, conclusions drawn
from them should be treated with caution.
The unavailability of data in computerised form meant that
setting up the database restricted the time and resources
available to carry out more detailed analyses than those
presented.
3109.4 FUTURE RESEARCH
From the analysis of this study we propose that future
research should include the following:
(a) Performance of more weak-form efficiency tests with
stronger or improved methodology. Where results are not
consistent with the EMH, studies should be replicated and
also performed over different time periods.
(b) The findings indicated that the nature of the signs of
the correlation coefficients in this market is unclear.
This should be established.
(c) Results on the distribution of returns on the NSE
suggested that they are not normally distributed. The
nature of the distribution underlying returns in this
market should be investigated.
(d) Research into higher levels of efficiency (semi-strong
and strong-form) should be undertaken.
(e) There should be attempts to undertake research that
establishes clearly the nature of the relationship between
economic and information efficiency.
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336APPENDIX 1 NAIROBI STOCK EXCHANGE: LIST OF QUOTED COMPANIES AS
AT 31 .12. 1988
COMPANY
CODE
	
NAME OF COMPANY
0010 African Tours and Hotels Ltd.
0020 A. Baumann & Co. Ltd.
0030 B.A.T. Kenya Ltd.
0040 Bamburi Portland Cement Co.Ltd.
0050 Barclays Bank Kenya Ltd.
0060 Brooke Bond Liebig Kenya Ltd.
0070 Car and General(Kenya)Ltd
0080 Carbacid Investments Ltd
0090 City Brewery Investments Ltd
0100 Consolidated Holdings Ltd
0110 CMC Holdings Ltd
0120 Credit Finance Corp Ltd
0130 Diamond Trust of Kenya Ltd
0140 Dunlop Kenya Ltd
0150 Eaagads Ltd
0160 E. A. Bag & Cordage Co.Ltd
0170 E. A. Breweries Ltd (Kenya Breweries Ltd.)
0180 E. A. Cables Ltd
0190 E. A. Oxygent Ltd
0200 E. A. Packaging Industries Ltd
0210 E. A. Portland Cement Co. Ltd
0220 E. A. Road Services Ltd
0230 Elliot's Bakery Ltd
0240 Express Kenya Ltd
0250 George Williamson Kenya Ltd
0260 Hutching Blamer Ltd
0270 1CDC Investment Co. Ltd
0280 Jubilee Insurance Co. Ltd
0290 Kakuzi Ltd.
0300 Kapchorua Tea Co. Ltd.
0310 Kenya National Mills Ltd.
0320 Kenya Oil Co. Ltd.
0330 Kenya Orchads Ltd.
0340 Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd
0350 Limuru Tea Co. Ltd.
0360 Marshalls(E.A) Ltd.
0370 Motor Mart Group Ltd.
0380 National Printer& Publisher
0390 National Industrial Credit
0400 01 Pejeta Ranching Ltd.
0410 Pan Africa Insurance Co. Ltd.
0420 Pearl Dry cleaners Ltd.
0430 Philips International ltd.
0440 Sasini Tea& coffee Ltd
0450 Sofar Investment Ltd
0460 Theta Group Ltd
0470 Timsales(A)
0480 Timsales(B)
0490 Unga Group
0500 Kenya Finance Corporation
0510 Kenya Commercial Bank
0520 Chancery Investments Ltd.
0530 Kenstock Ltd.
0540 Kenya Co-operative Cremaries Ltd.
0550 Kenya Hotels Ltd.
0560 Kenya Planters Co-operative Union
337APPENDIX 2 NAIROBI STOCK EXCHANGE: WEEKLY CALL-OVER SHEET
NAIROBI STOCK EXCHANGE: WEEKLY CALL-OVER SHEET 	 DATE:
COMPANY
CODE
0010
0020
0030
0040
0050
0060
0070
0080
0090
0100
0110
0120
0130
0140
0150
0160
0170
0180
0190
0200
0210
0220
0230
0240
0250
0260
0270
0280
0290
0300
0310
0320
0330
0340
NAME OF COMPANY
African Tours and Hotels Ltd
A. Baumann & Co. Ltd
B.A.T. Kenya Ltd
Bamburi Portland Cement Co.Ltd
Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd
Brooke Bond Liebig Kenya Ltd
Car and General(Kenya)Ltd
Carbacid Investments Ltd
City Brewery Investments Ltd
Consolidated Holdings Ltd
CMC Holdings Ltd
Credit Finance Corp Ltd
Diamond Trust of Kenya Ltd
Dunlop Kenya Ltd
Eaagads Ltd
E. A. Bag & Cordage Co.Ltd
E. A. Breweries Ltd
E. A. Cables Ltd
E. A. Oxygent Ltd
E. A. Packaging Industries Ltd
E. A. Portland Cement Co. Ltd
E. A. Road Services Ltd
Elliot's Bakery Ltd
Express Kenya Ltd
George Williamson Kenya Ltd
Hutching Biemer Ltd
ICDC Investment Co. Ltd
Jubilee Insurance Co. Ltd
Kakuzi Ltd.
Kipchorua Tea Co. Ltd.
Kenya National Mills Ltd.
Kenya Oil Co. Ltd.
Kenya Orchads Ltd.
Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd
PAR
VALUE
OF SHARE
Ord 20/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 10/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 10/-
Ord 10/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 51-
Ord -/50
Ord 1/25
338
BUYERS SELLERS	 SALES
Ord 5/-
Ord 10/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 10/-
Ord 20/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 20/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 5/-
Ord 4/-
Ord 5/-0350 Limuru Tea Co. Ltd. Ord	 20/-
0360 Marshalls(E.A) Ltd. Ord	 5/-
0370 Motor Mart Group Ltd. Ord	 5/-
0380 National Printer& Publisher Ord	 5/-
0390 National Industrial Credit Ord	 5/-
0400 Ol Pajeta Ranching Ltd. Ord	 4/"
0410 Pan Africa Insurance Co. Ltd. Ord	 5/-
0420 Pearl Dry cleaners Ltd. Ord	 5/-
0430 Philips Harrison & Crossifield Ord	 20/-
0440 Sasini Tea& coffee Ltd Ord	 5/-
0450 Sofar Investment Ltd Ord	 2.50
0460 Theta Group Ltd Ord	 if-
0470 Timsales(A) Ord	 20/-
0480 Timsales(B) Ord	 20/-
0490 Unga Group Ord	 5/-
0500 Kenya Finance Corporation Ord	 10/-
0510 Kenya Commercial Bank Ord	 5/-
0520 Chancery Investment Ltd. Ord	 10/-
0530 Kenstock Ltd Ord	 5/-
0540 Kenya Co-operative Cremaries Ord	 5/-
0550 Kenya Hotels Ltd. Ord	 5/-
0560 Kenya Planters Co-operative Ord	 5/-
339APPENDIX 3 NAIROBI STOCK EXCHANGE: DIVIDEND CODING SHEET
NAIROBI STOCK EXCHANGE: DIVIDEND COOING SHEET	 YEAR 19
COMPANY
CODE NAME OF COMPANY
0010 African Tours and Hotels Ltd
	
PAR WEEK	 WEEK	 WEEK	 WEEK
	
VALUE CODE	 DIVIDEND	 CODE	 DIVIDEND	 CODE	 DIVIDEND	 CODE
OF SHARE	 1	 2	 3
0020 A. Baumann & Co. Ltd
0030	 B.A.T. Kenya Ltd
0040 Bamburi Portland Cement Co.Ltd
0050 Baclays Bank	 Kenya Ltd
0060 Brooke Bond Liebig Kenya Ltd
0070 Car and General(Kenya)Ltd
0080 Carbacid Investments Ltd
0090 City Brewery Investments Ltd
0100	 Consolidated Holdings Ltd
0110	 CMC Holdings Ltd
0120	 Credit Finance Corp Ltd
0130 Diamond Trust of Kenya Ltd
0140 Dunlop Kenya Ltd
0150	 Eaagads Ltd
0160	 E. A. Bag & Cordage Co.Ltd
0170	 E. A. Breweries Ltd
0180	 E. A. Cables Ltd
0190	 E. A. Oxygent Ltd
0200	 E. A. Packaging Industries Ltd
0210	 E. A. Portland Cement Co. Ltd
0220 E. A. Road Services Ltd
0230	 Elliot's Bakery Ltd
0240 Express Kenya Ltd
0250	 George Williamson Kenya Ltd
0260	 Hutching Biemer Ltd
0270	 ICDC Investment Co. Ltd
0280	 Jubilee Insurance Co. Ltd
0290	 Kakuzi Ltd.
0300	 Kipchorua Tea Co. Ltd.
0310	 Kenya National Mills Ltd.
0320	 Kenya Oil Co. Ltd.
0330 Kenya Orchads Ltd.
0340	 Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd
0350	 Limuru Tea Co. Ltd.
3400360	 Marshalls(E.A) Ltd.
0370 Motor Mart Group Ltd.
0380	 National Printer& Publisher
0390	 National Industrial Credit
0400	 01 Pajeta Ranching Ltd.
0410	 Pan Africa Insurance Co. Ltd.
0420	 Pearl Dry cleaners Ltd.
0430	 Philips Harrison & Crossifield
0440	 Sasini Tea& coffee Ltd
0450	 Sofar Investment Ltd
0460 Theta Group Ltd
0470	 Timsales(A)
0480	 Timsales(B)
0490 Unga Group
0500 Kenya Finance Corporation
0510 Kenya Commercial Bank
0520	 Chancery Investment Ltd.
0530	 Kenstock Ltd.
0540 Kenya Co-operative Creameries
0550 Kenya Hotels Ltd.
0560	 Kenya Planters Co-operative
341APPENDIX 4:	 SERIAL	 CORRELATION	 COEFFICIENTS	 FOR TRANSACTION RETURNS OF THE NAIROBI STOCK EXCHANGE
(1979-1988) LAGS 1 to30 DIFFERENCING INTERVAL 1
LAG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0020 .0944 -.0326 -.0188 -.0765 -.0232 .0665 -.0921 -.1329 .0701 .0541
0030 -.0212 -.1231* -.0196 -.0806 -.0202 -.0424 .0686 -.0053 .0440 -.0291
0040 -.0130 .0382 -.0505 -.0940 -.0159 -.0915 -.0183 .0120 -.0079 -.0807
0060 -.0188 .0848 -.0755 .0033 .0224 -.0019 .0197 .0732 -.0134 -.0930
0070 .0123 .0286 -.0568 .0291 .0017 .0730 .0090 .0468 -.0093 .0436
0090 .0408 -.0190 -.1104 -.0128 -.0593 .0149 .0130 -.0530 .0329 -.0559
0100 -.0328 .0000 -.0211 .0721 .0537 -.0292 .0098 .0471 -.1565** .0092
0110 .0211 -.0033 .0162 .0357 -.0024 -.0556 -.0537 .0212 .0475 .0337
0120 .0683 .0665 .1239 .0123 -.0184 -.0315 -.1092 .0350 .0653 .0157
0130 -.0321 -.0085 -.0507 .0199 .0048 .0082 -.0439 .0147 .0162 .0416
0160 -.0993 .0335 -.0822 .0749 .0138 -.1015 .0355 -.0367 .0635 -.1153
0170 -.0040 -.0368 -.1748** -.0842 -.0325 -.0259 .0331 -.0022 .0652 .0124
0180 -.0168 -.0396 -.0366 -.1092 .0862 .0835 -.0465 -.0581 -.0715 .0218
0200 -.0293 -.0001 -.0061 -.0211 .0216 -.0285 .0671 -.0004 -.0193 .0188
0220 .0748 -.0819 .1429* -.0397 .0382 -.0554 .0045 -.0066 .1306 -.0105
0230 -.0365 -.0767 -.0422 .0157 .0902 .0560 -.1141 -.0869 -.0876 -.0241
0240 -.0568 -.0069 -.1451 .0555 .0507 -.0467 -.0623 -.0469 -.0359 -.0455
0250 -.0131 .0154 .0823 -.0225 -.0465 .1212 .0773 -.0520 .0366 .0455
0270 .0080 .0508 -.0478 .0205 -.0381 .0325 .0099 -.0025 .0243 .0245
0290 .0073 .0216 -.0858 .0717 .0977 -.1014 -.0135 -.0250 .0335 -.0044
0310 .0867 .0839 .0321 .0435 .0148 .0062 .0324 .0312 -.1060* .0258
0320 -.0483 .0562 .0889 .1054 -.0399 .1549* "-.0206 -.0231 .0497 -.0821
0340 .0710 .0677 -.0183 -.0363 -.0289 .0169 .0153 .0418 .0228 .0223
0370 .0986 .0895 .0937 .1458 .0238 -.0553 .0910 -.0988 .0099 -.0294
0380 -.0685 -.0949 .0102 .0666 .0417 -.0075 .0351 -.0964 -.0372 -.0306
0390 .0467 -.0838 .0295 -.0059 .0236 .0992 .0087 .0142 .0505 .0209
0410 .0540 -.0822 -.1228 .0427 .0587 -.0487 -.0532 -.0992 .0306 .1124
0420 -.0278 -.1593* -.0792 .0051 .0653 .1895* .0872 .0029 .0080 .1062
0440 -.0888 .0516 .0742 -.0122 -.1457* .0775 .0260 -.0209 .0287 -.0046
0490 .1273* -.0742 .0942 -.0336 .0590 -.0023 -.0763 .0044 -.0130 .0047
AVSCC .0068 -.0078 -.0152 .0064 .0099 .0092 -.0020 -.0167 .0091 .0003
INDEX .0809 .2072** .2158** .1055* .1457** .0695 .0705 .0645 .1067** .0783
+SCC 14 14 11 17 18 14 18 12 19 17
-SCC 16 16 19 13 12 16 12 18 11 13
No.5% 1 2 2 1 2 2
342APPENDIX 4: TRANSACTION RETURNS
	
LAG	 11	 12	 13	 14	 15	 16	 17	 18	 19	 20
	
0020	 -.0762	 -.0946	 -.0793	 .1103	 .0067	 -.1419	 -.0070	 -.0257	 .0520	 .0408
	
0030	 .0466	 .0378	 .0181	 -.0322	 .0222	 .0266	 -.0481	 -.0497	 -.0406	 -.0414
	
0040	 .0408	 -.0244	 -.0287	 -.1116	 .0086	 .0251	 -.0435	 -.0223	 .0751	 .0064
	
0060	 .0769	 -.0760	 .0313	 .0254	 -.0094	 .0787	 -.0811	 .0022	 -.0133	 .0851
	
0070	 -.0202	 .0619	 -.0745	 .0829	 .0608	 .0104	 .0063	 .0501	 .0715	 -.0234
	
0090	 -.1098	 -.0153	 -.0648	 .1261	 -.0238	 .0171	 .0551	 -.0257	 -.0298	 .0407
	
0100	 .0602	 .0689	 .0167	 .0854	 -.0814	 .0737	 -.0292	 .0561	 -.0459	 -.0642
	
0110	 -.0542	 -.0135	 .0131	 .0392	 .0668	 -.0921	 -.0171	 .0344	 .0072	 -.0031
	
0120	 .0707	 -.0018	 .1392	 -.0805	 -.0069	 .0964	 -.1258	 -.0287	 .1069	 -.0295
	
0130	 -.0085	 .0260	 -.0194	 -.0145	 .0059	 .0817	 -.0504	 -.0082	 -.0265	 .0116
	
0160	 .1140	 .0034	 -.1003	 -.0286	 .0584	 -.0036	 -.0056	 .0417	 .0151	 -.0712
	
0170	 .0664	 .0427	 .0027	 .0716	 .0771	 .0433	 .0075	 .0540	 .0086	 .0128
	
0180	 -.0590	 -.0409	 .0401	 .0172	 .0824	 .0170	 .1026	 -.1004	 -.0658	 .0439
	
0200	 -.0222	 -.0893	 .0324	 .0488	 -.0088	 .0394	 .0402	 -.1026	 .0743	 -.1402*
	
0220	 -.0178	 -.0029	 -.0075	 -.0776	 .0410	 -.0247	 .1032	 -.0175	 -.0383	 -.0984
	
0230	 .0014	 -.0245	 .0221	 -.0353	 -.0102	 .0087	 .0333	 .0241	 .1433	 .0896
	
0240	 -.1206	 -.0402	 .0268	 .0169	 .1807*	 .0844	 -.0822	 .0677	 -.0702	 .0030
	
0250	 -.0066	 .0163	 -.0219	 -.0292	 .0069	 .0108	 .1289	 .0105	 -.1347*	 -.0691
	
0270	 -.0300	 .0118	 .0151	 .0258	 -.0179	 -.0104	 .0462	 -.0177	 .0105	 .0004 0290	 -.0402	 .0190	 -.0052	 .0120	 -.0336	 .0510	 -.0446	 -.0305	 -.0876	 .0619 0310	 -.0142	 .0275	 -.0308	 -.0143	 -.0003	 .0122	 -.0868	 .0802	 -.0326	 -.0120 0320	 .1274	 .0172	 .0154	 .0025	 -.1407	 -.0318	 -.0152	 -.1311	 -.1051	 -.0199 0340	 -.0292	 .0871	 -.0084	 .0282	 -.0321	 .0390	 .0471	 -.0689	 .0406	 .0130 0370	 .0329	 -.0647	 -.0612	 -.0545	 -.1131	 -.0942	 -.1318	 .0231	 -.0012	 .1020 0380	 .0452	 .0336	 -.0055	 .0526	 -.0916	 -.1350*	 .0508	 .1187*	 .0207	 -.0795 0390	 -.0054	 .1341*	 .0748	 .0229	 -.0294	 -.0383	 .0390	 -.0154	 -.0240	 .0006 0410	 -.0964	 .0525	 -.1214	 -.0397	 .0875	 .1133	 -.0015	 .0132	 -.0314	 -.0482 0420	 -.0097	 .0284	 -.0451	 .0221	 -.0508	 -.0180	 .1137	 .0133	 -.0531	 -.0750 0440	 .0102	 .0199	 -.1204	 .0495	 .0777	 .0055	 .0107	 -.1410	 -.0175	 -.0042 0490	 .0016	 .0469	 -.0417	 .0656	 .1045	 -.0259	 .0184	 -.0104	 .0197	 -.0304 AVSC	 -.0009	 .0082	 -.0129	 .0129	 .0079	 .0073	 .0011	 -.0069	 -.0057	 -.0099
INDEX	 .0345	 .0815	 .0634	 .0474	 .1481**	 .0861	 .1060*	 .0882*	 .0522	 .0878*
+SCC	 13	 18	 13	 19	 15	 19	 15	 14	 13	 14
-SCC	 17	 12	 17	 11	 1511	 15	 16	 17	 16
N01%	 -
-	 -	 - N05%	 1	
1	 1	 1	 1	 1
	 =	
343APPENDIX 4: TRANSACTION RETURNS
LAG 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
0020 -.0050 -.1030 -.0954 -.0411 .0668 -.0197 -.0622 .0170 .0447 .1209
0030 -.0500 .0469 .0083 .0106 .0011 -.0026 .0387 -.0208 .0202 .0430
0040 .1013 -.0057 -.0434 -.0951 .1895** .0185 -.1018 .0313 -.0114 .0283
0060 -.0866 -.0188 .0155 .0379 -.0137 .0234 .0859 -.0896 -.0234 .0700
0070 .0034 -.0204 .0135 .0585 .0821 .0473 -.0902 -.0485 .1027 .0740
0090 -.0005 -.1332 -.0128 -.0758 -.0826 .0451 .1318 -.0758 .0689 -.0316
0100 -.0898 .0854 -.0258 -.0509 -.0116 .0758 .0100 .0281 .0389 .0673
0110 .0557 -.1215* -.0121 .0784 .0161 -.0997 .0782 -.0165 .1148* -.0073
0120 -.0648 -.0969 .0646 -.0267 .0956 .0139 .0263 -.0464 -.0299 .0173
0130 -.0367 .0220 -.0146 .0721 -.0069 .0387 .0028 -.0041 -.0953 .0487
0160 -.0221 .0511 -.0963 .0789 .0318 .0134 -.0318 -.0307 .0492 -.0848
0170 .0135 -.0033 .0069 .0027 .0482 .0104 -.0149 .0014 .0056 -.0284
0180 -.0910 -.0458 .0290 .0398 .0174 .0752 .0122 -.0665 -.0087 -.0108
0200 .1041 -.0993 .0559 .0908 -.0321 -.0487 -.1083 .0764 -.0747 -.0120
0220 .0357 .0335 -.0205 -.0344 -.0225 -.0395 .0973 .0447 -.0702 -.0250
0230 -.0848 -.0392 .1305 -.0905 .0346 -.1199 -.0797 -.0482 .0601 -.0520
0240 .1177 .0035 -.1139 -.0153 -.1180 -.0088 -.0508 .1116 -.0188 -.0232
0250 .0492 .1183 .0114 -.0048 -.0224 .0278 .0923 .0289 .1568* -.0637
0270 .0129 .0039 .0527 -.0705 .0022 -.0279 .0759 .0694 -.1228* -.0051
0290 .0506 .0376 -.0369 .0557 -.0779 -.0275 .0332 .0407 -.0738 .0181
0310 .0224 .0346 -.0354 -.0284 -.0330 .0105 .0144 .0556 -.0126 -.0617
0320 -.1567* -.0016 .0785 .1178 -.0672 -.1113 .0245 .0111 -.0335 -.0079
0340 .0337 .0036 .0327 .1111* -.0697 .0189 -.0549 .0427 -.0029 -.0389
0370 .0506 .1358 .0055 .0331 -.0324 -.1384 -.0705 .0875 .0151 -.1401
0380 -.0182 .0097 -.0422 .0761 .0564 .0244 -.0503 -.0239 .0492 -.0837
0390 .0258 .0355 .0093 -.0593 -.0041 -.1038 .0296 -.0704 -.0720 -.0767
0410 -.1185 .0829 -.0034 -.0391 -.0214 -.0345 -.0038 .0464 -.0045 -.0979
0420 -.0054 .1101 .1706* .0367 -.0087 -.0064 .0044 -.0739 .0128 -.1359
0440 .0127 .0559 .0083 .1010 .0675 -.0522 .0758 -.0833 -.0517 -.0443
0490 .0264 -.0590 -.0167 .0135 -.0133 .1184 -.0672 .0122 .0284 -.0402
AVSCc -.0038 .0041 .0041 .0128 .0024 -.0093 .0016 .0003 .0020 -.0195 INDEX .0360 -.0063 .0298 .0474 .0897* .0570 .0417 .0435 .0529 .0778 +SCC 16 17 16 17 13 15 17 16 14 9 -sCC
No1%
14 13
-
14
-
13
-
17
1
15 13 14
-
16
.
21
.
N05% 1 1 1 1 1 3
a
344APPENDIX 5:	 SERIAL	 CORRELATION	 COEFFICIENTS	 FOR BID RETURNS OF THE NAIROBI STOCK EXCHANGE
(1979-1988) LAGS 1 to30 DIFFERENCING INTERVAL 1
LAG
	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 a	 9	 10
0020	 -.0026	 -.0176	 -.0162	 .0192	 -.0108	 -.0517	 -.0058	 -.0191	 .0327	 -.0171
0030	 -.0577	 -.0625	 .0410	 .0996*	 .0767	 -.0078	 -.0055	 -.0086	 -.0040	 .0047
0040	 -.0525	 -.0238	 -.0618	 .0534	 -.1074*	 .0077	 .0116	 -.0553	 .0072	 -.0036
0060	 .0204	 -.1290**	 -.0535	 -.0198	 -.0034	 -.0171	 -.0023	 -.0070	 .0052	 -.0101
0070	 -.0665	 -.0484	 .0351	 -.0274	 -.0604	 -.0369	 .0008	 .0134	 .0077	 .0513
0090	 -.0397	 -.0900*	 -.0175	 -.0398	 .0148	 -.0183	 .0282	 .0149	 .0185	 .0038
0100	 -.0983*	 -.0118	 -.0052	 -.0127	 -.0009	 -.0020	 .0032	 -.0024	 -.0015	 -.0003
0110	 -.0282	 -.0002	 -.0019	 -.0056	 -.0077	 .0331	 .0135	 -.0001	 .0181	 .0169
0120	 -.0323	 -.0070	 -.0162	 -.0215	 .0209	 -.0054	 .0025	 .0061	 .0268	 -.0287
0130	 -.0208	 -.0376	 -.0069	 -.0032	 .0084	 -.0048	 -.0031	 .0025	 -.0021	 .0103
0160	 -.0406	 -.0466	 -.0269	 .0118	 .0112	 .0032	 .0225	 .0350	 -.0065	 -.0471
0170	 -.0282	 .0260	 .0051	 -.0036	 .0113	 -.0236	 .0669	 -.0143	 -.0050	 -.0061
0180	 -.0461	 -.0227	 -.0514	 .0193	 -.0498	 -.0163	 .0228	 .0074	 -.0010	 .0216
0200	 -.0050	 -.0099	 -.0175	 .0110	 -.0509	 .0103	 -.0128	 .0199	 .0004	 .0226
0220	 -.0679	 -.0023	 .0208	 .0246	 -.0187	 .0011	 .0158	 .0122	 .0312	 .0106
0230	 .0034	 -.0105	 -.0348	 -.0065	 -.0184	 .0057	 -.0004	 -.0183	 -.0449	 .0005
0240	 -.0230	 -.0108	 .0142	 .0204	 -.0032	 .0012	 -.0056	 .0071	 -.0017	 .0115
0250	 .0394	 .0613	 .0514	 -.0714	 -.0389	 -.0403	 .0039	 -.0703	 -.1612**	 -.1661**
0270	 -.0306	 -.0221	 -.0212	 .0036	 -.0034	 .0084	 -.0330	 .0047	 -.0201	 -.0419
0290	 .0586	 -.0965*	 -.0424	 -.0428	 -.0836	 -.0391	 -.0103	 -.0724	 -.0081	 .0028
0310	 -.0415	 -.0053	 -.0126	 -.0118	 -.0099	 -.0243	 -.0092	 -.0529	 .0344	 -.0129
0320	 -.0033	 -.0478	 -.0375	 .0027	 -.0604	 -.0315	 .0151	 .0081	 -.0173	 -.0237
0340	 -.0035	 -.0180	 -.0380	 -.0139	 -.0194	 -.0102	 -.0055	 -.0126	 -.0088	 -.0426
0370	 -.0712	 -.0662	 .0155	 .0181	 -.0512	 -.1196*	 -.0136	 -.0259	 .0809	 -.0208
0380	 -.0877*	 .0979*	 .0106	 -.0571	 .0295	 .0330	 -.0464	 -.0401	 .0344	 .0480
0390	 -.0084	 -.0927*	 .0134	 .0988*	 -.1074*	 .0357	 -.1268*	 .0230	 -.1345*	 -.1542**
0410	 -.0118	 .0441	 -.0473	 -.0424	 .0244	 -.0164	 -.0310	 .0022	 -.0167	 .0086
0420	 -.0156	 -.0259	 -.0061	 .0490	 .0458	 -.0216	 -.0048	 .0291	 -.0061	 -.0065
0440	 -.0117	 -.0269	 -.0693	 .0031	 .0223	 .0448	 -.0289	 .1101*	 -.0486	 -.0041
0490	 .0099	 .0357	 .0113	 -.0323	 -.0085	 .0181	 .0442	 .0815	 .0463	 .0235
	
AVSCC -.0257	 -.0221	 -.0122	 -.0008	 -.0150	 -.0095	 -.0031	 -.0007	 -.0047	 -.0116
INDEX	 .0809	 .2072**	 .2158**	 .1055*	 .1457**	 .0695	 .0705	 .0645	 .1067**	 .0783
+SCC	 5	 5	 10	 14	 10	 12	 13	 16	 13	 14
-SCC	 25	 25	 20	 16	 20	 18	 17	 14	 17	 16
N01%	 .	 1	 -	 -	 1	 1	 2
N05%	 2	 5	 2	 2	 1	 1	 1	 2	 2
345APPENDIX 5: BID RETURNS
13 14 16 17 18 19 20
	.0167 	 -.0145	 .0327
	
-.0021	 -.0052	 .0148
	
-.1299**	 -.0521	 -.0114
	
-.0325	 -.0693	 .0579
	
.0078	 .0016	 .0024
	
.0059	 -.0188	 .0050
	
.0168	 -.0053	 .0710
	
.0090	 .0372	 .0299
	
-.0778	 -.0502	 -.0093
	
-.0033	 -.0076	 .0057
	
-.0585	 .0726	 .0047
	
-.0014	 -.0179	 -.0905*
	
.0221	 -.0016	 -.0932*
	
.0142	 -.0081	 -.0378
	
.0027	 .0912*	 -.0645
	
.0019	 .0079	 .0203
	
-.0701	 -.1224**	 -.0064
	
-.0154	 -.0637	 -.1020*
	
-.0035	 -.0213	 .0512
	
-.0582	 -.0618	 -.0958*
	
-.0658	 -.0022	 .0108
	
-.0561	 -.0340	 -.0774
	
.1491**	 .0012	 -.0061
	
-.0050	 .0027	 -.0096
	
-.0404	 .0248	 -.0053
	
.0747	 -.0242	 .0472
	
-.0499	 -.0354	 -.0476
	
-.0226	 .0056	 -.0265
	
-.0318	 -.0027	 -.0382
	
-.0089	 .0189	 .0199
-.0118
.0522
10
20
2
-.0137
.0882*
11
19
2
2
-.0118
.0878*
14
16
4
	
-.0025	 -.0023	 -.0087	 -.0215
	
.0815	 .0634	 .0474	 .1481**
	
13	 15	 15	 13
	
17	 15	 15	 17
	
-	 2	 1
	
2	 2
	
-.0055	
-.0163
	
.0861	
.1060*
	
15
	
12
	
15
	
18
2
	
1
	
3
LAG	 11
15
0020	 -.0320	 .0058	 -.0694	 .0338	 .0023
0030	 .0040	 -.0100	 -.0112	 -.0081	 .0024
0040	 .0305	 .0052	 .0283	 .0752	 -.0258
0060	 .0086	 -.0074	 -.0325	 .0077	 -.0146
0070	 -.0506	 -.0296	 .0030	 .0005	 -.0240
0090	 -.0005	 .0206	 .0124	 -.0220	 .0084
0100	 .0024	 .0282	 .0865	 -.1446**	 .0101
0110	 .0030	 -.0009	 .0053	 .0030	 .0022
0120	 .0086	 .0303	 .0186	 .0483	 .0068
0130	 -.0063	 -.0161	 -.0210	 .0014	 .0062
0160	 -.0119	 .0269	 .0482	 .0555	 -.0536
0170	 .0191	 -.0065	 .0169	 -.0017	 .0021
0180	 -.0196	 .0324	 -.0016	 -.0463	 -.0854
0200	 -.0360	 -.0043	 -.0208	 -.0461	 .0640
0220	 .0227	 -.0222	 -.0564	 .0300	 .0055
0230	 -.0233	 .0050	 .0051	 -.0204	 -.0002
0240	 -.0655	 -.0043	 -.0406	 -.2057**	 -.1003*
0250	 -.0340	 .0133	 .0034	 .0318	 -.0268
0270	 -.0391	 -.0526	 -.0269	 -.0379	 -.0147
0290	 -.0138	 .0164	 -.0206	 .0503	 -.0448
0310	 -.0530	 -.0145	 -.0079	 -.0335	 .0151
0320	 -.0341	 -.0901	 -.0653	 -.0459	 -.0719
0340	 .0041	 -.0095	 .0533	 .0246	 .0034
0370	 .0153	 -.0194	 .0084	 -.0283	 -.0628
0380	 -.0097	 -.0222	 -.0378	 .0447	 -.0252
0390	 -.0683	 .0402	 .0151	 -.0003	 .0073
0410	 -.0536	 -.0302	 -.0173	 -.0459	 -.0294
0420	 -.0074	 .0212	 -.0108	 .0403	 -.1245**
0440	 .0269	 -.0047	 .0494	 -.0253	 -.0029
0490	 .0430	 .0253	 .0223	 .0052	 -.0750
AVSCC -.0123
INDEX	 .0345
+SCC	 12
-SCC	 18
NO1X
NO5X
12
	
-.0018	 .0026
	
.0023	 -.0454
	
.0243	 .0964*
	
.0232	 .0044
	
.0024	 .0093
	
-.0010	 .0027
	
.0007	 -.0124
	
.0023	 .0287
	
-.0321	 -.0362
	
-.0201	 -.0258
	
-.0665	 .0153
	
-.0477	 -.0637
	
-.0351	 .0411
	
.0676	 -.0026
	
.0177	 .0281
	
.0097	 -.0035
	
-.0273	 -.1337**
	
-.0033	 -.0501
	
.0000	 .0246
	
-.0535	 -.0630
-.0460	 .0393
.0007	 -.0745
-.0019	 .0023
-.0899	 -.0015
. 0108	 -.0033
. 1055*	 -.1924**
-.0415	 -.0619
-.0002	 -.0040
.0188	 -.0020
.0182	 -.0082
346APPENDIX 5: BID	 RETURNS
LAG	 21	 22	 23	 24	 25	 26	 27	 28	 29	 30
0020	 -.1253**	 -.0802	 -.0274	 -.0062	 .0031	 -.0191	 .0067	 .0075	 -.0516	 -.0344
0030	 -.0076	 .0022	 .0159	 .0051	 .0154	 .0043	 .0235	 .0127	 .0294	 .0160
0040	 -.0456	 -.0236	 .0640	 .0623	 .0095	 .0493	 .0331	 -.0209	 .0038	 .0229
0060	 -.0482	 -.0813	 -.0142	 .0095	 -.0020	 .0036	 -.0091	 .0066	 .0137	 -.0344
0070	 -.0218	 .0071	 .0013	 -.0002	 .0123	 .0028	 .0107	 -.0656	 .0042	 -.0001
0090	 .0009	 .0011	 .0536	 .0153	 .0105	 -.0987*	 .0479	 .0155	 -.0157	 -.0010
0100	 .0285	 .0187	 .0278	 -.0001	 .0023	 .0162	 -.0068	 .1001	 -.0023	 -.0061
0110	 .0450	 .0219	 .0252	 -.0006	 -.0158	 .0171	 -.0066	 .0039	 .0030	 .0245
0120	 .0181	 -.0240	 .0281	 -.0007	 .0190	 -.0102	 -.0292	 -.0297	 .0011	 .0340
0130	 -.0017	 .0106	 .0106	 .0023	 -.0061	 -.0001	 .0309	 -.0318	 -.0303	 .0038
0160	 .0146	 .0189	 .0400	 -.0190	 -.0196	 .0026	 .0049	 -.0236	 -.1143*	 .0738
0170	 .0746	 -.0208	 -.0182	 -.0022	 .0285	 .0082	 .0208	 -.0193	 -.0092	 .0058
0180	 -.1405**	 -.1070*	 .0098	 .0300	 -.0547	 .0067	 .0535	 .0159	 .0285	 .0184
0200	 -.0787	 -.0534	 -.0268	 .0098	 .0154	 -.0247	 .0176	 .0017	 -.0505	 .0607
0220	 .0194	 .0306	 .0015	 .0104	 .0029	 -.0011	 -.0190	 .0213	 .0032	 .0101
0230	 .0178	 .0252	 .0858	 -.0081	 -.0054	 .0239	 .0069	 -.0758	 .0140	 .0028
0240	 -.0208	 .0387	 -.0160	 -.0288	 -.0088	 .0166	 .0619	 .0210	 -.0037	 -.0167
0250	 -.0513	 -.0040	 -.0252	 -.0020	 -.0159	 -.0123	 -.0117	 .0110	 -.0026	 .0049
0270	 .0340	 -.0283	 -.0069	 -.0900*	 -.0983*	 -.0784	 -.0737	 -.0276	 -.0168	 -.0446
0290	 -.0311	 -.0017	 -.0407	 -.0252	 -.0103	 -.0181	 .0347	 .0572	 .0224	 -.0267
0310	 .0034	 .0027	 -.0634	 -.0120	 -.0820	 -.0128	 -.0142	 -.0134	 -.0486	 -.0265
0320	 -.0431	 -.0669	 -.0371	 -.0024	 -.0075	 .0607	 .0042	 .0517	 .0815	 .0355
0340	 .0023	 -.0051	 -.0443	 -.0123	 -.0170	 -.0105	 -.0446	 -.0102	 -.0183	 -.0036
0370	 -.0048	 -.0164	 -.0113	 .0321	 .0390	 -.0184	 .0984*	 -.1077*	 -.1025*	 -.0284
0380	 .0161	 .0033	 .0665	 -.0329	 .0613	 .0149	 .0268	 -.0425	 .0260	 .0455
0390	 -.0010	 .0008	 -.0595	 .0172	 .0000	 .0023	 .0018	 .0610	 -.0578	 -.0002
0410	 .0812	 -.0478	 -.0334	 -.0500	 -.0177	 -.0707	 -.0387	 -.0555	 -.0421	 -.0482
0420	 -.0046	 -.0034	 .0457	 -.0080	 .0219	 .0507	 .0289	 -.0076	 -.0207	 -.1641**
0440	 -.0028	 .0019	 .0066	 .0261	 .0903*	 -.0641	 -.0128	 .0396	 -.0022	 .0022
0490	 .0198	 -.0332	 -.0361	 -.0372	 -.0073	 -.0077	 .0341	 .0074	 .0197	 -.0065
AVSCC	 .0084	 -.0138	 .0007	 -.0039	 -.0012	 -.0056	 .0094	 -.0032	 -.0113	 -.0027
INDEX	 .0360	 -.0063	 .0298	 .0474	 .0897*	 .0570	 .0417	 .0435	 .0529	 .0778
+SCC	 14	 14	 15	 11	 15	 15	 19	 16	 13	 15
-SCC	 16	 16	 15	 19	 15	 15	 11	 14	 17	 15
N01%	 2	 1
N05%	 2	 1	 1	 2	 1	 1	 1	 2	 1
347APPENDIX 6:	 SERIAL	 CORRELATION	 COEFFICIENTS	 FOR ASK RETURNS OF THE NAIROBI STOCK EXCHANGE
(1979-1988) LAGS 1 to30 DIFFERENCING INTERVAL 1
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
0020	 .0789	 .0599	 .0013	 .0315	 .1168*	 .0290	 .0453	 -.0188	 .0556	 .0323
0030	 .0277	 .0180	 .0427	 .0704	 .1681*	 .1863*	 .1460	 -.0097	 .1465	 .0996
0040	 .0140	 -.0401	 -.0319	 -.0092	 -.0158	 -.0231	 .0120	 .0087	 -.0194	 -.0161
0060	 .0693	 .0228	 -.0241	 .0453	 .0279	 -.0077	 -.0118	 .0269	 -.0321	 -.0459
0070	 .0555	 .0346	 .0809	 .0497	 -.0380	 -.0269	 .0063	 .0320	 -.0843	 -.0183
0090	 .0803	 .0355	 .1220	 .1562	 .2079	 .0084	 .0455	 -.1891	 -.1770	 -.2504
0100	 .0225	 .0512	 .0475	 .0377	 .0203	 .0730	 .0211	 -.0025	 .0260	 -.0553
0110	 .0486	 .0767	 .1118*	 -.0039	 .0281	 .0853	 .0139	 .0033	 -.0587	 .0031
	
0120 -.0087	 .0305	 .0610	 .0500	 .0601	 .0455	 -.0184	 .0099	 .0061	 .0301
	
0130 -.0524	 -.0274	 .0110	 .0530	 .0510	 -.0062	 .0184	 •1545*	 .0318	 -.1104
0160	 .0285	 .0219	 -.0220	 .0109	 .0282	 .0141	 .0501	 -.0480	 -.0397	 .0579
0170	 .0305	 .0304	 .0361	 -.0021	 .0422	 .0529	 .0237	 .0199	 .0473	 .1050*
0180	 .0284	 .0301	 -.0222	 -.0022	 -.0188	 -.0176	 -.1069	 -.1171	 -.0322	 -.0815
	
0200 -.0200	 -.0212	 -.0429	 -.0642	 -.0399	 .0140	 .0481	 .0374	 -.0130	 -.0390
	
0220 -.0114	 -.0613	 .0021	 -.0477	 -.0893	 .0463	 .0166	 .0394	 -.0683	 -.0057
0230	 .0232	 -.0017	 -.0040	 .0102	 .0915	 .1346	 .1367	 .0755	 -.0067	 .0538
	
0240 -.0175	 .0024	 .0290	 .0236	 -.0274	 .0424	 .0132	 -.0375	 -.0399	 -.0017
	
0250 -.0789	 .0422	 .0164	 -.0107	 .1167*	 -.0168	 .0018	 .0522	 .0404	 .0046
0270	 .0938	 .0397	 .0262	 .0307	 .0818	 .1426*	 .0688	 -.0039	 .0402	 .0966
0290	 .0567	 -.0073	 .0059	 .0546	 .0049	 -.0092	 .0776	 .0137	 .0452	 .0360
0310	 .0054	 .0411	 .0336	 .0189	 .0503	 .0178	 -.0041	 .0089	 -.0193	 .0251
	
0320 -.0884	 -.0300	 .0030	 -.0154	 .0358	 .0118	 -.0445	 -.0386	 -.0297	 -.0442
0340	 .1256*	 .0193	 .0177	 .0572	 -.0562	 .1486*	 .0638	 .0381	 .0430	 .0560
0370	 .0818	 .0852	 .0865	 .0060	 .0048	 .0069	 .0411	 .0675	 .0260	 .0055
	
0380 -.0494	 .0379	 .0764	 .0645	 .0060	 .0618	 .0722	 .0480	 .0276	 .0751
0390	 .0225	 .0132	 .0275	 .0111	 .1132	 .0072	 -.0572	 .0327	 .0068	 .0140
	
0410 -.0750	 .0726	 .0851	 .0607	 .0538	 .0765	 -.0637	 .0609	 .0313	 .0205
0420	 .0062	 -.1057	 -.0239	 .0398	 -.0192	 .0074	 .0668	 .0923	 .0336	 -.0117
	
0440 -.0051	 .1560*	 .1401	 .0359	 .0471	 .0458	 .0917	 -.1069	 -.0773	 .0242
	
0490 -.0166	 -.0021	 .0182	 -.0086	 -.0037	 .0145	 .0943	 .0721	 .0864	 .0795
,
AVSCC .0159	 .0208	 .0304	 .0251	 .0349	 .0388	 .0289	 .0107	 -.0001	 .0046
INDEX .0809	 .2072**	 .2158**	 .1055*	 .1457**	 .0695	 .0705	 .0645	 .1067**	 .0783
+5CC	 19	 21	 23	 21	 21	 23	 23	 20	 16	 18
-SCC	 11	 9	 7	 9	 9	 7	 7	 10	 14	 12
N01%	 -	 -
N05%	 1	 1	 1	 3	 3	 1	 1
1=	 ==
348APPENDIX 6: ASK RETURNS
LAG	 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
0020	 .0024 -.0139 -.0283 -.0401 -.0102 -.0141 -.0246 .0061 .0072 -.0309
0030	 .0809 .0921 .0234 .0745 .1697* .0385 -.0468 .0234 .0055 -.0237
0040	 .0697 -.0017 .0389 -.0207 -.0248 .0052 -.0765 .0516 -.0180 -.0067
0060	 -.0054 .0600 .0978 .0217 -.0219 .0299 .0479 .0755 .1045 .0172
0070	 .0140 .0256 -.0836 -.0542 -.0043 .0354 .0759 .0729 .0010 .0820
0090	 -.0343 .0474 .1023 .0958 .1550 .0987 .0420 -.0410 -.0345 .0677
0100	 .0256 -.0141 .0384 .0241 .0092 .0441 -.0216 -.0145 .0308 .0148
0110	 .0082 -.0218 .0385 -.0507 -.0267 -.0330 -.0132 -.0007 -.0060 -.0206
0120	 .0116 .0656 .0418 .0392 -.0449 .0446 .0496 .0427 .0155 -.1179
0130	 -.0511 .0433 .0375 .0220 -.0179 .0005 .0277 -.0221 .0283 .0337
0160	 -.0201 .0049 -.0030 .0292 .0175 .0241 -.0110 .0230 -.0537 -.0955*
0170	 .0145 -.0052 .0417 .0781 .0040 .0765 -.0171 .0382 .0375 -.0117
0180	 -.0201 .0145 -.0073 .1605 .0763 .0709 .0997 .1370 .0783 .0076
0200	 -.0388 -.0658 -.0164 -.0012 .0234 -.0554 -.0176 .0432 .0227 .0163
0220	 .0515 .0131 .0175 -.0127 -.0395 -.0252 -.0394 -.0607 -.0287 .0909
0230	 .1883* .1611* -.0035 .0365 .0341 -.0581 .0906 .0053 -.0270 -.0377
0240	 -.0330 -.0163 -.0125 .0193 -.0470 -.0211 -.0439 -.0184 -.0092 -.0196
0250	 .0141 -.0586 -.0379 .0060 .0346 -.0167 -.0585 -.0621 -.0020 .0147
0270	 .0343 .0618 .0342 .0960 .0692 .1026 .1253* .0717 -.0810 _.0231
0290	 .1505** .0451 .0016 -.0526 -.0757 -.0779 -.0124 -.0784 -.0688 -.0235
0310	 -.0131 -.0383 .0027 -.0060 .0866 .0312 -.0538 .1056* -.0567 -.0275
0320	 .0012 -.0082 .0211 .0003 -.0206 .0384 -.0306 -.0094 -.0684 .0036
0340	 .0529 .0569 .0367 .0388 .0531 -.0678 .0465 .0438 .0241 .0275
0370	 .0225 -.0311 .0013 .0140 -.0578 -.0343 -.0250 -.0464 -.0274 -.0230
0380	 .0206 -.0116 .0606 .0448 .0637 .0806 .0834 .0094 .0141 .0371
0390	 .0053 .0136 .0010 .0925 -.1312 .0214 -.0166 .0882 -.0651 -.0001
0410	 .0237 .0029 .0473 .0110 .0459 .0301 .0108 .0180 .0077 .0234
0420	 .0296 -.0194 .0039 .0115 .0587 .0103 .0254 .0427 .0257 .0079
0440	 .0571 .1146 -.0007 -.0103 .0317 -.0021 -.0036 -.0153 -.0053 -.0035
0490	 .0678 .1030 -.0002 .0173 .0109 .0100 .0426 -.0124 .0359 .0524
AVSCC	 .0243 .0207 .0165 .0228 .0140 .0129 .0085 .0172 -.0038 .0011 INDEX	 .0345 .0815 .0634 .0474 .1481** .0861 .1060* .0882* .0522 .0878* +SCC	 22 17 20 21 17 19 13 18 15 15 -SCC	 8
N01%	 1
13
•
10 9 13 11
-
17
.
12
.
15 15
N05%	 2 1 1 1 1 1
349APPENDIX 6: ASK RETURNS
LAG	 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
0020	 -.0213 -.0185 -.0808 -.0473 -.0184 -.0469 -.0085 .0159 -.0060 -.0430
0030	 .0125 -.0279 .0268 .0855 -.0251 -.0046 .0439 -.0368 -.0582 -.0587
0040	 .0014 .0099 -.0053 .0149 .0341 -.0634 .0118 .0270 -.0053 -.0105
0060	 .0748 -.0212 .0369 .0040 .0624 .1322* .0583 -.0348 -.0186 -.0396
0070	 .0650 .0879 .0026 .0192 -.0120 .0493 -.0021 .0837 .0558 .0478
0090	 -.0449 .0381 -.1739 .0334 .1349 .1334 .2331 .1769 .1263 .1549
0100	 .0086 .0419 .0203 -.0730 -.0628 -.0627 .0320 -.0554 -.0312 .0593
0110	 -.0230 -.0519 .0165 -.0008 .0633 .0437 -.0128 .0100 -.0434 -.0309
0120	 -.0334 .0625 .0002 -.0826 -.0518 .0201 .0392 .0745 .0025 .0086
0130	 .0083 .0045 .0632 .0546 .0730 .0450 .0645 -.0121 .1013 .0642
0160	 -.0081 -.0494 -.0632 .0625 -.0104 .1774** .0727 .0321 .0197 .0124
0170	 .1385** .0683 .0887 .1030* .0429 -.0035 .0458 .0126 -.0078 .0255
0180	 .0388 .0045 -.0019 -.0600 -.0103 .0072 .0298 -.0004 -.0594 .0112
0200	 .1010 .1150* .0458 .0355 -.0222 -.0172 -.0158 -.0233 .0083 .0620
0220	 .0961 -.0250 -.0618 -.0982 -.0034 -.0140 -.0259 .0023 -.0054 .0604
0230	 -.0396 -.0613 .0009 -.0709 -.0078 .0183 .0200 -.0237 -.0032 .0031
0240	 -.0520 -.0135 .0062 -.0022 -.0208 .0475 .0319 .0268 .0604 .0298
0250	 .0559 .0445 -.0348 -.0493 -.0723 .0469 .0163 -.0036 .0432 .0086
0270	 .1015 .1104 .0172 .0492 .0195 .0806 .0569 .0914 .0640 .0836
0290	 -.0554 -.0182 -.0383 -.0460 .0340 .0107 -.0101 .0031 -.0346 -.0915
0310	 .0379 .0003 .0216 -.0021 .0094 .0691 .0047 .0134 .1035* .0272
0320	 -.0379 -.0583 -.0182 -.0453 -.0426 -.0600 -.0292 -.0372 -.0832 -.0748
0340	 .0156 .0480 .1242* -.0499 .0104 .0272 .0244 .1139 .0475 .0536
0370	 -.0102 -.0217 .0745 .0420 .0676 .0367 -.0315 .0729 .1363* .1221*
0380	 .0530 -.0032 -.0381 .0543 .0589 .0384 .0585 .0411 .0035 .0444
0390	 .0946 -.0765 -.0338 .0543 .0024 .0203 -.0187 .0067 .0013 .0064
0410	 .0134 .0436 .0552 .0268 .0740 .0418 .0496 .0538 .0500 .0569
0420	 .1068 .0528 .1143 .0522 .0508 -.0433 .0248 .0193 .0439 .1299*
0440	 .0458 .0429 -.0025 -.0013 -.0089 -.0101 .0319 .0127 -.0059 -.0031
0490	 -.0015 -.0198 -.0506 .0042 -.0255 .0030 .0681 .0234 .0730 .0835
AVSCC	 .0247 .0103 .0037 .0022 .0114 .0241 .0288 .0229 .0193 .0268
INDEX	 .0360 -.0063 .0298 .0474 .0897* .0570 .0417 .0435 .0529 .0778
+5CC	 20 16 17 16 15 20 21 21 17 22
-5CC	 10 14 13 14 15 10 9 9 13 8
N01%	 1 - - 1 - - . .
N05%	 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
= 	.	
350APPENDIX 7:	 SERIAL	 CORRELATION	 COEFFICIENTS	 FOR MONTHLY TRANSACTION RETURNS OF THE NAIROBI STOCK
EXCHANGE (1979-1988) LAGS1 to30 DIFFERENCINGINTERVAL1
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
020	 .0270	 -.0114	 .0152	 -.0160	 -.1217	 -.1702	 .1212	 -.1394	 .0196	 -.0266
030	 -.0556	 .0600	 .2200*	 .0275	 .0164	 .0699	 .0437	 .0802	 -.0308	 -.0292
040	 -.2128*	 -.0275	 -.0138	 .0954	 -.0656	 .0223	 .0433	 .0184	 -.1749	 .0467
060	 -.0339	 .0257	 -.0215	 -.1331	 .0292	 .0988	 .1812	 -.0004	 -.1280	 .0512
070	 .0016	 -.0078	 -.0002	 .0641	 .0316	 .0140	 .0626	 .0313	 .0902	 .0220
090	 -.0086	 .0629	 -.1029	 .2053	 -.2387*	 .0527	 -.1574	 .1775	 .0010	 -.0170
100	 -.0768	 .0400	 .0426	 .1370	 -.0047	 -.0958	 .1291	 -.1571	 .0749	 .0566
110	 .1012	 .0194	 .0057	 .0302	 .0218	 -.0535	 .0510	 .0211	 .0270	 .03
120	 .1911	 -.0235	 -.0169	 .0515	 -.0724	 .0259	 -.1639	 .0738	 .0431	 -.0027
130	 -.0775	 -.0090	 .0432	 -.0261	 -.0567	 .0638	 -.0984	 -.0399	 -.0442	 .0439
160	 -.1442	 -.0199	 -.0558	 .0214	 .0158	 .0586	 .0263	 .2 3	 -.1887	 .1696
170	 -.1612	 -.0787	 .0210	 -.1480	 -.0478	 .1058	 .0753	 - .0744	 -.0065	 -.1
180	 -.1342	 .0482	 .0034	 .1409	 -.0898	 -.0628	 .0390	 .1517
	 -.0769
200	 .0061	 -.0247	 -.0733	 -.0148	 .0376	 -.0508	 -.0921	 .0220	 .2376*	 -.05
220	 -.0418	 .0448	 -.0158	 -.0134	 .0688	 .0554	 -.2131	 .1044	 .1167	 - .2447*
230	 - .2375*	 .0918	 - .0681	 .0927	 - .0364	 - .0491	 - .1103	 .1451	 .0749	 - .0104
240	 -.0545	 -.0487	 .0066	 -.0252	 -.1003	 -.0464	 .1165	 -.1587	 .0056	 -.1176
250	 -.0608	 .1598	 .0613	 -.0664	 .1132	 .1145	 .0586	 -.0147	 - .0648	 .0713
270	 -.0460	 -.0098	 -.0094	 .0108	 .0148	 .0338	 .0726	 -.0038	 -.1073	 .0065
290	 -.0398	 -.0803	 .0691	 -.0380	 .0958	 .0202	 .0694	 .0099	 -.2058*	 .0343
310	 -.1273	 -.2042*	 .1632	 .0432	 -.0049	 -.0760	 .0683	 -.0109	 -.0095	 .0355
320	 .2127*	 -.0374	 .0310	 -.2595*	 -.1150	 .0613	 -.1592	 -.0584	 .0689	 -.0266
340	 .1857*	 .1134	 -.0963	 .0583	 .0209	 .1029	 -.0633	 .1868	 -.0628	 .2961**
370	 .1832	 .1119	 -.2095	 -.0636	 .1609	 -.1737	 .0829	 -.0219	 .1764	 -.0441
380	 -.0961	 -.0613	 -.1079	 -.0356	 .1505	 -.0747	 .0392	 .0417	 .1803	 .0082
390	 -.0832	 .0315	 .2136*	 .0924	 .0950	 .0646	 -.1564	 -.0379	 .0446	 -.0962
410	 -.0508	 -.0987	 .0545	 -.1104	 .0708	 .0213	 -.1713	 .1154	 -.0414	 .1171
420	 .1042	 .0019	 -.1451	 .0185	 .2900*	 .0244	 -.1725	 .0153	 .1691	 .0446
440	 .1375	 -.0475	 .0273	 -.0055	 .0661	 .0269	 -.1843	 .0392	 -.0405	 .1607
490	 .0236	 .1054	 -.1206	 -.0118	 -.0483	 -.0610	 .0577	 -.0220	 -.0133	 .1636
AVSCC -0.0190	 0.0042	 -0.0026	 0.0041	 0.0036	 0.0041	 -0.0135	 0.0233	 0.0092	 0.0180
INDEX	 .2515**	 -.0077	 .1419	 .0885	 .0456	 -.1639	 .0675	 .2480**	 -.0236	 .2668**
+SCC	 11	 14	 15	 15	 16	 19	 18	 17	 16	 17
-SCC	 19	 16	 15	 15	 14	 11	 12	 13	 14	 13
N01%	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1
N05%	 4	 1	 2	 1	 2	 1	 2	 2
351APPENDIX 7: TRANSACTION	 RETURNS MONTHLY
LAG	 11	 12	 13	 14	 15	 16	 17	 18	 19	 20
020	 -.0929	 .3300**	 .0291	 .1797	 -.0129	 .1811	 -.2334	 .2421*	 -.2448*	 -.0375
030	 .1057	 -.0611	 .0308	 -.1000	 -.0199	 -.0419	 -.0163	 -.0611	 .0250	 -.0066
040	 .0377	 .0236	 .0960	 .0702	 .0239	 -.1314	 -.0929	 .0390	 .0225	 .0147
060	 .1350	 .2054*	 .1487	 -.0286	 -.0955	 -.2486*	 -.0116	 .0975	 .0783	 .0160
070	 -.1267	 .0357	 .1948	 -.0571	 .0024	 -.0230	 -.0208	 .0169	 -.0438	 -.0159
090	 -.0515	 .0499	 .0007	 -.0491	 .0587	 .1008	 -.0974	 -.1845	 .0736	 .1567
100	 .0295	 -.1267	 -.0325	 -.0402	 .1035	 -.0661	 -.0788	 -.0434	 .0924	 .0427
110	 -.0324	 .0402	 -.0203	 .0346	 -.0157	 .1727	 -.0173	 -.0543	 .0095	 .0121
120	 -.0326	 -.1314	 .2424*	 -.1861	 -.0013	 .0431	 .1554	 -.1390	 -.0575	 .2821*
130	 .0112	 .0814	 -.0971	 .0002	 .0319	 -.0442	 .0116	 .0099	 -.0479	 .0134
160	 .0048	 .0805	 -.0804	 -.0852	 .0859	 -.0027	 -.0694	 .0742	 .0046	 -.0130
170	 .1109	 .1896*	 -.0344	 -.0636	 -.1233	 -.0884	 .1196	 .0048	 .0532	 -.0931
180	 -.0583	 .0240	 -.1454	 -.0879	 -.1619	 .0890	 .0266	 .1667	 -.1078	 -.0545
200	 .0778	 -.0647	 -.0890	 .0036	 -.0212	 .0801	 -.0140	 -.0233	 .0809	 .1069
220	 .1996	 -.0366	 .0749	 -.0605	 -.0805	 -.0413	 .1274	 -.0735	 .0134	 .1960
230	 .0640	 -.1428	 .0652	 .0184	 -.0199	 .0538	 .0639	 -.1553	 .0262	 -.0352
240	 .1601	 -.0704	 -.0831	 -.0611	 .0076	 -.0050	 -.0388	 .0497	 -.0373	 .1171
250	 .0492	 .1093	 .0951	 -.1144	 .0171	 .1098	 .1092	 -.1688	 .0871	 .0708
270	 .0398	 .0517	 -.0099	 .0055	 -.0059	 -.0095	 .0479	 .0505	 .0184	 -.0138
290	 -.0444	 .0674	 -.0760	 .0326	 -.0521	 .0469	 .0470	 .0649	 .0845	 -.0683
310	 .0706	 .0245	 .0603	 .0274	 -.0366	 -.0641	 .0643	 -.0135	 -.1302	 .0981
320	 -.0357	 -.0675	 -.0880	 -.1677	 -.0362	 .1139	 -.0288	 -.1516	 .0508	 .1717
340	 .0562	 .0180	 .0685	 .0274	 .1244	 -.0920	 .0831	 .0911	 -.0053	 -.0962
370	 -.2523*	 .1069	 .1122	 .0049	 -.1248	 .0028	 .0111	 -.0656	 .1358	 .0218
380	 -.1613	 .2469*	 -.1415	 .1205	 .0796	 -.1663	 .0238	 -.0617	 -.0995	 -.0024
390	 .0059	 -.1024	 .2243*	 .0224	 -.0470	 -.1862	 .1386	 -.1518	 -.0097	 .0090
410	 -.0547	 -.1547	 .0983	 -.1397	 -.0370	 .1137	 .0429	 -.0451	 .0359	 -.0032
420	 -.1901	 .0147	 .0627	 -.1160	 .1552	 -.2936*	 .2157	 -.0487	 -.0292	 .1127
440	 -.0044	 -.1294	 .0270	 .2116	 -.0690	 -.0733	 .1540	 .0781	 -.0264	 .0250
490	 -.1401	 .0768	 .0658	 -.0081	 -.0576	 .0487	 -.0195	 -.0629	 -.1615	 .2771**
AVSCC -0.0040	 0.0230	 0.0266	 -0.0202	 -0.0109	 -0.0140	 0.0234	 -0.0173	 -0.0036	 0.0435
INDEX	 .2134*	 .2255*	 .1239	 .0591	 .2233*	 .0644	 -.1822	 -.0557	 .1430	 .1049
+SCC	 16	 19	 18	 14	 11	 13	 17	 13	 17	 18
-SCC	 14	 11	 12	 16	 19	 17	 13	 17	 13	 12
N01%	 -	 1	 -	 -	 -	 1
N05%	 1	 4	 2	 2	 1	 1	 2
352APPENDIX 7: TRANSACTION	 RETURNS MONTHLY
LAG	 21	 22	 23	 24	 25	 26	 27	 28	 29	 30
020	 -.0242	 -.0491	 .0214	 -.0656	 .1048	 -.2191	 .2188	 -.1965	 .2275	 -.0271
030	 -.0002	 -.0515	 -.0638	 -.0425	 .0297	 -.1065	 -.0589	 -.1492	 .0062	 -.0169
040	 .0098	 .1843	 -.0266	 -.0104	 -.0633	 -.0159	 .0358	 .1098	 -.0398	 .0393
060	 -.0486	 -.0480	 .0999	 -.1137	 .1772	 -.1892	 -.0743	 -.0638	 -.1327	 .1451
070	 -.0750	 .0754	 -.0243	 .0798	 -.0409	 -.0036	 .0980	 .0506	 .0064	 .1023
090	 -.0176	 -.1969	 .0133	 -.0183	 .0756	 -.0912	 -.0210	 .1184	 .0110	 -.0806
100	 -.0794	 .0469	 -.0629	 .2150*	 -.2415*	 .1028	 -.1917	 .2086	 -.0414	 -.0570
110	 .0729	 -.0212	 .0081	 .0388	 -.0128	 .0270	 .0611	 .0145	 .0073	 -.1004
120	 -.2237*	 -.0932	 -.1398	 .0590	 .0043	 -.0625	 .1760	 -.0205	 -.0423	 .1850
130	 .0375	 -.0592	 .0020	 -.0266	 .0159	 .0240	 -.0159	 .0014	 -.0167	 -.0249
160	 -.1674	 .0293	 .2086*	 -.1163	 -.1356	 .1269	 -.0860	 .0267	 .0324	 -.0400
170	 -.0812	 -.0681	 .0632	 .2389*	 .0738	 -.1387	 -.0233	 -.1577	 -.0063	 .0355
180	 -.0770	 .1031	 .0504	 .1436	 .1715	 -.1896	 -.2117	 .0170	 .0640	 -.2169
200	 -.0494	 .2173*	 -.0006	 -.0228	 .0396	 .0320	 -.0284	 -.1285	 -.2445*	 .0120
	
220	 -.0494	 .1283	 -.1564	 -.0835	 .1649	 .0893	 -.1121	 -.0028	 .0955	 -.2252
	
230	 -.0714	 .0629	 -.1131	 .0382	 .1165	 .0194	 -.0703	 -.0733	 -.0791	 -.0165
	
240	 -.0887	 .1814	 -.0667	 -.0007	 -.1221	 .0979	 .1003	 .0660	 .0521	 -.0338
	
250	 .0581	 -.1131	 -.0112	 -.0748	 -.1164	 .0963	 .1072	 -.0602	 .1002	 -.1607
	
270	 -.0494	 .0287	 .0209	 .0178	 -.0024	 -.0122	 .0155	 -.0127	 .0707	 .0213
	
290	 .0215	 .1334	 .0705	 .0569	 .0917	 .0100	 -.0240	 .0653	 .0625	 .0039
	
310	 .0469	 -.0701	 .0722	 .1284	 -.0710	 .0555	 .1211	 .0711	 -.1324	 .1160
	
320	 -.1756	 -.0614	 -.0626	 -.1080	 .0607	 -.2009	 .1346	 .0522	 .0390	 .1344
	
340	 .1259	 -.1128	 .1341	 .0183	 -.0066	 .0656	 .0913	 .0042	 .1121	 .0370
	
370	 .0712	 -.1949	 .0092	 .2601*	 -.0549	 -.0849	 .0057	 -.0363	 -.2662*	 .0966
	
380	 -.0198	 .1264	 -.0660	 .0317	 .1206	 -.1275	 -.2340*	 .0753	 .0117	 -.0713
	
390	 .1745	 .1259	 -.2223*	 .1033	 -.0535	 .2076	 .0521	 .1249	 -.0395	 -.1526
	
410	 .1238	 -.2825*	 .0908	 -.1349	 .1410	 .0010	 .0415	 .0611	 .0667	 .0046
	
420	 -.0442	 .0510	 .0618	 -.0511	 .0059	 -.1324	 .0282	 -.1568	 .0167	 .2187
440	 -.0219	 -.0575	 .1947	 -.1445	 -.1126	 .1251	 .0914	 -.0236	 -.2109	 .1309
490	 -.0872	 .1263	 -.2426*	 .0108	 .1733	 -.0304	 .0171	 -.0376	 -.0006	 -.1617
AVSCC -0.0236	 0.0047	 -0.0046	 0.0142	 0.0178	 -0.0212	 0.0016	 -0.0017	 -0.0090	 -0.0037
INDEX -.1917	 -.0148	 .2677**	 .2684**	 .0113	 .2807**	 .2341	 .0135	 .0260	 .0551
+SCC	 10	 15	 16	 15	 17	 14	 17	 16	 17	 14
-SCC	 20	 15	 14	 15	 13	 16	 13	 14	 13	 16
N01%	 -	 -	 -	 -
N05%	 1	 2	 3	 2	 1	 1	 2
353APPENDIX 8: SERIAL	 CORRELATION	 COEFFICIENTS	 FOR MONTHLY BID RETURNS OF THE NAIROBI STOCK
EXCHANGE (1979-1988)LAGS1 to30 DIFFERENCINGINTERVAL1
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
020	 -.1684	 -.1247	 -.1016	 .1348	 .1109	 -.0890	 .0284	 -.1229	 .0377	 -.0134
030	 -.0041	 -.1384	 -.1034	 -.0240	 .0022	 .1763	 .0796	 .0021	 .0387	 -.0908
040	 -.1623	 -.0117	 -.1466	 -.0328	 -.0573	 -.0249	 .0470	 -.0598	 .0583	 .0363
060	 -.2487**	 .1273	 -.0038	 .0593	 -.0408	 -.0953	 .1003	 .0208	 .0085	 .0372
070	 -.1410	 .1077	 .1185	 .0149	 .1565	 -.2013*	 .1774	 -.0068	 -.0154	 -.1096
090	 -.1645	 -.0037	 .0279	 .0586	 -.0881	 -.0228	 -.0950	 .0561	 -.0597	 .0507
100	 -.1699	 .0525	 -.0895	 .1140	 -.0215	 .0604	 -.0916	 .0058	 .0036	 .0169
110	 .1034	 .0377	 .1320	 .0684	 .0711	 .0836	 .1166	 -.0540	 .0215	 .0203
120	 -.1652	 -.2029*	 .0639	 .0417	 -.0193	 -.0955	 -.0916	 .0928	 -.0534	 -.0029
130	 -.2212*	 .0671	 -.0456	 -.1309	 -.0235	 .0375	 -.0300	 -.0321	 -.0080	 -.0316
160	 -.1312	 -.1577	 -.0423	 -.0479	 .0760	 -.0842	 -.0353	 -.0178	 .0953	 .1370
170	 -.0035	 -.2101*	 .1585	 .0479	 -.0947	 .1297	 .0421	 -.0488	 -.1224	 -.1059
180	 -.0993	 -.0357	 -.0162	 -.0456	 .0309	 -.0709	 .0802	 .0522	 -.0437	 -.1143
	
200	 -.1139	 -.0121	 -.0478	 -.1283	 .0989	 -.0862	 .0484	 -.0036	 -.0068	 -.1423
	
220	 -.1580	 .0093	 -.0536	 .0612	 -.0269	 -.0382	 -.0648	 .0110	 .0849	 -.1664
	
230	 -.0555	 -.0075	 -.0076	 -.0229	 .1245	 .0225	 .0300	 -.1697	 -.0012	 .0970
	
240	 -.0276	 -.0299	 .0085	 -.2034*	 .0030	 .0972	 .0114	 -.0582	 -.0032	 .0078
	
250	 -.1226	 .0133	 -.0767	 -.1094	 .0008	 -.0039	 .0014	 -.0111	 -.0143	 .0186
	
270	 -.0454	 .0299	 -.0156	 -.0523	 -.1450	 .1632	 .0122	 -.0237	 -.0072	 .0261
	
290	 -.1122	 .0014	 -.1677	 .0210	 .0168	 -.0281	 -.0243	 -.0045	 -.0140	 .0461
	
310	 -.0604	 -.0211	 .0026	 .2286*	 -.1488	 -.1031	 -.0511	 .0673	 .0073	 -.0466
	
320	 -.0347	 -.0189	 .0169	 -.0374	 -.0260	 -.0060	 .0467	 .0381	 -.1171	 .0422
	
340	 -.1490	 -.0777	 .0868	 .0599	 .0242	 .0278	 .0938	 .0853	 -.0029	 .0674
	
370	 -.1336	 .1383	 -.1923*	 .0161	 .0785	 -.0050	 -.1774	 -.0377	 -.0854	 -.0900
	
380	 -.1149	 -.0351	 -.0708	 -.0606	 .0541	 -.0910	 .1113	 .1360	 -.0138	 -.0482
	
390	 -.1129	 -.1029	 -.1054	 -.1120	 .0810	 .0646	 -.0872	 -.0915	 -.0321	 .0817
	
410	 -.0544	 -.0578	 -.0403	 -.0718	 -.1288	 -.0949	 -.1159	 -.0949	 -.0728	 -.0310
	
420	 -.1015	 -.1267	 -.0547	 -.0379	 .0533	 -.0232	 -.0767	 -.0675	 .0945	 -.0102
	
440	 -.1038	 .1047	 -.0929	 .1015	 .0256	 .0370	 .0354	 .0312	 -.0086	 -.0163
	
490	 -.2794**	 .1751	 -.1615	 -.0569	 .0005	 -.1732	 .1399	 -.2120*	 .2013*	 .0448
	
AVSCC -0.1119	 -0.0170	 -0.0340	 -0.0049	 0.0063	 -0.0146	 0.0087	 -0.0173	 -0.0010	 -0.0096
INDEX	 .2515**	 -.0077	 .1419	 .0885	 .0456	 -.1639	 .0675	 .2480**	 -.0236	 .2668**
+SCC	 1	 12	 9	 14	 18	 11	 16	 15	 17	 14
-SCC	 29	 18	 21	 16	 12	 19	 14	 15	 13	 16
N01%	 2	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
N05%	 3	 2	 1	 2	 1	 1	 1
354APPENDIX 8: BID RETURNS MONTHLY
LAG 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
020 -.0235 -.0727 .1105 -.2240* .0945 .0138 -.0860 -.0068 .0219 .1483
030 -.0372 .1970* -.0396 -.1906 .0808 .0688 -.0978 -.0688 .0335 -.1793
040 .0095 -.0504 -.0037 -.0389 -.0811 -.0067 -.0058 -.0181 -.0063 .1276
060 .0503 .1686 -.0785 .0943 .0147 -.0468 -.0341 -.0534 .0543 .0102
070 -.0473 .1276 -.1881 .0600 -.1274 -.0937 .1260 -.1849 .0884 -.0358
090 -.0983 .1309 -.1069 .0387 -.0278 .0741 -.1539 .0670 .1081 -.0900
100 .0298 .1241 -.1119 .0059 .0008 .0146 .0485 -.0638 -.1271 .1056
110 .0033 .1356 -.0721 -.0336 -.2141* -.0515 .0965 .0407 .1905 -.0860
120 .0559 .0335 .1503 .0558 -.0198 -.0734 -.0547 -.0605 .0755 -.0512
130 .0055 .1663 -.0655 -.0342 .0794 -.1195 .0341 -.0486 -.0347 -.0546
160 .0524 -.2180* .0290 -.0991 -.0156 -.0813 -.0158 .1894 .0667 .0072
170 .0621 .2978** -.0336 -.0637 .0978 -.1400 .1012 .1888 -.0780 -.1191
180 .1202 .0470 -.1112 .0879 .0675 -.0540 .0366 .0040 .1276 .0055
200 .1854 .1737 -.0827 -.0509 -.0278 .0627 .2198 .1150 -.1540 -.0397
220 .1164 -.0369 -.0269 -.0231 .1501 -.0137 .0664 -.1412 .0259 -.0939
230 -.0390 .0219 .0793 -.0426 -.0253 -.0084 .0063 -.0088 -.0066 .1465
240 -.1214 .1353 .3126** -.3543** -.0446 .0094 .0081 .0669 .0556 -.0132
250 .0294 -.0023 .0195 .0238 .1041 -.0080 -.0997 -.0827 -.0141 .0324
270 .0038 .0524 .0723 -.0476 -.0022 .1191 -.1743 .1071 .0079 .0103
290 -.0995 .0384 -.0173 -.0343 -.2080* .0525 .0798 .0554 .0370 .0944
310 .0840 .2268* .0649 .0398 .0369 -.0056 -.0855 -.0533 .0067 .0014
320 -.0028 -.3118** -.1592 -.1813 -.1820 -.0305 -.1544 -.3043** -.1083 -.1022
340 -.0295 .2631** -.0674 -.0140 -.0314 .0634 .1168 -.0266 .0082 .0995
370 .0263 .0652 -.0578 -.1161 -.1189 -.1872 -.0852 -.0363 -.0482 -.0374
380 -.0537 .0291 .0419 .1217 .0051 -.0933 .0791 .0751 .0434 -.0161
390 -.0434 .0091 -.1098 -.1031 -.0438 -.0325 .1812 -.0772 .2086* -.0318
410 -.0316 -.0647 -.0565 -.0495 -.0467 -.0598 -.0361 -.0429 -.0762 -.1056
420 -.0293 .1547 -.0350 .0780 -.0221 .0304 -.0729 -.0755 -.0469 .0024
440 -.0589 -.0321 .0463 .0482 .0078 .0040 -.0171 .0026 -.0213 -.1119
490 .0771 .1358 -.1181 .0387 -.0731 -.0304 .0062 .1332 -.0636 -.0688
AVSCC 0.0065 0.0648 -0.0205 -0.0343 -0.0191 -0.0208 0.0011 -0.0091 0.0125 -0.0148
INDEX .2134* .2255* .1239 .0591 .2233* .0644 -.1822 -.0557 .1430 .1049
+sCC 16 22 10 12 12 11 15 13 17 13
-SCC 14 8 20 18 18 19 15 18 13 17
N01% 1 3 1 1 1 - .
N05% 6 1 2 2 1 1
355APPENDIX 8: BID	 RETURNS MONTHLY
LAG	 21	 22	 23	 24	 25	 26	 27	 28	 29	 30
020	 -.2223*	 -.0185	 .1206	 .1454	 -.1081	 -.0327	 -.0711	 .1723	 .0604	 -.0732
030	 -.0134	 -.0923	 -.0009	 .1967	 -.1636	 -.1458	 -.0606	 -.1405	 .0309	 .1350
040	 -.1122	 .3049**	 -.2520*	 .1489	 .0650	 -.0028	 -.0141	 -.1605	 -.0742	 .1085
060	 -.0582	 .0785	 -.0325	 .0250	 -.1090	 .0367	 -.0105	 -.0556	 .0436	 -.0757
070	 -.1026	 .0724	 -.0988	 .1235	 -.0196	 .0071	 -.1537	 -.1249	 .0794	 -.2075
090	 -.1411	 .1523	 -.0717	 -.1039	 .0340	 .0342	 -.0299	 -.0164	 -.1578	 .0088
100	 .0214	 -.0180	 -.0108	 -.1778	 .0615	 -.0874	 .0446	 .0298	 .1012	 -.0876
110	 .0353	 -.0752	 -.0581	 .1838	 -.0015	 -.0769	 .0109	 -.1089	 .0904	 .0913
120	 -.0708	 .1515	 -.0091	 .0266	 .1578	 .0391	 -.1364	 .0501	 -.1442	 -.0045
130	 .0182	 -.1805	 .1632	 -.0843	 .1345	 -.0657	 .0256	 -.0019	 -.0647	 -.0215
160	 -.1518	 -.0390	 .0259	 -.0399	 -.0609	 -.0368	 .1228	 .0099	 .1601	 -.1302
170	 -.1983*	 -.1388	 .0435	 .0909	 .0108	 -.0529	 -.0560	 -.0772	 .0714	 -.0032
180	 -.0106	 -.0326	 -.1274	 -.1077	 -.0533	 .3270**	 -.1198	 .0868	 -.0923	 -.0472
200	 -.1371	 .0109	 .1814	 .0172	 .1122	 -.1149	 -.0067	 -.0688	 .1565	 .0131
220	 -.0553	 -.1156	 .0778	 .0133	 .1129	 -.0004	 .0054	 -.0314	 -.0948	 .0084
230	 -.2663**	 .3182**	 -.0209	 .0892	 .0129	 -.0296	 .2122*	 -.0233	 -.0014	 .1838
240	 -.0102	 .0256	 -.0044	 -.0112	 .0339	 -.0017	 -.0412	 .0404	 -.0040	 -.0080
250	 -.0739	 -.0008	 .0271	 .0024	 .0102	 .0012	 .0160	 -.0289	 -.1223	 -.1378
270	 -.0080	 -.0033	 -.0540	 .1622	 .0323	 -.0098	 -.0472	 -.0126	 .0626	 .0149
290	 -.0224	 -.0531	 -.0694	 .0674	 .0605	 .0379	 -.0972	 .0217	 -.0438	 -.0362
310	 -.1308	 -.0757	 .1841	 -.0314	 -.0081	 -.0103	 .2630*	 -.1744	 .0430	 -.0095
320	 -.0591	 -.1283	 -.1183	 -.0068	 .0362	 -.0236	 -.1596	 -.1261	 .1334	 -.0358
340	 .0931	 -.0634	 .1396	 .2090*	 -.0943	 -.0637	 -.0547	 .1316	 .1171	 -.0205
370	 .0148	 .0032	 .0067	 .0040	 -.0558	 -.0317	 -.1057	 -.1095	 -.0015	 -.0628
380	 -.0414	 -.0343	 .1559	 -.1351	 .1317	 .0197	 .1046	 .0496	 -.0901	 -.0377
390	 -.1457	 .0105	 .0720	 -.0686	 .0764	 -.0227	 -.0727	 -.0117	 -.0126	 -.0345
410	 -.0584	 -.1097	 -.1043	 -.0714	 -.1079	 -.1007	 -.0617	 -.0720	 -.0312	 -.0577
420	 -.0375	 .0338	 .0899	 .0053	 .0383	 -.1335	 -.0385	 -.0686	 -.0798	 -.0467
440	 .1299	 -.0490	 .0316	 .0453	 -.0313	 -.1762	 .0586	 .0155	 -.0246	 -.0130
490	 .1584	 -.0351	 -.0420	 .0794	 -.1705	 .0283	 -.0519	 .0841	 -.0496	 .0326
	
AVSCC -0.0552	 0.0017	 0.0082	 0.0266	 0.0046	 -0.0230	 -0.0175	 -0.0240	 0.0020	 -0.0185
	
INDEX -.1917	 -.0148	 .2677**	 .2684**	 .0113	 .2807**	 .2341	 .0135	 .0260	 .0551
+5CC	 7	 11	 14	 19	 17	 9	 10	 11	 13	 9
-SCC	 23	 19	 16	 11	 13	 21	 20	 19	 17	 21
N01%	 1	 2	 -	 -	 -	 1	 -	 -	 -
N05%	 3	 2	 1	 1	 1	 2
356APPENDIX 9:	 SERIAL	 CORRELATION	 COEFFICIENTS	 FOR MONTHLY ASK RETURNS OF THE NAIROBI STOCK
EXCHANGE (1979-1988) LAGS 1 to30 DIFFERENCINGINTERVAL1
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10
020	 .1407	 .0137	 .0096	 -.0890	 -.0066	 -.1240	 -.0782	 .0842	 .1567	 .1674
030	 .2267	 .1525	 .2174	 .0997	 .1750	 -.0640	 -.1550	 .0791	 -.0885	 .0998
040	 .0276	 -.0413	 .0282	 -.0264	 -.0513	 .0408	 -.0139	 .0169	 -.0380	 .0748
060	 .0609	 -.0134	 .1031	 .1828	 .1574	 -.0876	 -.1080	 -.0161	 .1927	 .2537*
070	 -.0085	 .0729	 -.0984	 .0903	 .0500	 -.0229	 .1521	 -.0243	 .0504	 -.0293
090	 .1563	 -.2656	 .2604	 -.1165	 .0581	 .0060	 .1987	 .0222	 -.0473	 .0173
100	 .1715	 -.0153	 .0628	 -.0043	 -.0064	 -.2232*	 .1075	 .1248	 .0072	 -.0110
110	 .0848	 .0844	 -.0612	 -.0085	 -.0153	 -.0886	 .1041	 .0721	 -.0244	 .0479
120	 .2753*	 -.0573	 .2080	 .0046	 .0278	 .0784	 -.0219	 .2456*	 .2612*	 .1527
130	 .0632	 .1978	 .1842	 .0283	 -.1597	 -.0861	 .0612	 .0894	 -.0450	 -.0301
160	 .0151	 -.0989	 .0987	 .0417	 -.0809	 .0849	 .0075	 -.0132	 .0305	 .1243
170	 .0123	 -.0304	 -.0124	 .2229*	 .0649	 .1511	 -.0599	 .0559	 .1457	 .1385
180	 -.0465	 -.1202	 .0057	 .2421	 -.1125	 .0595	 .0581	 -.0001	 .1299	 -.0541
200	 -.0278	 -.0362	 -.0457	 -.0369	 .2175*	 -.1509	 .0406	 -.0669	 .0224	 .0570
220	 .0303	 -.0848	 .0175	 -.1241	 .0055	 -.1313	 .0352	 .1295	 .0416	 -.0383
230	 .0458	 .1147	 .2133	 .0445	 -.1057	 -.1497	 .1337	 .0936	 -.0018	 -.0288
240	 -.0276	 -.0181	 -.0242	 -.0263	 -.1605	 -.0057	 .0568	 .0505	 -.0560	 -.0631
250	 .0398	 .1215	 .0262	 -.0267	 -.1062	 .1549	 -.1644	 .0601	 -.0672	 .0516
270	 .1615	 .0017	 .0760	 .1417	 -.0267	 .0537	 .3215**	 -.0879	 .1479	 .0498
290	 .0123	 .1219	 .0380	 -.1622	 -.0059	 -.1020	 .0443	 .1279	 .0430	 .0546
310	 .0710	 -.1096	 .0404	 -.0062	 .0015	 .1604	 .2753**	 .0353	 .0035	 -.1474
320	 -.0300	 .0207	 -.0851	 -.0848	 -.1156	 -.1520	 -.1356	 .0028	 -.2753**	 -.0211
340	 -.0051	 .1829	 .0995	 .0132	 .0623	 .0932	 .2666*	 .0474	 .1258	 .1442
370	 -.0180	 .0401	 -.1716	 -.0154	 .0017	 .1410	 .2683*	 .0096	 -.0432	 .1197
380	 .0080	 .0206	 .0220	 -.0270	 .0738	 .1060	 .1812	 .1243	 -.0405	 .0712
390	 -.0235	 .0349	 -.0164	 -.0283	 .0488	 .2000	 .0102	 -.1233	 .0676	 .0071
410	 -.1567	 .1169	 .1115	 .1087	 .0442	 .0206	 .1628	 .3118*	 -.0271	 .0894
420	 -.1003	 .0117	 .0565	 .0338	 .1448	 .0545	 .1411	 .1307	 .0070	 -.0548
440	 -.1017	 .1337	 .1786	 -.0055	 .0947	 .0447	 -.0516	 .0529	 -.0148	 .0514
490	 -.0951	 .2599**	 .0601	 .0856	 -.0976	 .0406	 .0375	 .0815	 .1553	 .0055
AVSCC 0.0321	 0.0270	 0.0534	 0.0165	 0.0059	 0.0034	 0.0625	 0.0572	 0.0273	 0.0433
INDEX	 .2515**	 -.0077	 .1419	 .0885	 .0456	 -.1639	 .0675	 .2480**	 -.0236	 .2668**
+sCC	 18	 18	 22	 13	 16	 17	 21	 23	 17	 20
-SCC	 12	 12	 8	 17	 14	 13	 9	 7	 13	 10
N01%	 -	 1	 -	 2	 -	 1	 -
N05%	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 4	 2	 2	 4
357APPENDIX 9: ASK RETURNS	 MONTHLY
LAG 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
020 .0477 .0241 .0283 -.1010 .1751 .0430 .2252* .0200 -.0011 -.1656
030 .1712 .1180 .1770 -.1143 -.0985 -.2430 -.2707* .0401 .0836 .0787
040 .1206 .0875 .0119 -.0011 .0337 -.0039 -.0869 .1788 .0056 .1168
060 .2123 .0391 -.1197 -.0784 .0968 .2375* .1558 .2153 -.0123 -.0534
070 .1246 -.0708 -.0176 .1829 .0411 -.0628 -.0705 -.1092 .1400 .1318
090 -.1256 -.1096 .0868 -.2086 -.1364 -.0186 -.1504 .0255 .0950 .1624
100 -.1319 -.0916 .2473* -.0072 -.0111 -.1208 -.0568 -.0553 -.1891 .0185
110 -.0723 .0944 .0998 -.0133 -.0262 -.0011 .0296 .1422 .0984 -.0321
120 .0445 -.0034 .1832 -.0138 .0985 -.0766 .0165 .0230 .0168 .1041
130 -.0356 .0574 .0373 .2486 .1715 .0731 .0623 .0578 .0616 .0390
160 -.1518 .1909 .0059 .0573 -.0182 -.0823 -.0184 .0097 -.0355 -.0132
170 .1915 -.0988 .0039 .0663 .2173* .1350 -.0222 -.0088 -.0043 .0896
180 -.0679 -.0368 -.2339 .0775 -.2099 -.0497 .0250 -.1280 -.0281 -.0815
200 .0361 -.0536 .0473 -.0177 -.0012 .0376 .1585 .1354 -.0560 .0172
220 .1342 -.0072 .1060 -.1467 .0210 -.0974 -.0044 -.0635 -.0052 .0765
230 .1022 .0624 -.0558 -.0730 -.0646 .0018 -.1021 -.0454 -.0823 -.1185
240 .1576 .2175 .2157 .1568 .0226 .1608 .1295 .1503 .1517 .0903
250 .1097 .0022 -.0492 .0741 .1540 -.0755 -.0235 -.0309 .0293 -.0633
270 .1454 -.0547 -.0936 .2506* .1851 .0043 -.0986 .0600 .1162 .1152
290 -.0792 .1304 .0005 -.0241 -.0152 -.1039 .1325 .2228 .1093 .1236
310 -.0101 .0059 .1844 -.0089 .0814 -.0377 .0055 -.0644 .0158 -.0915
320 -.1887 -.0392 -.1103 -.1060 -.0211 -.0907 -.1655 -.1052 -.1081 -.0636
340 .1321 -.0166 .0986 .2486* .0869 .0598 .1296 .1689 .0779 .0142
370 .1403 .2101 .0052 .0848 .1252 .0176 -.0567 .0336 -.0233 .0902
380 .0558 -.1165 -.0419 -.0854 .1348 .1533 .1173 .0394 .0348 -.0108
390 -.0017 -.0081 .0279 -.0140 .0066 .0923 .0094 .1396 .0168 -.1824
410 .0206 .1763 -.1266 .1149 -.0146 .0301 .0604 .1817 -.0638 .0705
420 -.0070 .0824 -.0592 .2343* .0539 .0115 -.0175 -.0493 -.1094 .0751
440 .0043 .0085 .0181 .0100 .0556 .0014 .0938 -.0627 -.0141 -.1736
490 .0148 .0452 .1408 .0360 .0131 .0040 -.0482 -.0050 .0671 .0352
AVSCC 0.0365 0.0282 0.0273 0.0276 0.0386 0.0000 0.0053 0.0372 0.0129 0.0133
INDEX .2134* .2255* .1239 .0591 .2233* .0644 -.1822 -.0557 .1430 .1049
+SCC 19 17 20 14 19 16 15 18 16 18
-SCC 11 13 10 16 11 14 15 12 14 12
N01% - - - -
N05% 1 3 1 1 2
358APPENDIX 9: ASK RETURNS MONTHLY
LAG 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
020 -.2367* .0599 .0975 .0441 .0494 .0750 .1452 -.2030 -.0542 -.1629
030 .1039 -.0606 .0751 .0810 .1409 .0973 -.1173 .0647 .0161 .0983
040 .0296 .0546 -.0710 .0996 -.0019 -.0057 .0678 -.0061 .0046 .0474
060 .0062 .0430 .1921 .1392 -.1230 .0172 .0551 .2326 .2704* .1116
070 -.1073 .0169 -.0822 -.0158 -.0023 .0531 -.1854 -.0573 -.0498 -.0572
090 .2544 -.1412 .0073 -.0056 -.2576 -.1631 -.1064 -.2274 -.1478 -.0608
100 .1849 -.1712 -.1257 .0920 .0215 .0109 .0656 -.0729 .0163 -.0098
110 -.0621 -.0756 -.1735 .1184 .1141 .0508 .1261 -.2740* -.1849 .0253
120 .1132 .0446 -.0098 .0388 .0441 -.0528 -.0642 -.0214 -.0071 .0096
130 -.0464 .0097 -.0440 -.0339 -.2205 .0228 -.0471 -.2466 -.0667 -.1615
160 -.0197 -.0465 .0451 -.0772 .0847 -.0500 .0741 -.1121 .1463 -.0610
170 .1609 .0378 .0738 .0085 -.0316 -.0265 -.0185 .0492 -.0052 .0098
180 -.1020 .0629 .0220 .0484 -.0357 .0023 .0607 .1025 -.1875 .0108
200 .0024 .2905** .1741 .1141 -.0069 -.0248 -.0775 .0342 .1019 -.0541
220 -.0413 -.0173 .1337 -.0558 .0713 .0336 .0468 -.1733 -.0063 -.0221
230 .1914 -.0022 -.0582 -.0639 .0240 .0327 -.0333 -.1549 -.1704 .0883
240 .2357 .1900 .1626 -.0138 .0887 .2099 .0183 .0755 .0541 .1229
250 .1052 -.0671 .0079 .0465 .1521 .0944 -.0527 -.1175 -.0986 -.0407
270 -.0715 .1368 .0174 .0553 .0437 .2277 .1576 -.1808 -.0714 .2126
290 -.0692 .0553 .1610 -.0943 .1945 .1131 -.2728* .0894 .0369 .0685
310 .2199* .0607 .1350 -.0062 .0552 -.0158 .0186 -.0172 -.0077 -.0764
320 -.0464 -.1368 .0935 .0985 -.1108 -.0705 .0408 .0042 -.0373 -.0298
340 -.0728 .1577 .1381 -.0473 .1819 -.0590 .0552 -.1112 .1629 .0230
370 .1027 .1947 .1834 .1444 .1801 .1369 .0493 .1557 .1147 .2331
380 .0798 .2363* .0292 .1039 -.0219 -.0709 -.0875 .1143 .1702 .0013
390 .0224 -.0178 .0326 -.0051 -.0402 .0490 .0169 .0661 .0352 -.0066
410 .1077 -.0917 .0138 .1069 .0370 .0280 -.0128 .0175 -.0108 -.1332
420 .1823 .0684 -.0358 -.2876* -.2538* .0718 .1484 .1653 .0304 -.1471
440 -.1483 .1385 .2239 -.0376 .0043 .0585 -.0345 -.2149 .0253 .1808
490 .0572 .0042 .0387 -.0951 .0229 -.1739 .0264 .0234 -.0797 .1064
AVSCC 0.0379 0.0345 0.0486 0.0167 0.0087 0.0224 0.0021 -0.0332 0.0000 0.0109
INDEX -.1917 -.0148 .2677** .2684** .0113 .2807** .2341 .0135 .0260 .0551
+SCC 18 19 22 16 17 19 17 14 14 16
-SCC 12 11 8 14 13 11 13 16 16 14
N01% - 1 - - -
N05% 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
359KEY TO APPENDICIES 4 TO 9
** Significant at 1% level
Significant at 5% level
AVSCC	 = AVERAGE SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
INDEX	 = NSE INDEX SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
+SCC	 = NUMBER OF POSITIVE SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
-SCC	 = NUMBER OF NEGATIVE SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
N01%	 = NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
N05%	 = NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT SERIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
360